Atlas / MCP servers / renoelis / flow-codeblock-rust-mcp

flow-codeblock-rust-mcpCAUTION

mcp/renoelis/flow-codeblock-rust-mcp
Verdict
CAUTION
Grade
C
Trust score
79 /100
Exposed tools
13 9r · 4w · 0d
Transport
stdio
License
MIT
Stars
0
01

Overview

From the repository's own README, as read at the audited commit. Badges and raw HTML are left out.

Local stdio MCP server and Codex Skill for Flow Codeblock. The MCP server calls the Flow Codeblock Rust REST API; it never executes user JavaScript on the user's computer. User code runs in the server's pinned Bun Supervisor.

Installation

Requires Bun 1.4.2 or newer:

bunx --bun [email protected]

Required environment:

FLOW_CODEBLOCK_BASE_URL=https://qingcode.oalite.com
FLOW_CODEBLOCK_TOKEN=flow_xxx
# Optional default owner name for lock/unlock operations
FLOW_CODEBLOCK_OWNER_NAME=Default Owner

FLOW_CODEBLOCK_BASE_URL is the deployed Flow Codeblock Rust API base URL and the base for returned call URLs. Non-script tools return ${FLOW_CODEBLOCK_BASE_URL}/flow/codeblock as execution_url; script create, update, and execution tools return ${FLOW_CODEBLOCK_BASE_URL}/flow/codeblock/{script_id} as script_url. Other management tools do not return a call URL. Use https://qingcode.oalite.com for the public service, or the matching localhost URL for a local Rust deployment. Store the token in the client's environment or secret manager; never put it in prompts, tool arguments, or public files.

The deployed Bun Supervisor exposes only a frozen, read-only Bun facade configured by the administrator. High-risk Bun. APIs may be unavailable, and bun:* modules may be blocked independently; code must not assume either is present. Configuring bun disables the entire Bun facade and all bun:* modules. The package includes the default moduleblacklist.json, and `flowwrite_code` returns its complete parsed contents for each code-writing request.

When FLOW_CODEBLOCK_OWNER_NAME is configured, owner_name may be omitted from flow_lock_script and flow_unlock_script; explicit arguments win. Both tools call the Rust API directly with owner_name and lock_password. The current API has no ownership challenge, release, or transfer rou

Read from source at commit c3de3c3cd99aOBSERVED · 2026-10-11
02

Connect

Built from this server's own package name, version and transport as found in its source — not copied from anyone's documentation, so it cannot drift against a page we do not control. Replace the environment placeholders with a token scoped to the least it needs.

claude-code
claude mcp add flow-codeblock-rust-mcp --env FLOW_CODEBLOCK_TOKEN=${FLOW_CODEBLOCK_TOKEN} -- npx -y [email protected]
claude-desktop
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "flow-codeblock-rust-mcp": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "[email protected]"
      ],
      "env": {
        "FLOW_CODEBLOCK_TOKEN": "${FLOW_CODEBLOCK_TOKEN}"
      }
    }
  }
}
03

Exposed tools (13)

9 read · 4 write · 0 destructive.

ToolRiskDescription
flow_apply_script_changewrite
flow_execute_codewrite
flow_execute_scriptwrite
flow_get_scriptread
flow_get_script_documentationread
flow_get_script_documentation_versionread
flow_get_script_versionread
flow_list_scriptsread
flow_lock_scriptread
flow_preview_script_changeread
flow_script_statsread
flow_unlock_scriptread
flow_write_codewrite
04

Trust audit

CAUTIONgrade C · trust 79/100 Install with care. The audit found things worth knowing before you trust its output.

LayerWhat it checksResult
L0Provenance & inventoryPASS
L1Static analysis of the codeWARN
L2Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)FAIL
L3Class-specific surfacePASS
L4Behavioural (sandbox)SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem
declared (1 observation(s))
Network
declared (1 observation(s))
Shell
none-observed
Dependencies
pinned
Secrets in source
found

Findings (11)

HIGHPrompt injection · prompt.override · CWE-94, CWE-1427
skills/flow-codeblock/references/AGENT_PROMPT.md:80
- Do not use JavaScript Unicode escapes in identifiers or property names (for example, `requ\u0069re` or `constr\u0075ctor`); the runtime rejects escaped names and they cannot be used to bypass the sa
Why it matters. asks the agent to drop prior instructions or safety
Fix. remove the instruction
MEDIUMHard-coded secrets · secret.generic · CWE-798, CWE-321
mcp-server/src/script-read-tools.test.ts:26
nested: { token: "flow_token_secret_5678" },
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
mcp-server/src/code-writer.test.ts:4
const referencesDirectory = new URL("../../skills/flow-codeblock/references/", import.meta.url);
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
mcp-server/src/code-writer.ts:6
const referencesDirectory = new URL("../../skills/flow-codeblock/references/", import.meta.url);
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
mcp-server/src/tools-metadata.test.ts:285
const referencesDirectory = new URL("../../skills/flow-codeblock/references/", import.meta.url);
LOWNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
mcp-server/src/startup.test.ts:21
FLOW_CODEBLOCK_BASE_URL: "http://127.0.0.1:1",
LOWNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
mcp-server/src/tools-metadata.test.ts:28
FLOW_CODEBLOCK_BASE_URL: "http://127.0.0.1:1",
LOWNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
mcp-server/src/tools-metadata.test.ts:264
expect(nonScriptPayload.execution_url).toBe("http://127.0.0.1:1/flow/codeblock");
LOWPrompt injection · prompt.transfer_instruction · CWE-94, CWE-1427
skills/flow-codeblock/references/AGENT_PROMPT.md:30
The endpoint is `GET|POST /flow/codeblock/{scriptId}`. The server builds global `input` as an HTTP envelope with `query`, `header`, `body`, and `cookies`.
Why it matters. an instruction to move sensitive data to an outside destination
Fix. remove; a skill never needs the user's secrets off the machine
INFOPrompt injection · prompt.credential_read · CWE-94, CWE-1427
README.md:57
- Third-party API keys are business inputs supplied through the documented body, query, or business headers. User code must not read `process.env`; `FLOW_CODEBLOCK_TOKEN` is platform authentication on
Why it matters. asks the agent to read credentials
INFOPrompt injection · prompt.credential_read · CWE-94, CWE-1427
skills/flow-codeblock/references/AGENT_PROMPT.md:22
All user data comes from global `input`, never from environment variables, persistent globals, or other external state. In user code `process` is `undefined`; never read `process.env` or assume busine
Why it matters. asks the agent to read credentials

Gates applied: instruction_override, no_behavioural_pass.

Audited 2026-10-11 · audit v0.4.1 · source sha c3de3c3cd99afull audit observations/trust-audit/mcp-server/renoelis__flow-codeblock-rust-mcp.json · Report an issue / request a re-scan
05

Audit history

Every audit this server has had. A grade with a past is a grade somebody is still checking.

DateSourceVerdictGradeScoreChange
2026-10-11c3de3c3cd99aCAUTIONC79first audit
06

Questions

What tools does flow-codeblock-rust-mcp expose?

13 in total: 9 read-only, 4 that write, and 0 that can delete or overwrite. Every one is listed on this page with its risk.

Is flow-codeblock-rust-mcp safe to connect to an agent?

With care. The audit graded it C (79/100) and found 11 things worth knowing before you trust this server, listed below with the exact line each was found on.

What credentials does flow-codeblock-rust-mcp need?

It reads FLOW_CODEBLOCK_TOKEN from the environment. Give it a token scoped to the least it needs — an agent that can be talked into calling a tool can be talked into calling it with your credentials.

How does flow-codeblock-rust-mcp run?

It speaks stdio, so it runs as a local process your client starts. It is published on npm as flow-codeblock-rust-mcp at 2.0.8.

How current is this page?

The grade is for one exact copy of the source (c3de3c3cd99a), read on 2026-10-11. The repository is watched and re-audited when it changes.

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