FileScopeCAUTION
Analyzes your codebase identifying important files based on dependency relationships. Generates diagrams and importance scores per file, helping AI assistants understand the codebase. Automatically parses popular programming languages such as Python, C, C++, Rust, Zig, Lua.
Overview
From the repository's own README, as read at the audited commit. Badges and raw HTML are left out.
Your AI already knows how to code. Now it knows your codebase.
[](https://github.com/admica/FileScopeMCP/actions) [](https://nodejs.org/) [](LICENSE) [](https://archestra.ai/mcp-catalog/admica__filescopemcp)
FileScopeMCP watches your code, ranks every file by importance, maps all dependencies, and keeps AI-generated summaries fresh in the background. When your LLM asks "what does this file do?" — it gets a real answer without reading the source.
Works with Claude Code, Hermes Agent, Codex, OpenClaw, Cursor AI, or as a standalone daemon. Supports TypeScript, JavaScript, Python, C, C++, Rust, Go, Ruby, Lua, Zig, PHP, C#, and Java.
Key Features
Importance ranking — every file scored 0-10 based on how many things depend on it, what it exports, and where it lives. Your LLM sees the critical files first.
Dependency mapping — bidirectional import tracking across all supported languages. AST-level extraction (tree-sitter) for TS/JS, Python, C, C++, and Rust; regex-based for Go, Ruby, Lua, Zig, PHP, C#, and Java. Finds circular dependencies too.
Symbol intelligence — extracts functions, classes, interfaces, types, enums, consts, modules, and structs via tree-sitter for TypeScript, JavaScript, Python, Go, and Ruby. find_symbol resolves names to file + line range. find_callers and find_callees map the call graph for TS/JS so your AI can answer "who calls this function?" before refactoring.
Always fresh — file watcher + semantic change detection means metadata updates automatically. AST-level diffing for TS/JS, LLM-powered analysis for everything else. Only re-processes what actually changed
6aca16a842abOBSERVED · 2026-10-05Connect
Built from this server's own package name, version and transport as found in its source — not copied from anyone's documentation, so it cannot drift against a page we do not control. Replace the environment placeholders with a token scoped to the least it needs.
claude mcp add medium-repo-fixture --env ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY} -- npx -y [email protected]{
"mcpServers": {
"medium-repo-fixture": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"[email protected]"
],
"env": {
"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY": "${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY}"
}
}
}
}Exposed tools (17)
13 read · 3 write · 1 destructive. Blast radius: 1 tool can delete or overwrite — an agent that can be talked into calling a tool can be talked into calling this one.
| Tool | Risk | Description |
|---|---|---|
detect_cycles | read | |
exclude_and_remove | destructive | |
find_callees | read | |
find_callers | read | |
find_important_files | read | |
find_symbol | read | |
get_communities | read | |
get_cycles_for_file | read | |
get_file_summary | read | |
list_changed_since | read | |
list_files | read | |
scan_all | read | |
search | read | |
set_base_directory | write | |
set_file_importance | write | |
set_file_summary | write | |
status | read |
Trust audit
CAUTIONgrade C · trust 79/100 Install with care. The audit found things worth knowing before you trust its output.
| Layer | What it checks | Result |
|---|---|---|
| L0 | Provenance & inventory | PASS |
| L1 | Static analysis of the code | PASS |
| L2 | Instruction surface (what it tells the agent) | FAIL |
| L3 | Class-specific surface | WARN |
| L4 | Behavioural (sandbox) | SKIPPED |
What the source does
- Filesystem
- declared (10 observation(s))
- Network
- declared (10 observation(s))
- Shell
- declared (5 observation(s))
- Dependencies
- not all pinned
- Secrets in source
- none-found
Findings (11)
Reviewed the four broker lifecycle files: client, config, main, and server. The code is well-structured with clear separation of concerns, proper error handling patterns, and good defensive programmin
exclude_and_remove
'../../drizzle'
outDir: '../../../dist/nexus/static',
import { SOCK_PATH, PID_PATH } from '../../src/broker/config.js';import { openDatabase, closeDatabase, getSqlite } from '../../src/db/db.js';} from '../../src/db/repository.js';
@ai-sdk/anthropic, @ai-sdk/openai-compatible, @fastify/static, @modelcontextprotocol/sdk, ai, better-sqlite3, chokidar, cytoscape
| T-31-06 | E (Elevation of Privilege) | tests spawn child processes | accept | Tests run as same user; no elevated privileges required; broker binary is project-owned code |
| T-31-06 | E (Elevation of Privilege) | tests spawn child processes | accept | Tests run as same user; no elevated privileges; broker binary is project-owned code built from repo | closed |
| user shell → `scripts/register-mcp.mjs` | Script runs in the user's shell with the user's permissions; no elevated privileges. |
Gates applied: instruction_override, no_behavioural_pass.
6aca16a842abfull audit observations/trust-audit/mcp-server/admica__filescope.json · Report an issue / request a re-scanAudit history
Every audit this server has had. A grade with a past is a grade somebody is still checking.
| Date | Source | Verdict | Grade | Score | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-05 | 6aca16a842ab | CAUTION | C | 79 | first audit |
Questions
What is the FileScope MCP server?
Analyzes your codebase identifying important files based on dependency relationships. Generates diagrams and importance scores per file, helping AI assistants understand the codebase. Automatically parses popular programming languages such as Python, C, C++, Rust, Zig, Lua.
What tools does FileScope expose?
17 in total: 13 read-only, 3 that write, and 1 that can delete or overwrite (exclude_and_remove). Every one is listed on this page with its risk.
Is FileScope safe to connect to an agent?
With care. The audit graded it C (79/100) and found 11 things worth knowing before you trust this server, listed below with the exact line each was found on. Separately from the audit: 1 of its tools can destroy data, so scope the token you give it to what you actually need.
What credentials does FileScope need?
It reads ANTHROPIC_API_KEY from the environment. Give it a token scoped to the least it needs — an agent that can be talked into calling a tool can be talked into calling it with your credentials.
How current is this page?
The grade is for one exact copy of the source (6aca16a842ab), read on 2026-10-05. The repository is watched and re-audited when it changes.