Atlas / MCP servers / mechubsec / rustmistmcp

rustmistmcpBLOCK

mcp/mechubsec/rustmistmcp

Async Rust MCP server for the HPE Juniper Mist cloud — bearer-token auth, org/site-scoped tools, bounded responses, guarded WAN-edge change control

Verdict
BLOCK
Grade
D
Trust score
61 /100
Exposed tools
—
Transport
stdio · streamable-http
License
MIT
Stars
1
01

Overview

From the repository's own README, as read at the audited commit. Badges and raw HTML are left out.

rustmistmcp

Async Rust Model Context Protocol server for the HPE Juniper Mist cloud a mechub project — sovereign network-security automation

Unofficial / community project. This is an independent community project and does not claim affiliation with or endorsement by Hewlett Packard Enterprise or Juniper Networks. Product names and trademarks are used only to identify the systems with which the software interoperates.

rustmistmcp exposes the Juniper Mist cloud — orgs, sites, APs, switches, gateways, WLANs, clients, SLE, and Marvis — to MCP clients as a bounded, auditable tool surface.

Where `rustjunosmcp` talks NETCONF to individual SRX devices and `rustpanosmcp` talks XML-API to individual PAN-OS firewalls, this server talks to a multi-tenant cloud control plane. One org-scoped call can reach every site and every access point in an estate, so scoping, bounded responses, and change control are not garnish here; they are the design.

The functional target is the Mist half of `nowireless4u/hpe-networking-mcp` — site health and SLE, device inventory and stats, WLAN/SSID management, client connectivity, events and alarms, audit logs, RRM and rogue detection, firmware, NAC/policy, guest access, webhooks, floor plans, and Marvis — reimplemented in Rust on the mecmcp foundation rather than as a Python spec-driven registry. That project registers on the order of a thousand generated tools; this one deliberately will not. A curated, scoped, individually-documented surface is the whole point of doing it again.

R

Read from source at commit be83b4e2ed8fOBSERVED · 2026-10-11
02

Connect

Built from this server's own package name, version and transport as found in its source — not copied from anyone's documentation, so it cannot drift against a page we do not control.

claude-code (oci)
claude mcp add rustmistmcp:0.3.2 -- docker run -i --rm ghcr.io/mechubsec/rustmistmcp:0.3.2:None stdio /var/lib/rustmistmcp/changeset-state.json
03

Trust audit

BLOCKgrade D · trust 61/100 Do not install this without reading the findings. The audit found something that could harm you or your machine.

LayerWhat it checksResult
L0Provenance & inventoryPASS
L1Static analysis of the codeFAIL
L2Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)PASS
L3Class-specific surfacePASS
L4Behavioural (sandbox)SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem
UNDECLARED (6 observation(s))
Network
declared (7 observation(s))
Shell
none-observed
Dependencies
pinned
Secrets in source
none-found

Findings (25)

HIGHNetwork egress · net.env_exfil · CWE-200, CWE-319
scripts/verify-packaging.sh:219
'.env' ... curl
Why it matters. reads secrets in the same file that sends data out
HIGHContainer / deploy · priv.container · CWE-250, CWE-16
scripts/smoke-oci.sh:46
--network host \
HIGHPrivilege escalation / persistence · priv.escalate · CWE-269, CWE-250
scripts/verify-packaging.sh:462
require_contains docs/OPERATIONS.md 'sudo install -D -o root -g rustmistmcp -m 0640'
Why it matters. asks for elevated privileges
HIGHPrivilege escalation / persistence · priv.escalate · CWE-269, CWE-250
scripts/verify-packaging.sh:463
require_contains docs/OPERATIONS.md 'sudo install -o rustmistmcp -g rustmistmcp -m 0600 /dev/null'
Why it matters. asks for elevated privileges
MEDIUMFilesystem / path · fs.destructive · CWE-22, CWE-59
packaging/lxc/install.sh:254
rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
MEDIUMFilesystem / path · fs.destructive · CWE-22, CWE-59
scripts/verify-packaging.sh:287
require_contains "$installer" 'rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*'
MEDIUMPrivilege escalation / persistence · fs.persistence · CWE-269, CWE-250
scripts/verify-packaging.sh:298
require_absent "$installer" 'systemctl enable'
MEDIUMFilesystem / path · fs.system_paths · CWE-22, CWE-59
Dockerfile:36
"/usr/local/bin/rustmistmcp", \
MEDIUMFilesystem / path · fs.system_paths · CWE-22, CWE-59
Dockerfile:37
"--device-mapping", "/etc/rustmistmcp/mist.json", \
MEDIUMFilesystem / path · fs.system_paths · CWE-22, CWE-59
crates/rustmistmcp/src/main.rs:801
assert_eq!(legacy, PathBuf::from("/etc/rustmistmcp/tokens.json"));
MEDIUMNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
crates/rustmistmcp/src/main.rs:985
args.shared.otel_endpoint = Some("http://127.0.0.1:4318".to_owned());
MEDIUMNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
crates/rustmistmcp/src/server/mod.rs:4571
"https://127.0.0.1/",
LOWInventory / provenance · inv.hidden_file · CWE-1104
.gitleaks-vendor.toml
.gitleaks-vendor.toml
Why it matters. hidden member outside the usual dotfiles
Fix. review its purpose
LOWInventory / provenance · inv.hidden_file · CWE-1104
.gitleaks.toml
.gitleaks.toml
Why it matters. hidden member outside the usual dotfiles
Fix. review its purpose
LOWInventory / provenance · inv.hidden_file · CWE-1104
.gitleaksignore
.gitleaksignore
Why it matters. hidden member outside the usual dotfiles
Fix. review its purpose
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.system_paths · CWE-22, CWE-59
crates/rustmistmcp/tests/runtime_contract.rs:147
"/etc/rustmistmcp/tokens.json",
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.system_paths · CWE-22, CWE-59
crates/rustmistmcp/tests/runtime_contract.rs:160
"/etc/rustmistmcp/tokens.json",
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
crates/rustmistmcp-core/src/catalog.rs:333
include_str!("../../../docs/mist-api/catalog.json")
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
crates/rustmistmcp-core/tests/catalog_contract.rs:7
const CATALOG_JSON: &str = include_str!("../../../docs/mist-api/catalog.json");
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
crates/rustmistmcp-core/tests/catalog_contract.rs:9
include_str!("../../../docs/mist-api/frozen-reference-inventory.json");
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
crates/rustmistmcp-core/tests/catalog_contract.rs:10
const PARITY_JSON: &str = include_str!("../../../docs/mist-api/parity.json");
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
crates/rustmistmcp-core/tests/workspace_contract.rs:5
const WORKSPACE_MANIFEST: &str = include_str!("../../../Cargo.toml");
LOWNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
crates/rustmistmcp-core/tests/config_grant_contract.rs:126
"https://127.0.0.1",
LOWNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
crates/rustmistmcp/tests/http_client_wiring.rs:56
let mock_base_url_http = format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}", addr.port());
LOWNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
docs/HOW-TO-SETUP-DOCKER.md:258
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -X POST http://127.0.0.1:30044/mcp \

Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.

Audited 2026-10-11 · audit v0.4.1 · source sha be83b4e2ed8ffull audit observations/trust-audit/mcp-server/mechubsec__rustmistmcp.json · Report an issue / request a re-scan
04

Audit history

Every audit this server has had. A grade with a past is a grade somebody is still checking.

DateSourceVerdictGradeScoreChange
2026-10-11be83b4e2ed8fBLOCKD61first audit
05

Questions

What is the rustmistmcp MCP server?

Async Rust MCP server for the HPE Juniper Mist cloud — bearer-token auth, org/site-scoped tools, bounded responses, guarded WAN-edge change control

Is rustmistmcp safe to connect to an agent?

No — not without reading the findings first. The audit graded it D (61/100) and found 4 critical or high issues in the source. Each one is listed on this page with the file and line it is on.

What credentials does rustmistmcp need?

No credential environment variables were found in its source, so it appears to need none.

How does rustmistmcp run?

It speaks stdio and streamable-http, so it runs as a local process your client starts.

How current is this page?

The grade is for one exact copy of the source (be83b4e2ed8f), read on 2026-10-11. The repository is watched and re-audited when it changes.

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