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rustpanosmcpSAFE

mcp/mechubsec/rustpanosmcp
MCP server by mechubsec · firewall · mcp · mcp server · Audited 2026-10-11
⚑ Report / re-scanSource ↗

Async Rust MCP server for Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS firewalls — bearer-token auth, per-token device/tool scopes, guarded candidate-config lifecycle

Verdict
SAFE
Grade
B
Trust score
84 /100
Exposed tools
—
Transport
stdio · streamable-http
License
MIT
Stars
1
01

Overview

From the repository's own README, as read at the audited commit. Badges and raw HTML are left out.

rust-panosmcp

Async Rust Model Context Protocol server for Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS firewalls a mechub project — sovereign network-security automation

Unofficial / community project. This is an independent community project and does not claim affiliation with or endorsement by Palo Alto Networks. Product names and trademarks are used only to identify the systems with which the software interoperates.

The repository contains the v0.16.0 release: a bearer-protected server with structured audit logging, guarded PAN-OS candidate configuration lifecycle, and hardened release packaging, with authentication and auditing provided by the shared `mecmcp-auth` and `mecmcp-audit` crates.

The project goal is a small, fast, production-oriented server with the same security posture as rust-junosmcp: bearer-token authentication, per-token device and tool scopes, TLS, strict remote-bind refusal rules, bounded input and output, auditable change operations, and efficient connection reuse.

The architecture and delivery plan are in PLAN.md. Security boundaries and release-blocking controls are tracked in THREAT_MODEL.md.

Workspace

rust-panosmcp/          # MCP binary and stdio adapter
rust-panosmcp-auth/     # bearer and secret-handling foundations
rust-panosmcp-core/     # inventory, PAN-OS client, validation, tool logic
config/                 # secret-free inventory examples
docs/                   # operator guidance and phase notes
fuzz/                   # isolated cargo-fuzz workspace
packaging/              # distroless/container and systemd assets
scripts/
Read from source at commit 6d52c6cabb2cOBSERVED · 2026-10-11
02

Connect

Built from this server's own package name, version and transport as found in its source — not copied from anyone's documentation, so it cannot drift against a page we do not control.

claude-code (oci)
claude mcp add rustpanosmcp:0.16.0 -- docker run -i --rm ghcr.io/mechubsec/rustpanosmcp:0.16.0:None stdio
03

Trust audit

SAFEgrade B · trust 84/100 Nothing in the source contradicts what it says it does. Grade A is reserved for packages that have also passed the behavioural sandbox.

LayerWhat it checksResult
L0Provenance & inventoryPASS
L1Static analysis of the codeWARN
L2Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)PASS
L3Class-specific surfacePASS
L4Behavioural (sandbox)SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem
declared (5 observation(s))
Network
declared (3 observation(s))
Shell
none-observed
Dependencies
pinned
Secrets in source
found

Findings (17)

MEDIUMHard-coded secrets · secret.private_key · CWE-798, CWE-321
rust-panosmcp-core/tests/secret_redaction.rs:44
"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n",
LOWInventory / provenance · inv.hidden_file · CWE-1104
.gitleaks-vendor.toml
.gitleaks-vendor.toml
Why it matters. hidden member outside the usual dotfiles
Fix. review its purpose
LOWInventory / provenance · inv.hidden_file · CWE-1104
.gitleaks.toml
.gitleaks.toml
Why it matters. hidden member outside the usual dotfiles
Fix. review its purpose
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
packaging/lxc/tests/test_config_dir_ownership.sh:8
PACKAGE_ROOT="$(cd -- "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../.." && pwd -P)"
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
packaging/lxc/tests/test_consistency_test_catches_mismatch.sh:9
PACKAGE_ROOT="$(cd -- "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../.." && pwd -P)"
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
packaging/lxc/tests/test_hmac_key_documented.sh:9
PACKAGE_ROOT="$(cd -- "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../.." && pwd -P)"
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
packaging/lxc/tests/test_install_unit_consistency.sh:13
PACKAGE_ROOT="$(cd -- "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../.." && pwd -P)"
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
packaging/lxc/tests/test_installer_path_guard.sh:9
PACKAGE_ROOT="$(cd -- "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../.." && pwd -P)"
LOWNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
README.md:113
The installer creates the `rust-panosmcp` user and directories via `systemd-sysusers` and `systemd-tmpfiles`, installs the binary and unit, creates an empty `tokens.json` with mode 0600, and never ove
LOWNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
docs/HOW-TO-SETUP-DOCKER.md:79
"endpoint": "https://192.0.2.20",
LOWNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
docs/HOW-TO-SETUP-DOCKER.md:159
--allowed-origin http://127.0.0.1:30031 --allowed-origin http://localhost:30031
LOWNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
docs/HOW-TO-SETUP-DOCKER.md:168
The `--allowed-origin http://127.0.0.1:30031` values are a working local default
LOWNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
docs/HOW-TO-SETUP-DOCKER.md:188
--allowed-origin http://127.0.0.1:30041 --allowed-origin http://localhost:30041 \
LOWPrompt injection · prompt.credential_read · CWE-94, CWE-1427
README.md:580
File holding the read identity's password. Must be 0600
Why it matters. asks the agent to read credentials
LOWPrompt injection · prompt.transfer_instruction · CWE-94, CWE-1427
CHANGELOG.md:514
- **Rate limiting now uses a token-bucket algorithm instead of a fixed sliding window**, via the shared [`mecmcp-transport`](https://github.com/mechubsec/mecmcp) crate (`transport-v0.1.6`). The CLI fl
Why it matters. an instruction to move sensitive data to an outside destination
Fix. remove; a skill never needs the user's secrets off the machine
LOWPrompt injection · prompt.transfer_instruction · CWE-94, CWE-1427
docs/PHASE2_OPERATIONS.md:67
The MCP endpoint is `https://mcp.example.test:30031/mcp`. Send the token as
Why it matters. an instruction to move sensitive data to an outside destination
Fix. remove; a skill never needs the user's secrets off the machine
LOWInventory / provenance · mcp.no_tools_extracted · CWE-1104
server.json
Why it matters. the tool list is enumerated at runtime by tools/list, not declared in source
Fix. the page says so rather than showing an empty table

Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.

Audited 2026-10-11 · audit v0.4.1 · source sha 6d52c6cabb2cfull audit observations/trust-audit/mcp-server/mechubsec__rustpanosmcp.json · Report an issue / request a re-scan
04

Audit history

Every audit this server has had. A grade with a past is a grade somebody is still checking.

DateSourceVerdictGradeScoreChange
2026-10-116d52c6cabb2cSAFEB84first audit
05

Questions

What is the rustpanosmcp MCP server?

Async Rust MCP server for Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS firewalls — bearer-token auth, per-token device/tool scopes, guarded candidate-config lifecycle

Is rustpanosmcp safe to connect to an agent?

The audit found nothing in the source that contradicts what it says it does, and graded it B (84/100). Grade A is held back for packages that have also passed a sandboxed behavioural run, which is why a clean server reads B.

What credentials does rustpanosmcp need?

No credential environment variables were found in its source, so it appears to need none.

How does rustpanosmcp run?

It speaks stdio and streamable-http, so it runs as a local process your client starts.

How current is this page?

The grade is for one exact copy of the source (6d52c6cabb2c), read on 2026-10-11. The repository is watched and re-audited when it changes.

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