Stride Analysis PatternsSAFE

oh-my-zsh for Claude Code — 16 agents, 35 commands, 32 skills, 21 safety hooks in one install. v4.0 adds an adversarial review loop: a second agent that never sees the first one's reasoning. MIT.

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: stride-analysis-patterns
description: Apply STRIDE methodology to systematically identify threats. Use when analyzing system security, conducting threat modeling sessions, or creating security documentation.
---

# STRIDE Analysis Patterns

Systematic threat identification using the STRIDE methodology.

## When to Use This Skill

- Starting new threat modeling sessions
- Analyzing existing system architecture
- Reviewing security design decisions
- Creating threat documentation
- Training teams on threat identification
- Compliance and audit preparation

## Core Concepts

### 1. STRIDE Categories

```
S - Spoofing       → Authentication threats
T - Tampering      → Integrity threats
R - Repudiation    → Non-repudiation threats
I - Information    → Confidentiality threats
    Disclosure
D - Denial of      → Availability threats
    Service
E - Elevation of   → Authorization threats
    Privilege
```

### 2. Threat Analysis Matrix

| Category            | Question                                  | Control Family |
| ------------------- | ----------------------------------------- | -------------- |
| **Spoofing**        | Can attacker pretend to be someone else?  | Authentication |
| **Tampering**       | Can attacker modify data in transit/rest? | Integrity      |
| **Repudiation**     | Can attacker deny actions?                | Logging/Audit  |
| **Info Disclosure** | Can attacker access unauthorized data?    | Encryption     |
| **DoS**             | Can attacker disrupt availability?        | Rate limiting  |
| **Elevation**       | Can attacker gain higher privileges?      | Authorization  |

## Templates

### Template 1: STRIDE Threat Model Document

```markdown
# Threat Model: [System Name]

## 1. System Overview

### 1.1 Description

[Brief description of the system and its purpose]

### 1.2 Data Flow Diagram
```

[User] --> [Web App] --> [API Gateway] --> [Backend Services]
|
v
[Database]

```

### 1.3 Trust Boundaries
- **External Boundary**: Internet to DMZ
- **Internal Boundary**: DMZ to Internal Network
- **Data Boundary**: Application to Database

## 2. Assets

| Asset | Sensitivity | Description |
|-------|-------------|-------------|
| User Credentials | High | Authentication tokens, passwords |
| Personal Data | High | PII, financial information |
| Session Data | Medium | Active user sessions |
| Application Logs | Medium | System activity records |
| Configuration | High | System settings, secrets |

## 3. STRIDE Analysis

### 3.1 Spoofing Threats

| ID | Threat | Target | Impact | Likelihood |
|----|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| S1 | Session hijacking | User sessions | High | Medium |
| S2 | Token forgery | JWT tokens | High | Low |
| S3 | Credential stuffing | Login endpoint | High | High |

**Mitigations:**
- [ ] Implement MFA
- [ ] Use secure session management
- [ ] Implement account lockout policies

### 3.2 Tampering Threats

| ID | Threat | Target | Impact | Likelihood |
|----|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| T1 | SQL injection | Database queries | Critical | Medium |
| T2 | Parameter manipulation | API requests | High | High |
| T3 | File upload abuse | File storage | High | Medium |

**Mitigations:**
- [ ] Input validation on all endpoints
- [ ] Parameterized queries
- [ ] File type validation

### 3.3 Repudiation Threats

| ID | Threat | Target | Impact | Likelihood |
|----|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| R1 | Transaction denial | Financial ops | High | Medium |
| R2 | Access log tampering | Audit logs | Medium | Low |
| R3 | Action attribution | User actions | Medium | Medium |

**Mitigations:**
- [ ] Comprehensive audit logging
- [ ] Log integrity protection
- [ ] Digital signatures for critical actions

### 3.4 Information Disclosure Threats

| ID | Threat | Target | Impact | Likelihood |
|----|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| I1 | Data breach | User PII | Critical | Medium |
| I2 | Error message leakage | System info | Low | High |
| I3 | Insecure transmission | Network traffic | High | Medium |

**Mitigations:**
- [ ] Encryption at rest and in transit
- [ ] Sanitize error messages
- [ ] Implement TLS 1.3

### 3.5 Denial of Service Threats

| ID | Threat | Target | Impact | Likelihood |
|----|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| D1 | Resource exhaustion | API servers | High | High |
| D2 | Database overload | Database | Critical | Medium |
| D3 | Bandwidth saturation | Network | High | Medium |

**Mitigations:**
- [ ] Rate limiting
- [ ] Auto-scaling
- [ ] DDoS protection

### 3.6 Elevation of Privilege Threats

| ID | Threat | Target | Impact | Likelihood |
|----|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| E1 | IDOR vulnerabilities | User resources | High | High |
| E2 | Role manipulation | Admin access | Critical | Low |
| E3 | JWT claim tampering | Authorization | High | Medium |

**Mitigations:**
- [ ] Proper authorization checks
- [ ] Principle of least privilege
- [ ] Server-side role validation

## 4. Risk Assessment

### 4.1 Risk Matrix

```

              IMPACT
         Low  Med  High Crit
    Low   1    2    3    4

L Med 2 4 6 8
I High 3 6 9 12
K Crit 4 8 12 16

```

### 4.2 Prioritized Risks

| Rank | Threat | Risk Score | Priority |
|------|--------|------------|----------|
| 1 | SQL Injection (T1) | 12 | Critical |
| 2 | IDOR (E1) | 9 | High |
| 3 | Credential Stuffing (S3) | 9 | High |
| 4 | Data Breach (I1) | 8 | High |

## 5. Recommendations

### Immediate Actions
1. Implement input validation framework
2. Add rate limiting to authentication endpoints
3. Enable comprehensive audit logging

### Short-term (30 days)
1. Deploy WAF with OWASP ruleset
2. Implement MFA for sensitive operations
3. Encrypt all PII at rest

### Long-term (90 days)
1. Security awareness training
2. Penetration testing
3. Bug bounty program
```

### Template 2: STRIDE Analysis Code

```python
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from enum import Enum
from typing import List, Dict, Optional
import json

SAFEgrade B · trust 89/100 Nothing in the source contradicts what it says it does. Grade A is reserved for packages that have also passed the behavioural sandbox.

What the source does

Filesystem

none-observed

Network

none-observed

Shell

none-observed

Dependencies

pinned

Secrets in source

none-found

Findings (1)

"E": "Process gaining elevated access",

Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.