Atlas / Skills / jeremylongshore / Ideogram Incident Runbook

Ideogram Incident RunbookSAFE

skills/jeremylongshore/ideogram-incident-runbook

Model-agnostic agent-skills platform with a harness-free canonical layer, verified adapters, and the ccpi package manager. Explore at tonsofskills.com.

Verdict
SAFE
Grade
B
Trust score
89 /100
Version
1.11.0
Hosts
1 documented
License
MIT
Stars
2,824
01

Overview

Model-agnostic agent-skills platform with a harness-free canonical layer, verified adapters, and the ccpi package manager. Explore at tonsofskills.com.

Read from source at commit 4f83675ca38aOBSERVED · 2026-10-09
02

Host compatibility

What the documentation claims. We have not run a compatibility test.

HostStatusNotes
claude-codementioned
03

What it tells the agent

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: ideogram-incident-runbook
description: >-
  Analyze and contain Ideogram incidents involving credentials, billing, throttling, unsafe output, webhook loss, asset expiry, or storage failure. Use when coordinating production response and recovery. Trigger with "Ideogram incident", "contain an Ideogram outage", or "recover missing Ideogram images".
allowed-tools: Read,Glob,Grep,Write,Edit
argument-hint: "<incident-id> <symptom> <environment>"
version: 1.11.0
license: MIT
author: Jeremy Longshore <[email protected]>
tags: [saas, ideogram, incident-response]
model: inherit
effort: high
compatibility: "Designed for Claude Code; operational mutations require the incident commander's approval"
---
# Ideogram Incident Response

## Overview

Stabilize an Ideogram integration before chasing image quality or replaying paid requests. Preserve evidence, reduce blast radius, reconcile accepted work, protect sensitive media, and choose recovery actions by incident class.

## Prerequisites

- Incident commander, environment, start time, impact statement, and communication channel.
- Read access to content-free application, queue, vendor-status, webhook, polling, storage, and billing evidence.
- Known controls for admission, concurrency, key revocation, traffic rollback, queue drain, and publication stop.

## Current Contract

Incidents commonly cross separate boundaries: server-side `Api-Key`, prepaid shared team credit, default in-flight capacity, async `generation_id`, signed but non-guaranteed webhook delivery, item safety, expiring URLs, and application storage. Recovery must not collapse these into a generic retry.

## Authentication

Never paste the API key into incident chat or commands. Verify secret provenance through metadata; if exposure is credible, stop new traffic, revoke under owner approval, rotate consumers, and audit historical leakage.

## Instructions

1. Declare severity, impact, affected environment and tenants, known time window, and incident commander.
2. Freeze risky deployments and broad retries; preserve sanitized statuses, identifiers, queue state, and storage receipts.
3. Classify credential, depleted credit, validation, `429` pressure, vendor capacity, unsafe publication, webhook loss, expired URL, or storage failure.
4. Contain with the smallest control: close admission, reduce concurrency, stop publishing, switch to polling, isolate storage, or roll back traffic.
5. Reconcile every accepted async identifier before resubmission and prevent duplicate asset publication.
6. Recover with synthetic canaries, then restore bounded traffic while monitoring safety, durable completion, errors, latency, and spend.
7. Record timeline, decisions, evidence, customer impact, cleanup, follow-ups, and final state.

## Tool Discipline

Use Read, Glob, and Grep for evidence and known runbooks. Use Write and Edit for approved incident records or fixes. Do not revoke keys, add credit, delete assets, replay jobs, or deploy without incident authority.

## Approval Boundaries

The incident commander approves containment and restoration; security owns credential response, billing owns credit, moderation owns unsafe publication, and data owners approve asset access or deletion. Separate reversible mitigation from destructive action.

## Error Handling

- Do not regenerate solely because a vendor URL expired; confirm rights, budget, and absence of durable copy.
- Do not increase concurrency during `429` pressure.
- Missing webhook delivery should trigger polling reconciliation, not duplicate submission.

## Output

Return incident class, impact, timeline, evidence IDs, containment, accepted-work reconciliation, spend and data exposure, recovery canary, owners, residual risk, and rollback or cleanup state. Exclude secrets and content.

## Examples

- On webhook loss, keep submissions bounded, poll known generation IDs, and deduplicate late deliveries.
- On unsafe publication, stop the publisher while preserving the generation and safety decision evidence.

## Validation

Confirm impact has stopped, all known generations and objects reconcile, synthetic canaries pass, and monitoring remains stable through the observation window. Test that rollback and emergency admission closure still work.

## Resources

- [Current first-party evidence map](references/official-docs.md) — use the dated endpoint, webhook, billing, team, and training links as the contract index for this workflow.
- Recheck the endpoint-specific page and current OpenAPI description before relying on an enum, limit, beta feature, or lifecycle claim.
- Record live observations as environment-specific evidence, not as universal vendor guarantees.
04

Trust audit

SAFEgrade B · trust 89/100 Nothing in the source contradicts what it says it does. Grade A is reserved for packages that have also passed the behavioural sandbox.

LayerWhat it checksResult
L0Provenance & inventoryPASS
L1Static analysis of the codePASS
L2Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)PASS
L3Class-specific surfacePASS
L4Behavioural (sandbox)SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem
none-observed
Network
none-observed
Shell
none-observed
Dependencies
pinned
Secrets in source
none-found

Findings (0)

No findings outside the package's declared scope.

Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.

Audited 2026-10-09 · audit v0.4.1 · source sha 4f83675ca38afull audit observations/trust-audit/skill/jeremylongshore__ideogram-incident-runbook.json · Report an issue / request a re-scan
05

Audit history

Every audit this skill has had.

DateSourceVerdictGradeScoreChange
2026-10-094f83675ca38aSAFEB89first audit
06

Questions

What does the Ideogram Incident Runbook skill do?

Model-agnostic agent-skills platform with a harness-free canonical layer, verified adapters, and the ccpi package manager. Explore at tonsofskills.com.

Is Ideogram Incident Runbook safe to install?

The audit found nothing in the source that contradicts what it says it does, and graded it B (89/100). Grade A is held back for packages that have also passed a sandboxed behavioural run, which is why a clean skill reads B.

What can Ideogram Incident Runbook access on my machine?

The audit observed no filesystem, network or shell use at all in its source.

Which assistants does Ideogram Incident Runbook work with?

Its documentation mentions claude-code. That is what the text claims, not a compatibility test we ran.

How current is this page?

The grade is for one exact copy of the source (4f83675ca38a), read on 2026-10-09. The repository is watched, and a new audit runs when it changes — this is the first audit.

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