Atlas / Skills / hoangnguyen0403 / Common Pentest Methodology

Common Pentest MethodologyBLOCK

skills/hoangnguyen0403/common-pentest-methodology

A collection of Agent Skills Standard and Best Practice for Programming Languages, Frameworks that help our AI Agent follow best practies on frameworks and programming laguages

Verdict
BLOCK
Grade
D
Trust score
69 /100
Version
—
Hosts
—
License
MIT
Stars
575
01

Overview

A collection of Agent Skills Standard and Best Practice for Programming Languages, Frameworks that help our AI Agent follow best practies on frameworks and programming laguages

Read from source at commit 6f5be687a268OBSERVED · 2026-10-14
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02

What it tells the agent

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: common-pentest-methodology
description: PTES-aligned penetration testing methodology for backend, frontend, and mobile. Provides attack taxonomy, exploit techniques per vulnerability class, and platform-specific test matrices. Use when executing pentest workflow, planning security assessments, mapping attack surfaces, or building threat models.
metadata:
  triggers:
    keywords:
    - pentest
    - penetration test
    - red team
    - attack surface
    - threat model
    - PTES
    - security assessment
    - exploit
    - hacker score
---
# Penetration Testing Methodology (PTES-Aligned)

## **Priority: P0 (CRITICAL)**

## Always-Apply Rules

- **No Exploit = No Report**: Every finding requires reproducible Proof-of-Concept. Hypotheses without PoC are discarded.
- **No Production Testing**: All dynamic probes target local/staging only. Confirm authorization before Phase 1.
- **No Single-Platform Bias**: Assess backend, frontend, AND mobile surfaces when in-scope.

## Workflow

Load alongside `/pentest` workflow. Provides methodology backbone for all 7 phases.

1. **Scope** → Define test mode (whitebox/greybox/blackbox), platforms, exclusions.
2. **Recon** → Build asset inventory per platform. See [platform-recon](references/platform-recon.md).
3. **Threat Model** → Rank endpoints by risk. See [threat-modeling](references/threat-modeling.md).
4. **Analyze** → Run vulnerability matrix across all domains. Load `common-owasp`, `common-security-audit`, `common-dast-tooling`.
5. **Exploit** → Validate each finding with PoC. See [exploit-techniques](references/exploit-techniques.md).
6. **Post-Exploit** → Assess blast radius, lateral movement, privilege escalation.
7. **Report** → Audit-grade output with CVSS scoring. See [report-template](references/report-template.md) and [compliance-mapping](references/compliance-mapping.md).

## Platform Coverage Matrix

| Domain | Backend/API | Frontend/Web | Mobile (iOS/Android) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Injection | SQLi, CMDi, NoSQLi, LDAPi | Template injection, DOM sinks | Content provider SQLi, Intent injection |
| XSS | Response encoding | DOM XSS, `innerHTML`, framework bypasses | WebView `loadUrl`, JavaScript bridges |
| Auth | JWT, OAuth, Session, MFA | Token storage, session management | Keychain/Keystore, biometric bypass |
| AuthZ | BOLA/IDOR, BFLA, Mass Assignment | Client-side role gates | Local permission checks without server |
| SSRF | HTTP client + user URL | SSR with user-supplied URL | Custom scheme fetching arbitrary URLs |
| Business Logic | Race conditions, workflow bypass | Client-only validation, price tamper | IAP bypass, receipt validation skip |
| Crypto | Weak hash, missing TLS | HTTP calls, weak CSP | Missing cert pin, cleartext traffic |
| Config | CORS, debug mode, headers | Source maps, debug flags in prod | `debuggable=true`, ATS exceptions |
| Deps/SCA | `npm audit`, `pip-audit`, `cargo audit` | Bundle vuln analysis | `pod audit`, Gradle dependency scan |
| Secrets | Entropy + regex + liveness | Secrets in JS bundles | Keys in BuildConfig/Info.plist |
| LLM/AI | Prompt injection, excessive agency | Output to DOM sinks | Agent tools without confirmation |

## Continuous & Compliance Execution

- **Continuous Testing**: Execute Delta scans on PRs or Replay regression PoCs. See [continuous-pentest](references/continuous-pentest.md).
- **Compliance Mapping**: Map findings to SOC 2, ISO 27001, PCI DSS, or OWASP MASVS. See [compliance-mapping](references/compliance-mapping.md).

## Anti-Patterns

- **No "scan and dump"**: Raw tool output not a pentest. Correlate findings across SAST + DAST + manual.
- **No severity inflation**: Theoretical risk without exploit evidence ≠ confirmed vulnerability.
- **No happy-path-only**: Test error states, edge cases, race conditions, not just golden flow.

## References

- [Platform Reconnaissance](references/platform-recon.md) — Phase 1 recon commands per platform
- [Threat Modeling Guide](references/threat-modeling.md) — Phase 2 attack surface prioritization
- [Exploit Techniques](references/exploit-techniques.md) — Phase 4 PoC construction per vuln class
- [Report Template](references/report-template.md) — Phase 6 audit-grade report format
- [OWASP Mobile Top 10](references/owasp-mobile.md) — Mobile vulnerability detection
- [Compliance Mapping](references/compliance-mapping.md) — SOC 2, ISO 27001, PCI DSS mapping
- [Continuous Pentesting](references/continuous-pentest.md) — CI/CD integration and Delta testing
03

Trust audit

BLOCKgrade D · trust 69/100 Do not install this without reading the findings. The audit found something that could harm you or your machine.

LayerWhat it checksResult
L0Provenance & inventoryPASS
L1Static analysis of the codeNA
L2Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)FAIL
L3Class-specific surfacePASS
L4Behavioural (sandbox)SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem
none-observed
Network
none-observed
Shell
none-observed
Dependencies
pinned
Secrets in source
none-found

Findings (10)

HIGHPrompt injection · prompt.hidden_comment · CWE-94, CWE-1427
references/exploit-techniques.md:84
<!-- Check: does endpoint accept cross-origin POST without CSRF token? -->
Why it matters. directive hidden in a comment the user does not see rendered
Fix. remove the comment
HIGHPrompt injection · prompt.override · CWE-94, CWE-1427
references/compliance-mapping.md:59
- **MASVS-RESILIENCE**: Reverse engineering, tampering, root/jailbreak detection.
Why it matters. asks the agent to drop prior instructions or safety
Fix. remove the instruction
HIGHPrompt injection · prompt.override · CWE-94, CWE-1427
references/owasp-mobile.md:13
| M7 | Insufficient Binary Protections | N/A | No obfuscation, debuggable builds, no root/jailbreak detection |
Why it matters. asks the agent to drop prior instructions or safety
Fix. remove the instruction
HIGHPrompt injection · prompt.override · CWE-94, CWE-1427
references/owasp-mobile.md:26
# M7 — Jailbreak detection
Why it matters. asks the agent to drop prior instructions or safety
Fix. remove the instruction
LOWInventory / provenance · inv.suspicious_name · CWE-1104
references/exploit-techniques.md
exploit-techniques.md
Why it matters. member named after an attack tool
Fix. remove or justify
LOWNetwork egress · net.metadata_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
references/exploit-techniques.md:31
curl "$TARGET/api/fetch?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"
Why it matters. cloud metadata endpoint: the classic SSRF credential grab
LOWNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
references/exploit-techniques.md:30
curl "$TARGET/api/fetch?url=http://127.0.0.1:6379"
LOWNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
references/exploit-techniques.md:31
curl "$TARGET/api/fetch?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"
LOWPrompt injection · prompt.credential_read · CWE-94, CWE-1427
references/threat-modeling.md:46
├── Path 2: Open redirect → phishing → credential harvest
Why it matters. asks the agent to read credentials
LOWPrompt injection · prompt.transfer_instruction · CWE-94, CWE-1427
references/exploit-techniques.md:84
<!-- Check: does endpoint accept cross-origin POST without CSRF token? -->
Why it matters. an instruction to move sensitive data to an outside destination
Fix. remove; a skill never needs the user's secrets off the machine

Gates applied: instruction_override, no_behavioural_pass.

Audited 2026-10-14 · audit v0.4.1 · source sha 6f5be687a268full audit observations/trust-audit/skill/hoangnguyen0403__common-pentest-methodology.json · Report an issue / request a re-scan
04

Audit history

Every audit this skill has had.

DateSourceVerdictGradeScoreChange
2026-10-146f5be687a268BLOCKD69first audit
05

Questions

What does the Common Pentest Methodology skill do?

A collection of Agent Skills Standard and Best Practice for Programming Languages, Frameworks that help our AI Agent follow best practies on frameworks and programming laguages

Is Common Pentest Methodology safe to install?

No — not without reading the findings first. The audit graded it D (69/100) and found 4 critical or high issues in the source. Each one is listed on this page with the file and line it is on.

What can Common Pentest Methodology access on my machine?

The audit observed no filesystem, network or shell use at all in its source.

How current is this page?

The grade is for one exact copy of the source (6f5be687a268), read on 2026-10-14. The repository is watched, and a new audit runs when it changes — this is the first audit.

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