Android Legacy SecuritySAFE

A collection of Agent Skills Standard and Best Practice for Programming Languages, Frameworks that help our AI Agent follow best practies on frameworks and programming laguages

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: android-legacy-security
description: Harden Intent handling, WebView configuration, and FileProvider access in Android apps. Use when securing Intent extras, configuring WebViews, or exposing files via FileProvider; defer manifest export flags and generic Bundle typing to focused Android security guidance.
metadata:
  triggers:
    files:
    - '**/*Activity.kt'
    - '**/*WebView*.kt'
    - 'AndroidManifest.xml'
    keywords:
    - Intent
    - WebView
    - FileProvider
    - javaScriptEnabled
---
# Android Legacy Security Standards

## **Priority: P0 (CRITICAL)**

## 1. Secure Intents and Components

- Set `android:exported="false"` for all internal Activities/Services unless needed for deep links.
- Verify `resolveActivity` before starting implicit intents.
- Treat all incoming Intent extras as untrusted — validate all schema/data types.

See [hardening examples](references/implementation.md) for manifest and component restrictions.

## 2. Lock Down WebViews

- Default to `javaScriptEnabled = false`. Use `WebViewClient` and `WebChromeClient` to restrict navigation.
- Disable `allowFileAccess` and `allowFileAccessFromFileURLs` to prevent local file theft via XSS.
- If using `@JavascriptInterface` (API 17+), strictly limit exposed API surface.

See [hardening examples](references/implementation.md) for WebView lockdown patterns.

## 3. Protect Storage and Files

- **NEVER expose `file://` URIs**. Use `FileProvider` to generate `content://` URIs with temporary permissions.
- Use `EncryptedSharedPreferences` for auth tokens and PII. Never use legacy public-read file modes.
- Use `NetworkSecurityConfig` to disable `cleartextTrafficPermitted` and implement certificate pinning.

## Anti-Patterns

- **No Implicit Intents Internally**: Use explicit intents with component class name.
- **No Public Read Modes**: Never expose SharedPreferences or files with global read access.

## References

- [Hardening Examples](references/implementation.md)

SAFEgrade B · trust 89/100 Nothing in the source contradicts what it says it does. Grade A is reserved for packages that have also passed the behavioural sandbox.

What the source does

Filesystem

none-observed

Network

none-observed

Shell

none-observed

Dependencies

pinned

Secrets in source

none-found

Findings (0)

No findings outside the package's declared scope.

Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.