Atlas / Skills / cyberstrikeus / T1625.001 System Runtime Api Hijacking

T1625.001 System Runtime Api HijackingCAUTION

skills/cyberstrikeus/t1625-001-system-runtime-api-hijacking

Agent skill by cyberstrikeus · agents · ai hacking · ai penetration testing · Audited 2026-10-18

⚑ Report / re-scan Source ↗

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Verdict

CAUTION

Grade

Trust score

89 /100

Version

18.1

Hosts

—

License

AGPL-3.0

Stars

3,185

Overview

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Read from source at commit eaf7d03223fcOBSERVED · 2026-10-18

What it tells the agent

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: "T1625.001_system-runtime-api-hijacking"
description: "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way an operating system runs applications."
category: "configuration"
version: "18.1"
author: "cyberstrike-official"
tags:
  - mitre-attack
  - mobile
  - t1625.001
  - persistence
  - android
  - sub-technique
technique_id: "T1625.001"
tactic: "persistence"
all_tactics:
  - persistence
platforms:
  - Android
mitre_url: "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1625/001"
tech_stack:
  - android
cwe_ids:
  - CWE-276
chains_with:
  - T1625
prerequisites:
  - T1625
severity_boost:
  T1625: "Chain with T1625 for deeper attack path"
---

# T1625.001 System Runtime API Hijacking

> **Sub-technique of:** T1625

## High-Level Description

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way an operating system runs applications. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence since this hijacked execution may reoccur at later points in time.

On Android, adversaries may overwrite the standard OS API library with a malicious alternative to hook into core functions to achieve persistence. By doing this, the adversary’s code will be executed every time the overwritten API function is called by an app on the infected device.

## Kill Chain Phase

- Persistence (TA0028)

**Platforms:** Android

## What to Check

- [ ] Identify if System Runtime API Hijacking technique is applicable to target mobile environment
- [ ] Check Android devices for indicators of System Runtime API Hijacking
- [ ] Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (2 known mitigations)
- [ ] Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)

## How to Test

### Identify Attack Surface

Determine if the target mobile environment is susceptible to System Runtime API Hijacking by examining the target platforms (Android).

### Assess Existing Defenses

Review whether mitigations for T1625.001 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.

## Remediation Guide

### M1002 Attestation

Device attestation could detect unauthorized operating system modifications.

### M1004 System Partition Integrity

Android Verified Boot can detect unauthorized modifications made to the system partition, which could lead to execution flow hijacking.

## Detection

### Detection of System Runtime API Hijacking

## Risk Assessment

| Finding                                           | Severity | Impact      |
| ------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ----------- |
| System Runtime API Hijacking technique applicable | High     | Persistence |

## CWE Categories

| CWE ID  | Title                         |
| ------- | ----------------------------- |
| CWE-276 | Incorrect Default Permissions |

## References

- [NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue](https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html)
- [MITRE ATT&CK Mobile - T1625.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1625/001)

Trust audit

CAUTIONgrade B · trust 89/100 Install with care. The audit found things worth knowing before you trust its output.

Layer	What it checks	Result
L0	Provenance & inventory	WARN
L1	Static analysis of the code	NA
L2	Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)	PASS
L3	Class-specific surface	PASS
L4	Behavioural (sandbox)	SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem: none-observed
Network: none-observed
Shell: none-observed
Dependencies: pinned
Secrets in source: none-found