Atlas / Skills / cyberstrikeus / T1616 Call Control

T1616 Call ControlCAUTION

skills/cyberstrikeus/t1616-call-control

Agent skill by cyberstrikeus · agents · ai hacking · ai penetration testing · Audited 2026-10-18

⚑ Report / re-scan Source ↗

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Verdict

CAUTION

Grade

Trust score

89 /100

Version

18.1

Hosts

—

License

AGPL-3.0

Stars

3,185

Overview

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Read from source at commit eaf7d03223fcOBSERVED · 2026-10-18

What it tells the agent

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: "T1616_call-control"
description: "Adversaries may make, forward, or block phone calls without user authorization."
category: "information-gathering"
version: "18.1"
author: "cyberstrike-official"
tags:
  - mitre-attack
  - mobile
  - t1616
  - collection
  - impact
  - command-and-control
  - android
technique_id: "T1616"
tactic: "collection"
all_tactics:
  - collection
  - impact
  - command-and-control
platforms:
  - Android
mitre_url: "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1616"
tech_stack:
  - android
cwe_ids:
  - CWE-200
chains_with: []
prerequisites: []
severity_boost: {}
---

# T1616 Call Control

## High-Level Description

Adversaries may make, forward, or block phone calls without user authorization. This could be used for adversary goals such as audio surveillance, blocking or forwarding calls from the device owner, or C2 communication.

Several permissions may be used to programmatically control phone calls, including:

- `ANSWER_PHONE_CALLS` - Allows the application to answer incoming phone calls
- `CALL_PHONE` - Allows the application to initiate a phone call without going through the Dialer interface
- `PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS` - Allows the application to see the number being dialed during an outgoing call with the option to redirect the call to a different number or abort the call altogether
- `MANAGE_OWN_CALLS` - Allows a calling application which manages its own calls through the self-managed `ConnectionService` APIs
- `BIND_TELECOM_CONNECTION_SERVICE` - Required permission when using a `ConnectionService`
- `WRITE_CALL_LOG` - Allows an application to write to the device call log, potentially to hide malicious phone calls

When granted some of these permissions, an application can make a phone call without opening the dialer first. However, if an application desires to simply redirect the user to the dialer with a phone number filled in, it can launch an Intent using `Intent.ACTION_DIAL`, which requires no specific permissions. This then requires the user to explicitly initiate the call or use some form of Input Injection to programmatically initiate it.

## Kill Chain Phase

- Collection (TA0035)
- Impact (TA0034)
- Command and Control (TA0037)

**Platforms:** Android

## What to Check

- [ ] Identify if Call Control technique is applicable to target mobile environment
- [ ] Check Android devices for indicators of Call Control
- [ ] Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (1 known mitigations)
- [ ] Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)

## How to Test

### Identify Attack Surface

Determine if the target mobile environment is susceptible to Call Control by examining the target platforms (Android).

### Assess Existing Defenses

Review whether mitigations for T1616 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.

## Remediation Guide

### M1011 User Guidance

Users should be encouraged to be very careful with what applications they grant phone call-based permissions to. Further, users should not change their default call handler to applications they do not recognize.

## Detection

### Detection of Call Control

## Risk Assessment

| Finding                           | Severity | Impact     |
| --------------------------------- | -------- | ---------- |
| Call Control technique applicable | High     | Collection |

## CWE Categories

| CWE ID  | Title                             |
| ------- | --------------------------------- |
| CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information |

## References

- [Android Permissions](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission)
- [NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue](https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-41.html)
- [NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue](https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-42.html)
- [NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue](https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-36.html)
- [NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue](https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-18.html)
- [MITRE ATT&CK Mobile - T1616](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1616)

Trust audit

CAUTIONgrade B · trust 89/100 Install with care. The audit found things worth knowing before you trust its output.

Layer	What it checks	Result
L0	Provenance & inventory	WARN
L1	Static analysis of the code	NA
L2	Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)	PASS
L3	Class-specific surface	PASS
L4	Behavioural (sandbox)	SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem: none-observed
Network: none-observed
Shell: none-observed
Dependencies: pinned
Secrets in source: none-found