T1608.001 Upload MalwareBLOCK
Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.
Overview
Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.
eaf7d03223fcOBSERVED · 2026-10-18What it tells the agent
The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.
--- name: "T1608.001_upload-malware" description: "Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting." category: "information-gathering" version: "18.1" author: "cyberstrike-official" tags: - mitre-attack - enterprise - t1608.001 - resource-development - pre - sub-technique technique_id: "T1608.001" tactic: "resource-development" all_tactics: - resource-development platforms: - PRE mitre_url: "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001" tech_stack: - pre cwe_ids: [] chains_with: - T1608 - T1608.002 - T1608.003 - T1608.004 - T1608.005 - T1608.006 prerequisites: - T1608 severity_boost: T1608: "Chain with T1608 for deeper attack path" T1608.002: "Chain with T1608.002 for deeper attack path" T1608.003: "Chain with T1608.003 for deeper attack path" --- # T1608.001 Upload Malware > **Sub-technique of:** T1608 ## High-Level Description Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable Ingress Tool Transfer by placing it on an Internet accessible web server. Malware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary (Acquire Infrastructure) or was otherwise compromised by them (Compromise Infrastructure). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin; hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), where decentralized content storage makes the removal of malicious files difficult; or saved on the blockchain as smart contracts, which are resilient against takedowns that would affect traditional infrastructure. Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as software packages, application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores, package libraries, extension marketplaces, or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub, PyPi, NPM). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via User Execution. Masquerading, including typo-squatting legitimate software, may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files. ## Kill Chain Phase - Resource Development (TA0042) **Platforms:** PRE ## What to Check - [ ] Identify if Upload Malware technique is applicable to target environment - [ ] Check PRE systems for indicators of Upload Malware - [ ] Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (1 known mitigations) - [ ] Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies) ## How to Test ### Manual Testing 1. **Identify Attack Surface**: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Upload Malware by examining the target platforms (PRE). 2. **Assess Existing Defenses**: Review whether mitigations for T1608.001 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable. 3. **Execute Test**: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below. > **Note**: No Atomic Red Team tests available for this technique. See [Atomic Red Team GitHub](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team) for updates. ## Remediation Guide ### M1056 Pre-compromise This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. ## Detection ### Detection of Upload Malware ## Risk Assessment | Finding | Severity | Impact | | ----------------------------------- | -------- | -------------------- | | Upload Malware technique applicable | High | Resource Development | ## CWE Categories | CWE ID | Title | | ------ | --------------------- | | N/A | No direct CWE mapping | ## References - [Datadog Security Labs Malicious PyPi Packages 2024](https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/malicious-pypi-package-targeting-highly-specific-macos-machines/) - [Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020](https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/) - [Bleeping Computer Binance Smart Chain 2023](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-use-binance-smart-chain-contracts-to-store-malicious-scripts/) - [Talos IPFS 2022](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/ipfs-abuse/) - [Guardio Etherhiding 2023](https://labs.guard.io/etherhiding-hiding-web2-malicious-code-in-web3-smart-contracts-65ea78efad16) - [Atomic Red Team - T1608.001](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/tree/master/atomics/T1608.001) - [MITRE ATT&CK - T1608.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001)
Trust audit
BLOCKgrade D · trust 69/100 Do not install this without reading the findings. The audit found something that could harm you or your machine.
| Layer | What it checks | Result |
|---|---|---|
| L0 | Provenance & inventory | WARN |
| L1 | Static analysis of the code | NA |
| L2 | Instruction surface (what it tells the agent) | FAIL |
| L3 | Class-specific surface | PASS |
| L4 | Behavioural (sandbox) | SKIPPED |
What the source does
- Filesystem
- none-observed
- Network
- none-observed
- Shell
- none-observed
- Dependencies
- pinned
- Secrets in source
- none-found
Findings (7)
**Execute Test**: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below.
packages/app/public/apple-touch-icon-v3.png
packages/app/public/apple-touch-icon.png
packages/app/public/favicon-96x96-v3.png
packages/app/public/favicon-96x96.png
packages/app/public/favicon-v3.ico
Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (1 known mitigations)
Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.
eaf7d03223fcfull audit observations/trust-audit/skill/cyberstrikeus__t1608.001_upload-malware.json · Report an issue / request a re-scanAudit history
Every audit this skill has had.
| Date | Source | Verdict | Grade | Score | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-18 | eaf7d03223fc | BLOCK | D | 69 | first audit |
Questions
What does the T1608.001 Upload Malware skill do?
Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.
Is T1608.001 Upload Malware safe to install?
No — not without reading the findings first. The audit graded it D (69/100) and found 1 critical or high issue in the source. Each one is listed on this page with the file and line it is on.
What can T1608.001 Upload Malware access on my machine?
The audit observed no filesystem, network or shell use at all in its source.
How current is this page?
The grade is for one exact copy of the source (eaf7d03223fc), read on 2026-10-18. The repository is watched, and a new audit runs when it changes — this is the first audit.
Add this badge to your README
Shows this page's audit result and links back to it. It updates when the audit does.
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