T1537 Transfer Data To Cloud AccountCAUTION
Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.
Overview
Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.
eaf7d03223fcOBSERVED · 2026-10-18What it tells the agent
The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.
---
name: "T1537_transfer-data-to-cloud-account"
description: "Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including through sharing/syncing and creating backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service."
category: "client-side"
version: "18.1"
author: "cyberstrike-official"
tags:
- mitre-attack
- enterprise
- t1537
- exfiltration
- iaas
- office-suite
- saas
technique_id: "T1537"
tactic: "exfiltration"
all_tactics:
- exfiltration
platforms:
- IaaS
- Office Suite
- SaaS
mitre_url: "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537"
tech_stack:
- cloud
- office
- saas
cwe_ids:
- CWE-200
chains_with: []
prerequisites: []
severity_boost: {}
---
# T1537 Transfer Data to Cloud Account
## High-Level Description
Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including through sharing/syncing and creating backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service.
A defender who is monitoring for large transfers to outside the cloud environment through normal file transfers or over command and control channels may not be watching for data transfers to another account within the same cloud provider. Such transfers may utilize existing cloud provider APIs and the internal address space of the cloud provider to blend into normal traffic or avoid data transfers over external network interfaces.
Adversaries may also use cloud-native mechanisms to share victim data with adversary-controlled cloud accounts, such as creating anonymous file sharing links or, in Azure, a shared access signature (SAS) URI.
Incidents have been observed where adversaries have created backups of cloud instances and transferred them to separate accounts.
## Kill Chain Phase
- Exfiltration (TA0010)
**Platforms:** IaaS, Office Suite, SaaS
## What to Check
- [ ] Identify if Transfer Data to Cloud Account technique is applicable to target environment
- [ ] Check IaaS systems for indicators of Transfer Data to Cloud Account
- [ ] Check Office Suite systems for indicators of Transfer Data to Cloud Account
- [ ] Check SaaS systems for indicators of Transfer Data to Cloud Account
- [ ] Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (4 known mitigations)
- [ ] Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)
## How to Test
### Manual Testing
1. **Identify Attack Surface**: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Transfer Data to Cloud Account by examining the target platforms (IaaS, Office Suite, SaaS).
2. **Assess Existing Defenses**: Review whether mitigations for T1537 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.
3. **Execute Test**: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below.
> **Note**: No Atomic Red Team tests available for this technique. See [Atomic Red Team GitHub](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team) for updates.
## Remediation Guide
### M1057 Data Loss Prevention
Data loss prevention can prevent and block sensitive data from being shared with individuals outside an organization.
### M1018 User Account Management
Limit user account and IAM policies to the least privileges required.
### M1054 Software Configuration
Configure appropriate data sharing restrictions in cloud services. For example, external sharing in Microsoft SharePoint and Google Drive can be turned off altogether, blocked for certain domains, or restricted to certain users.
### M1037 Filter Network Traffic
Implement network-based filtering restrictions to prohibit data transfers to untrusted VPCs.
## Detection
### Cross-Platform Detection of Data Transfer to Cloud Account
## Risk Assessment
| Finding | Severity | Impact |
| --------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------------ |
| Transfer Data to Cloud Account technique applicable | Low | Exfiltration |
## CWE Categories
| CWE ID | Title |
| ------- | --------------------------------- |
| CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information |
## References
- [AWS EBS Snapshot Sharing](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ebs-modifying-snapshot-permissions.html)
- [TLDRSec AWS Attacks](https://tldrsec.com/p/blog-lesser-known-aws-attacks)
- [Azure Shared Access Signature](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/delegate-access-with-shared-access-signature)
- [Azure Blob Snapshots](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/snapshots-overview)
- [Microsoft Azure Storage Shared Access Signature](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-sas-overview)
- [DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018](https://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2018/images/07/13/gru.indictment.pdf)
- [Atomic Red Team - T1537](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/tree/master/atomics/T1537)
- [MITRE ATT&CK - T1537](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537)Trust audit
CAUTIONgrade B · trust 89/100 Install with care. The audit found things worth knowing before you trust its output.
| Layer | What it checks | Result |
|---|---|---|
| L0 | Provenance & inventory | WARN |
| L1 | Static analysis of the code | NA |
| L2 | Instruction surface (what it tells the agent) | PASS |
| L3 | Class-specific surface | PASS |
| L4 | Behavioural (sandbox) | SKIPPED |
What the source does
- Filesystem
- none-observed
- Network
- none-observed
- Shell
- none-observed
- Dependencies
- pinned
- Secrets in source
- none-found
Findings (5)
packages/app/public/apple-touch-icon-v3.png
packages/app/public/apple-touch-icon.png
packages/app/public/favicon-96x96-v3.png
packages/app/public/favicon-96x96.png
packages/app/public/favicon-v3.ico
Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.
eaf7d03223fcfull audit observations/trust-audit/skill/cyberstrikeus__t1537_transfer-data-to-cloud-account.json · Report an issue / request a re-scanAudit history
Every audit this skill has had.
| Date | Source | Verdict | Grade | Score | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-18 | eaf7d03223fc | CAUTION | B | 89 | first audit |
Questions
What does the T1537 Transfer Data To Cloud Account skill do?
Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.
Is T1537 Transfer Data To Cloud Account safe to install?
With care. The audit graded it B (89/100) and found 5 things worth knowing before you trust this skill, listed below with the exact line each was found on.
What can T1537 Transfer Data To Cloud Account access on my machine?
The audit observed no filesystem, network or shell use at all in its source.
How current is this page?
The grade is for one exact copy of the source (eaf7d03223fc), read on 2026-10-18. The repository is watched, and a new audit runs when it changes — this is the first audit.
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