Atlas / Skills / cyberstrikeus / T1516 Input Injection

T1516 Input InjectionCAUTION

skills/cyberstrikeus/t1516-input-injection

Agent skill by cyberstrikeus · agents · ai hacking · ai penetration testing · Audited 2026-10-18

⚑ Report / re-scan Source ↗

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Verdict

CAUTION

Grade

Trust score

89 /100

Version

18.1

Hosts

—

License

AGPL-3.0

Stars

3,185

Overview

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Read from source at commit eaf7d03223fcOBSERVED · 2026-10-18

What it tells the agent

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: "T1516_input-injection"
description: "A malicious application can inject input to the user interface to mimic user interaction through the abuse of Android's accessibility APIs."
category: "configuration"
version: "18.1"
author: "cyberstrike-official"
tags:
  - mitre-attack
  - mobile
  - t1516
  - defense-evasion
  - impact
  - android
technique_id: "T1516"
tactic: "defense-evasion"
all_tactics:
  - defense-evasion
  - impact
platforms:
  - Android
mitre_url: "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516"
tech_stack:
  - android
cwe_ids:
  - CWE-693
chains_with: []
prerequisites: []
severity_boost: {}
---

# T1516 Input Injection

## High-Level Description

A malicious application can inject input to the user interface to mimic user interaction through the abuse of Android's accessibility APIs.

Input Injection can be achieved using any of the following methods:

- Mimicking user clicks on the screen, for example to steal money from a user's PayPal account.
- Injecting global actions, such as `GLOBAL_ACTION_BACK` (programatically mimicking a physical back button press), to trigger actions on behalf of the user.
- Inserting input into text fields on behalf of the user. This method is used legitimately to auto-fill text fields by applications such as password managers.

## Kill Chain Phase

- Defense Evasion (TA0030)
- Impact (TA0034)

**Platforms:** Android

## What to Check

- [ ] Identify if Input Injection technique is applicable to target mobile environment
- [ ] Check Android devices for indicators of Input Injection
- [ ] Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (2 known mitigations)
- [ ] Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)

## How to Test

### Identify Attack Surface

Determine if the target mobile environment is susceptible to Input Injection by examining the target platforms (Android).

### Assess Existing Defenses

Review whether mitigations for T1516 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.

## Remediation Guide

### M1011 User Guidance

Users should be warned against granting access to accessibility features, and to carefully scrutinize applications that request this dangerous permission.

### M1012 Enterprise Policy

An EMM/MDM can use the Android `DevicePolicyManager.setPermittedAccessibilityServices` method to set an explicit list of applications that are allowed to use Android's accessibility features.

## Detection

### Detection of Input Injection

## Risk Assessment

| Finding                              | Severity | Impact          |
| ------------------------------------ | -------- | --------------- |
| Input Injection technique applicable | High     | Defense Evasion |

## CWE Categories

| CWE ID  | Title                        |
| ------- | ---------------------------- |
| CWE-693 | Protection Mechanism Failure |

## References

- [bitwarden autofill logins](https://help.bitwarden.com/article/auto-fill-android/)
- [android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa](https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/)
- [Talos Gustuff Apr 2019](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/gustuff-targets-australia.html)
- [MITRE ATT&CK Mobile - T1516](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516)

Trust audit

CAUTIONgrade B · trust 89/100 Install with care. The audit found things worth knowing before you trust its output.

Layer	What it checks	Result
L0	Provenance & inventory	WARN
L1	Static analysis of the code	NA
L2	Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)	PASS
L3	Class-specific surface	PASS
L4	Behavioural (sandbox)	SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem: none-observed
Network: none-observed
Shell: none-observed
Dependencies: pinned
Secrets in source: none-found