Atlas / Skills / cyberstrikeus / T1513 Screen Capture

T1513 Screen CaptureCAUTION

skills/cyberstrikeus/t1513-screen-capture

Agent skill by cyberstrikeus · agents · ai hacking · ai penetration testing · Audited 2026-10-18

⚑ Report / re-scan Source ↗

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Verdict

CAUTION

Grade

Trust score

89 /100

Version

18.1

Hosts

—

License

AGPL-3.0

Stars

3,185

Overview

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Read from source at commit eaf7d03223fcOBSERVED · 2026-10-18

What it tells the agent

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: "T1513_screen-capture"
description: "Adversaries may use screen capture to collect additional information about a target device, such as applications running in the foreground, user data, credentials, or other sensitive information."
category: "information-gathering"
version: "18.1"
author: "cyberstrike-official"
tags:
  - mitre-attack
  - mobile
  - t1513
  - collection
  - android
technique_id: "T1513"
tactic: "collection"
all_tactics:
  - collection
platforms:
  - Android
mitre_url: "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1513"
tech_stack:
  - android
cwe_ids:
  - CWE-200
chains_with: []
prerequisites: []
severity_boost: {}
---

# T1513 Screen Capture

## High-Level Description

Adversaries may use screen capture to collect additional information about a target device, such as applications running in the foreground, user data, credentials, or other sensitive information. Applications running in the background can capture screenshots or videos of another application running in the foreground by using the Android `MediaProjectionManager` (generally requires the device user to grant consent). Background applications can also use Android accessibility services to capture screen contents being displayed by a foreground application. An adversary with root access or Android Debug Bridge (adb) access could call the Android `screencap` or `screenrecord` commands.

## Kill Chain Phase

- Collection (TA0035)

**Platforms:** Android

## What to Check

- [ ] Identify if Screen Capture technique is applicable to target mobile environment
- [ ] Check Android devices for indicators of Screen Capture
- [ ] Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (3 known mitigations)
- [ ] Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)

## How to Test

### Identify Attack Surface

Determine if the target mobile environment is susceptible to Screen Capture by examining the target platforms (Android).

### Assess Existing Defenses

Review whether mitigations for T1513 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.

## Remediation Guide

### M1012 Enterprise Policy

Enterprise policies should block access to the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) by preventing users from enabling USB debugging on Android devices unless specifically needed (e.g., if the device is used for application development). An EMM/MDM can use the Android `DevicePolicyManager.setPermittedAccessibilityServices` method to set an explicit list of applications that are allowed to use Android's accessibility features.

### M1011 User Guidance

Users should be advised not to grant consent for screen captures to occur unless expected. Users should avoid enabling USB debugging (Android Debug Bridge) unless explicitly required.

### M1013 Application Developer Guidance

Application developers can apply the `FLAG_SECURE` property to sensitive screens within their apps to make it more difficult for the screen contents to be captured.

## Detection

### Detection of Screen Capture

## Risk Assessment

| Finding                             | Severity | Impact     |
| ----------------------------------- | -------- | ---------- |
| Screen Capture technique applicable | High     | Collection |

## CWE Categories

| CWE ID  | Title                             |
| ------- | --------------------------------- |
| CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information |

## References

- [Android ScreenCap2 2019](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb)
- [Android ScreenCap1 2019](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/media/projection/MediaProjectionManager)
- [Lookout-Monokle](https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/lookout-discovers-monokle-threat-report.pdf)
- [Fortinet screencap July 2019](https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/new-wave-bianlian-malware.html)
- [Trend Micro ScreenCap July 2015](https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/hacking-team-rcsandroid-spying-tool-listens-to-calls-roots-devices-to-get-in/)
- [NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue](https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-40.html)
- [MITRE ATT&CK Mobile - T1513](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1513)

Trust audit

CAUTIONgrade B · trust 89/100 Install with care. The audit found things worth knowing before you trust its output.

Layer	What it checks	Result
L0	Provenance & inventory	WARN
L1	Static analysis of the code	NA
L2	Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)	PASS
L3	Class-specific surface	PASS
L4	Behavioural (sandbox)	SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem: none-observed
Network: none-observed
Shell: none-observed
Dependencies: pinned
Secrets in source: none-found