Atlas / Skills / cyberstrikeus / T1490 Inhibit System Recovery

T1490 Inhibit System RecoveryCAUTION

skills/cyberstrikeus/t1490-inhibit-system-recovery

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Verdict
CAUTION
Grade
B
Trust score
89 /100
Version
18.1
Hosts
—
License
AGPL-3.0
Stars
3,185
01

Overview

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Read from source at commit eaf7d03223fcOBSERVED · 2026-10-18
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02

What it tells the agent

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: "T1490_inhibit-system-recovery"
description: "Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery."
category: "business-logic"
version: "18.1"
author: "cyberstrike-official"
tags:
  - mitre-attack
  - enterprise
  - t1490
  - impact
  - containers
  - esxi
  - iaas
  - linux
  - macos
  - network-devices
  - windows
technique_id: "T1490"
tactic: "impact"
all_tactics:
  - impact
platforms:
  - Containers
  - ESXi
  - IaaS
  - Linux
  - macOS
  - Network Devices
  - Windows
mitre_url: "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490"
tech_stack:
  - containers
  - esxi
  - cloud
  - linux
  - macos
  - network devices
  - windows
cwe_ids:
  - CWE-400
chains_with: []
prerequisites: []
severity_boost: {}
---

# T1490 Inhibit System Recovery

## High-Level Description

Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery. This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.

Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of Data Destruction and Data Encrypted for Impact. Furthermore, adversaries may disable recovery notifications, then corrupt backups.

A number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features:

- <code>vssadmin.exe</code> can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - <code>vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet</code>
- Windows Management Instrumentation can be used to delete volume shadow copies - <code>wmic shadowcopy delete</code>
- <code>wbadmin.exe</code> can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - <code>wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet</code>
- <code>bcdedit.exe</code> can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - <code>bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no</code>
- <code>REAgentC.exe</code> can be used to disable Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) repair/recovery options of an infected system
- <code>diskshadow.exe</code> can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - <code>diskshadow delete shadows all</code>

On network devices, adversaries may leverage Disk Wipe to delete backup firmware images and reformat the file system, then System Shutdown/Reboot to reload the device. Together this activity may leave network devices completely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations.

On ESXi servers, adversaries may delete or encrypt snapshots of virtual machines to support Data Encrypted for Impact, preventing them from being leveraged as backups (e.g., via ` vim-cmd vmsvc/snapshot.removeall`).

Adversaries may also delete “online” backups that are connected to their network – whether via network storage media or through folders that sync to cloud services. In cloud environments, adversaries may disable versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, database backups, machine images, and prior versions of objects designed to be used in disaster recovery scenarios.

## Kill Chain Phase

- Impact (TA0040)

**Platforms:** Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows

## What to Check

- [ ] Identify if Inhibit System Recovery technique is applicable to target environment
- [ ] Check Containers systems for indicators of Inhibit System Recovery
- [ ] Check ESXi systems for indicators of Inhibit System Recovery
- [ ] Check IaaS systems for indicators of Inhibit System Recovery
- [ ] Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (4 known mitigations)
- [ ] Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)

## How to Test

### Atomic Red Team Tests

The following tests are from [Atomic Red Team](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team) and provide actionable ways to test this technique:

### Atomic Test 1: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies

Deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer. Upon
execution, if no shadow volumes exist the message "No items found that satisfy the query." will be displayed. If shadow volumes are present, it
will delete them without printing output to the screen. This is because the /quiet parameter was passed which also suppresses the y/n
confirmation prompt. Shadow copies can only be created on Windows server or Windows 8.

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc788055(v=ws.11)

**Supported Platforms:** windows
**Elevation Required:** Yes

```cmd
vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
```

**Dependencies:**

- Create volume shadow copy of C:\ . This prereq command only works on Windows Server or Windows 8.

### Atomic Test 2: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies via WMI

Deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies via WMI. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer.

**Supported Platforms:** windows
**Elevation Required:** Yes

```cmd
wmic.exe shadowcopy delete
```

**Dependencies:**

- Create volume shadow copy of C:\ .

### Atomic Test 3: Windows - wbadmin Delete Windows Backup Catalog

Deletes Windows Backup Catalog. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer. Upon execution,
"The backup catalog has been successfully deleted." will be displayed in the PowerShell session.

**Supported Platforms:** windows
**Elevation Required:** Yes

```cmd
wbadmin delete catalog -quiet
```

### Atomic Test 4: Windows - Disable Windows Recovery Console Repair

Disables repair by the Windows Recovery Console on boot. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympi
03

Trust audit

CAUTIONgrade B · trust 89/100 Install with care. The audit found things worth knowing before you trust its output.

LayerWhat it checksResult
L0Provenance & inventoryWARN
L1Static analysis of the codeNA
L2Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)PASS
L3Class-specific surfacePASS
L4Behavioural (sandbox)SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem
none-observed
Network
none-observed
Shell
none-observed
Dependencies
pinned
Secrets in source
none-found

Findings (5)

MEDIUMInventory / provenance · inv.symlink · CWE-1104
packages/app/public/apple-touch-icon-v3.png
packages/app/public/apple-touch-icon-v3.png
Why it matters. link not followed
MEDIUMInventory / provenance · inv.symlink · CWE-1104
packages/app/public/apple-touch-icon.png
packages/app/public/apple-touch-icon.png
Why it matters. link not followed
MEDIUMInventory / provenance · inv.symlink · CWE-1104
packages/app/public/favicon-96x96-v3.png
packages/app/public/favicon-96x96-v3.png
Why it matters. link not followed
MEDIUMInventory / provenance · inv.symlink · CWE-1104
packages/app/public/favicon-96x96.png
packages/app/public/favicon-96x96.png
Why it matters. link not followed
MEDIUMInventory / provenance · inv.symlink · CWE-1104
packages/app/public/favicon-v3.ico
packages/app/public/favicon-v3.ico
Why it matters. link not followed

Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.

Audited 2026-10-18 · audit v0.4.1 · source sha eaf7d03223fcfull audit observations/trust-audit/skill/cyberstrikeus__t1490_inhibit-system-recovery.json · Report an issue / request a re-scan
04

Audit history

Every audit this skill has had.

DateSourceVerdictGradeScoreChange
2026-10-18eaf7d03223fcCAUTIONB89first audit
05

Questions

What does the T1490 Inhibit System Recovery skill do?

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Is T1490 Inhibit System Recovery safe to install?

With care. The audit graded it B (89/100) and found 5 things worth knowing before you trust this skill, listed below with the exact line each was found on.

What can T1490 Inhibit System Recovery access on my machine?

The audit observed no filesystem, network or shell use at all in its source.

How current is this page?

The grade is for one exact copy of the source (eaf7d03223fc), read on 2026-10-18. The repository is watched, and a new audit runs when it changes — this is the first audit.

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