T1485.001 Lifecycle Triggered DeletionCAUTION
Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.
Overview
Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.
eaf7d03223fcOBSERVED · 2026-10-18What it tells the agent
The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.
--- name: "T1485.001_lifecycle-triggered-deletion" description: "Adversaries may modify the lifecycle policies of a cloud storage bucket to destroy all objects stored within." category: "business-logic" version: "18.1" author: "cyberstrike-official" tags: - mitre-attack - enterprise - t1485.001 - impact - iaas - sub-technique technique_id: "T1485.001" tactic: "impact" all_tactics: - impact platforms: - IaaS mitre_url: "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/001" tech_stack: - cloud cwe_ids: - CWE-400 chains_with: - T1485 prerequisites: - T1485 severity_boost: T1485: "Chain with T1485 for deeper attack path" --- # T1485.001 Lifecycle-Triggered Deletion > **Sub-technique of:** T1485 ## High-Level Description Adversaries may modify the lifecycle policies of a cloud storage bucket to destroy all objects stored within. Cloud storage buckets often allow users to set lifecycle policies to automate the migration, archival, or deletion of objects after a set period of time. If a threat actor has sufficient permissions to modify these policies, they may be able to delete all objects at once. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary with the `PutLifecycleConfiguration` permission may use the `PutBucketLifecycle` API call to apply a lifecycle policy to an S3 bucket that deletes all objects in the bucket after one day. In addition to destroying data for purposes of extortion and Financial Theft, adversaries may also perform this action on buckets storing cloud logs for Indicator Removal. ## Kill Chain Phase - Impact (TA0040) **Platforms:** IaaS ## What to Check - [ ] Identify if Lifecycle-Triggered Deletion technique is applicable to target environment - [ ] Check IaaS systems for indicators of Lifecycle-Triggered Deletion - [ ] Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (2 known mitigations) - [ ] Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies) ## How to Test ### Manual Testing 1. **Identify Attack Surface**: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Lifecycle-Triggered Deletion by examining the target platforms (IaaS). 2. **Assess Existing Defenses**: Review whether mitigations for T1485.001 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable. 3. **Execute Test**: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below. > **Note**: No Atomic Red Team tests available for this technique. See [Atomic Red Team GitHub](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team) for updates. ## Remediation Guide ### M1018 User Account Management In cloud environments, limit permissions to modify cloud bucket lifecycle policies (e.g., `PutLifecycleConfiguration` in AWS) to only those accounts that require it. In AWS environments, consider using Service Control policies to limit the use of the `PutBucketLifecycle` API call. ### M1053 Data Backup Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data. Ensure backups are stored off system and protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and destroy the backups to prevent recovery. ## Detection ### Detection of Lifecycle Policy Modifications for Triggered Deletion in IaaS Cloud Storage ## Risk Assessment | Finding | Severity | Impact | | ------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------ | | Lifecycle-Triggered Deletion technique applicable | Low | Impact | ## CWE Categories | CWE ID | Title | | ------- | --------------------------------- | | CWE-400 | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | ## References - [AWS Storage Lifecycles](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/object-lifecycle-mgmt.html) - [GCP Storage Lifecycles](https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/lifecycle) - [Halcyon AWS Ransomware 2025](https://www.halcyon.ai/blog/abusing-aws-native-services-ransomware-encrypting-s3-buckets-with-sse-c) - [Azure Storage Lifecycles](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/lifecycle-management-policy-configure?tabs=azure-portal) - [Palo Alto Cloud Ransomware](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/blog/prisma-cloud/ransomware-data-protection-cloud/) - [Datadog S3 Lifecycle CloudTrail Logs](https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-lifecycle-rule/) - [Atomic Red Team - T1485.001](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/tree/master/atomics/T1485.001) - [MITRE ATT&CK - T1485.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/001)
Trust audit
CAUTIONgrade B · trust 80/100 Install with care. The audit found things worth knowing before you trust its output.
| Layer | What it checks | Result |
|---|---|---|
| L0 | Provenance & inventory | WARN |
| L1 | Static analysis of the code | NA |
| L2 | Instruction surface (what it tells the agent) | WARN |
| L3 | Class-specific surface | PASS |
| L4 | Behavioural (sandbox) | SKIPPED |
What the source does
- Filesystem
- none-observed
- Network
- none-observed
- Shell
- none-observed
- Dependencies
- pinned
- Secrets in source
- none-found
Findings (8)
packages/app/public/apple-touch-icon-v3.png
packages/app/public/apple-touch-icon.png
packages/app/public/favicon-96x96-v3.png
packages/app/public/favicon-96x96.png
packages/app/public/favicon-v3.ico
3. **Execute Test**: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below.
an adversary with the `PutLifecycleConfiguration` permission may use the `PutBucketLifecycle` API call to apply a lifecycle policy
If a threat actor has sufficient permissions to modify these policies, they may be able to delete all objects at once.
Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.
eaf7d03223fcfull audit observations/trust-audit/skill/cyberstrikeus__t1485.001_lifecycle-triggered-deletion.json · Report an issue / request a re-scanAudit history
Every audit this skill has had.
| Date | Source | Verdict | Grade | Score | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-18 | eaf7d03223fc | CAUTION | B | 80 | first audit |
Questions
What does the T1485.001 Lifecycle Triggered Deletion skill do?
Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.
Is T1485.001 Lifecycle Triggered Deletion safe to install?
With care. The audit graded it B (80/100) and found 8 things worth knowing before you trust this skill, listed below with the exact line each was found on.
What can T1485.001 Lifecycle Triggered Deletion access on my machine?
The audit observed no filesystem, network or shell use at all in its source.
How current is this page?
The grade is for one exact copy of the source (eaf7d03223fc), read on 2026-10-18. The repository is watched, and a new audit runs when it changes — this is the first audit.
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