Atlas / Skills / cyberstrikeus / T1485.001 Lifecycle Triggered Deletion

T1485.001 Lifecycle Triggered DeletionCAUTION

skills/cyberstrikeus/t1485-001-lifecycle-triggered-deletion

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Verdict
CAUTION
Grade
B
Trust score
80 /100
Version
18.1
Hosts
—
License
AGPL-3.0
Stars
3,185
01

Overview

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Read from source at commit eaf7d03223fcOBSERVED · 2026-10-18
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02

What it tells the agent

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: "T1485.001_lifecycle-triggered-deletion"
description: "Adversaries may modify the lifecycle policies of a cloud storage bucket to destroy all objects stored within."
category: "business-logic"
version: "18.1"
author: "cyberstrike-official"
tags:
  - mitre-attack
  - enterprise
  - t1485.001
  - impact
  - iaas
  - sub-technique
technique_id: "T1485.001"
tactic: "impact"
all_tactics:
  - impact
platforms:
  - IaaS
mitre_url: "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/001"
tech_stack:
  - cloud
cwe_ids:
  - CWE-400
chains_with:
  - T1485
prerequisites:
  - T1485
severity_boost:
  T1485: "Chain with T1485 for deeper attack path"
---

# T1485.001 Lifecycle-Triggered Deletion

> **Sub-technique of:** T1485

## High-Level Description

Adversaries may modify the lifecycle policies of a cloud storage bucket to destroy all objects stored within.

Cloud storage buckets often allow users to set lifecycle policies to automate the migration, archival, or deletion of objects after a set period of time. If a threat actor has sufficient permissions to modify these policies, they may be able to delete all objects at once.

For example, in AWS environments, an adversary with the `PutLifecycleConfiguration` permission may use the `PutBucketLifecycle` API call to apply a lifecycle policy to an S3 bucket that deletes all objects in the bucket after one day. In addition to destroying data for purposes of extortion and Financial Theft, adversaries may also perform this action on buckets storing cloud logs for Indicator Removal.

## Kill Chain Phase

- Impact (TA0040)

**Platforms:** IaaS

## What to Check

- [ ] Identify if Lifecycle-Triggered Deletion technique is applicable to target environment
- [ ] Check IaaS systems for indicators of Lifecycle-Triggered Deletion
- [ ] Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (2 known mitigations)
- [ ] Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)

## How to Test

### Manual Testing

1. **Identify Attack Surface**: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Lifecycle-Triggered Deletion by examining the target platforms (IaaS).

2. **Assess Existing Defenses**: Review whether mitigations for T1485.001 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.

3. **Execute Test**: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below.

> **Note**: No Atomic Red Team tests available for this technique. See [Atomic Red Team GitHub](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team) for updates.

## Remediation Guide

### M1018 User Account Management

In cloud environments, limit permissions to modify cloud bucket lifecycle policies (e.g., `PutLifecycleConfiguration` in AWS) to only those accounts that require it. In AWS environments, consider using Service Control policies to limit the use of the `PutBucketLifecycle` API call.

### M1053 Data Backup

Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data. Ensure backups are stored off system and protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and destroy the backups to prevent recovery.

## Detection

### Detection of Lifecycle Policy Modifications for Triggered Deletion in IaaS Cloud Storage

## Risk Assessment

| Finding                                           | Severity | Impact |
| ------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------ |
| Lifecycle-Triggered Deletion technique applicable | Low      | Impact |

## CWE Categories

| CWE ID  | Title                             |
| ------- | --------------------------------- |
| CWE-400 | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption |

## References

- [AWS Storage Lifecycles](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/object-lifecycle-mgmt.html)
- [GCP Storage Lifecycles](https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/lifecycle)
- [Halcyon AWS Ransomware 2025](https://www.halcyon.ai/blog/abusing-aws-native-services-ransomware-encrypting-s3-buckets-with-sse-c)
- [Azure Storage Lifecycles](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/lifecycle-management-policy-configure?tabs=azure-portal)
- [Palo Alto Cloud Ransomware](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/blog/prisma-cloud/ransomware-data-protection-cloud/)
- [Datadog S3 Lifecycle CloudTrail Logs](https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-lifecycle-rule/)
- [Atomic Red Team - T1485.001](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/tree/master/atomics/T1485.001)
- [MITRE ATT&CK - T1485.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/001)
03

Trust audit

CAUTIONgrade B · trust 80/100 Install with care. The audit found things worth knowing before you trust its output.

LayerWhat it checksResult
L0Provenance & inventoryWARN
L1Static analysis of the codeNA
L2Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)WARN
L3Class-specific surfacePASS
L4Behavioural (sandbox)SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem
none-observed
Network
none-observed
Shell
none-observed
Dependencies
pinned
Secrets in source
none-found

Findings (8)

MEDIUMInventory / provenance · inv.symlink · CWE-1104
packages/app/public/apple-touch-icon-v3.png
packages/app/public/apple-touch-icon-v3.png
Why it matters. link not followed
MEDIUMInventory / provenance · inv.symlink · CWE-1104
packages/app/public/apple-touch-icon.png
packages/app/public/apple-touch-icon.png
Why it matters. link not followed
MEDIUMInventory / provenance · inv.symlink · CWE-1104
packages/app/public/favicon-96x96-v3.png
packages/app/public/favicon-96x96-v3.png
Why it matters. link not followed
MEDIUMInventory / provenance · inv.symlink · CWE-1104
packages/app/public/favicon-96x96.png
packages/app/public/favicon-96x96.png
Why it matters. link not followed
MEDIUMInventory / provenance · inv.symlink · CWE-1104
packages/app/public/favicon-v3.ico
packages/app/public/favicon-v3.ico
Why it matters. link not followed
MEDIUMPrivilege escalation / persistence · review.unsafe_action · CWE-269, CWE-250
SKILL.md
3. **Execute Test**: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below.
Why it matters. The package directs an automated agent to execute the test procedure without requiring user approval or defining safe, non-destructive boundaries.
Fix. rewrite it so the instruction says plainly what it does, and asks the user before it acts
MEDIUMPrivilege escalation / persistence · review.unsafe_action · CWE-269, CWE-250
SKILL.md
an adversary with the `PutLifecycleConfiguration` permission may use the `PutBucketLifecycle` API call to apply a lifecycle policy
Why it matters. The package instructs the agent on how to apply a lifecycle policy capable of destroying all data in a cloud storage bucket.
Fix. rewrite it so the instruction says plainly what it does, and asks the user before it acts
MEDIUMPrivilege escalation / persistence · review.unsafe_action · CWE-269, CWE-250
SKILL.md
If a threat actor has sufficient permissions to modify these policies, they may be able to delete all objects at once.
Why it matters. The text explicitly outlines a destructive action that results in the total deletion of cloud storage objects.
Fix. rewrite it so the instruction says plainly what it does, and asks the user before it acts

Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.

Audited 2026-10-18 · audit v0.4.1 · source sha eaf7d03223fcfull audit observations/trust-audit/skill/cyberstrikeus__t1485.001_lifecycle-triggered-deletion.json · Report an issue / request a re-scan
04

Audit history

Every audit this skill has had.

DateSourceVerdictGradeScoreChange
2026-10-18eaf7d03223fcCAUTIONB80first audit
05

Questions

What does the T1485.001 Lifecycle Triggered Deletion skill do?

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Is T1485.001 Lifecycle Triggered Deletion safe to install?

With care. The audit graded it B (80/100) and found 8 things worth knowing before you trust this skill, listed below with the exact line each was found on.

What can T1485.001 Lifecycle Triggered Deletion access on my machine?

The audit observed no filesystem, network or shell use at all in its source.

How current is this page?

The grade is for one exact copy of the source (eaf7d03223fc), read on 2026-10-18. The repository is watched, and a new audit runs when it changes — this is the first audit.

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