Atlas / Skills / cyberstrikeus / T1453 Abuse Accessibility Features

T1453 Abuse Accessibility FeaturesCAUTION

skills/cyberstrikeus/t1453-abuse-accessibility-features

Agent skill by cyberstrikeus · agents · ai hacking · ai penetration testing · Audited 2026-10-18

⚑ Report / re-scan Source ↗

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Verdict

CAUTION

Grade

Trust score

89 /100

Version

18.1

Hosts

—

License

AGPL-3.0

Stars

3,185

Overview

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Read from source at commit eaf7d03223fcOBSERVED · 2026-10-18

What it tells the agent

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: "T1453_abuse-accessibility-features"
description: "Adversaries may abuse accessibility features in Android devices to steal sensitive data and to spread malware to other devices."
category: "information-gathering"
version: "18.1"
author: "cyberstrike-official"
tags:
  - mitre-attack
  - mobile
  - t1453
  - collection
  - credential-access
  - android
technique_id: "T1453"
tactic: "collection"
all_tactics:
  - collection
  - credential-access
platforms:
  - Android
mitre_url: "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1453"
tech_stack:
  - android
cwe_ids:
  - CWE-200
chains_with: []
prerequisites: []
severity_boost: {}
---

# T1453 Abuse Accessibility Features

## High-Level Description

Adversaries may abuse accessibility features in Android devices to steal sensitive data and to spread malware to other devices. Accessibility features in Android are designed to assist users with disabilities, performing a variety of tasks, such as using Action Blocks to control lightbulbs, and changing the device’s user interface, such as changing the font size and adjusting contract or colors.

One example of how adversaries abuse accessibility features is overlaying an HTML object mimicking a legitimate login screen. The user types their credentials in the overlay HTML object, which is then sent to the adversaries.

Another example is a malicious accessibility feature acting as a keylogger. The keylogger monitors changes on the EditText fields and sends it to the adversaries. This method of attack is also described in Keylogging; whereas Abuse Accessibility Features captures the overall abuse of accessibility features.

## Kill Chain Phase

- Collection (TA0035)
- Credential Access (TA0031)

**Platforms:** Android

## What to Check

- [ ] Identify if Abuse Accessibility Features technique is applicable to target mobile environment
- [ ] Check Android devices for indicators of Abuse Accessibility Features
- [ ] Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (1 known mitigations)
- [ ] Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)

## How to Test

### Identify Attack Surface

Determine if the target mobile environment is susceptible to Abuse Accessibility Features by examining the target platforms (Android).

### Assess Existing Defenses

Review whether mitigations for T1453 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.

## Remediation Guide

### M1011 User Guidance

First, users should be wary of clicking on suspicious text messages, links and emails. Secondly, users should be wary of granting applications accessibility features. Users may check applications that have been granted accessibility features by going to Settings, then Accessibility. Finally, users should be wary of downloading applications; although applications may be on the Google Play Store, they may not be benign (see Application Versioning).

## Detection

### Detection of Abuse Accessibility Features

## Risk Assessment

| Finding                                           | Severity | Impact     |
| ------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ---------- |
| Abuse Accessibility Features technique applicable | High     | Collection |

## CWE Categories

| CWE ID  | Title                             |
| ------- | --------------------------------- |
| CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information |

## References

- [Google_AndroidAcsOverview](https://support.google.com/accessibility/android/answer/6006564?hl=en&ref_topic=6007234&sjid=9936713164149272548-NA)
- [SahinSRLabs_FluBot_Dec2021](https://www.srlabs.de/blog-post/flubot-abuses-accessibility-features-to-steal-data)
- [MITRE ATT&CK Mobile - T1453](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1453)

Trust audit

CAUTIONgrade B · trust 89/100 Install with care. The audit found things worth knowing before you trust its output.

Layer	What it checks	Result
L0	Provenance & inventory	WARN
L1	Static analysis of the code	NA
L2	Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)	PASS
L3	Class-specific surface	PASS
L4	Behavioural (sandbox)	SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem: none-observed
Network: none-observed
Shell: none-observed
Dependencies: pinned
Secrets in source: none-found