Atlas / Skills / cyberstrikeus / T1429 Audio Capture

T1429 Audio CaptureCAUTION

skills/cyberstrikeus/t1429-audio-capture

Agent skill by cyberstrikeus · agents · ai hacking · ai penetration testing · Audited 2026-10-18

⚑ Report / re-scan Source ↗

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Verdict

CAUTION

Grade

Trust score

89 /100

Version

18.1

Hosts

—

License

AGPL-3.0

Stars

3,185

Overview

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Read from source at commit eaf7d03223fcOBSERVED · 2026-10-18

What it tells the agent

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: "T1429_audio-capture"
description: "Adversaries may capture audio to collect information by leveraging standard operating system APIs of a mobile device."
category: "information-gathering"
version: "18.1"
author: "cyberstrike-official"
tags:
  - mitre-attack
  - mobile
  - t1429
  - collection
  - android
  - ios
technique_id: "T1429"
tactic: "collection"
all_tactics:
  - collection
platforms:
  - Android
  - iOS
mitre_url: "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1429"
tech_stack:
  - android
  - ios
cwe_ids:
  - CWE-200
chains_with: []
prerequisites: []
severity_boost: {}
---

# T1429 Audio Capture

## High-Level Description

Adversaries may capture audio to collect information by leveraging standard operating system APIs of a mobile device. Examples of audio information adversaries may target include user conversations, surroundings, phone calls, or other sensitive information.

Android and iOS, by default, require that applications request device microphone access from the user.

On Android devices, applications must hold the `RECORD_AUDIO` permission to access the microphone or the `CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT` permission to access audio output. Because Android does not allow third-party applications to hold the `CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT` permission by default, only privileged applications, such as those distributed by Google or the device vendor, can access audio output. However, adversaries may be able to gain this access after successfully elevating their privileges. With the `CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT` permission, adversaries may pass the `MediaRecorder.AudioSource.VOICE_CALL` constant to `MediaRecorder.setAudioOutput`, allowing capture of both voice call uplink and downlink.

On iOS devices, applications must include the `NSMicrophoneUsageDescription` key in their `Info.plist` file to access the microphone.

## Kill Chain Phase

- Collection (TA0035)

**Platforms:** Android, iOS

## What to Check

- [ ] Identify if Audio Capture technique is applicable to target mobile environment
- [ ] Check Android devices for indicators of Audio Capture
- [ ] Check iOS devices for indicators of Audio Capture
- [ ] Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (2 known mitigations)
- [ ] Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)

## How to Test

### Identify Attack Surface

Determine if the target mobile environment is susceptible to Audio Capture by examining the target platforms (Android, iOS).

### Assess Existing Defenses

Review whether mitigations for T1429 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.

## Remediation Guide

### M1006 Use Recent OS Version

Android 9 and above restricts access to microphone, camera, and other sensors from background applications.

### M1011 User Guidance

Users should be wary of granting applications dangerous or privacy-intrusive permissions, such as access to microphone or audio output.

## Detection

### Detection of Audio Capture

## Risk Assessment

| Finding                            | Severity | Impact     |
| ---------------------------------- | -------- | ---------- |
| Audio Capture technique applicable | High     | Collection |

## CWE Categories

| CWE ID  | Title                             |
| ------- | --------------------------------- |
| CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information |

## References

- [Manifest.permission](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/media/MediaRecorder.AudioSource#VOICE_CALL)
- [Requesting Auth-Media Capture](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/avfoundation/cameras_and_media_capture/requesting_authorization_for_media_capture_on_ios)
- [Android Permissions](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission)
- [Android Privacy Indicators](https://source.android.com/devices/tech/config/privacy-indicators)
- [iOS Mic Spyware](https://blog.zecops.com/research/how-ios-malware-can-spy-on-users-silently/)
- [NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue](https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html)
- [MITRE ATT&CK Mobile - T1429](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1429)

Trust audit

CAUTIONgrade B · trust 89/100 Install with care. The audit found things worth knowing before you trust its output.

Layer	What it checks	Result
L0	Provenance & inventory	WARN
L1	Static analysis of the code	NA
L2	Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)	PASS
L3	Class-specific surface	PASS
L4	Behavioural (sandbox)	SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem: none-observed
Network: none-observed
Shell: none-observed
Dependencies: pinned
Secrets in source: none-found