T1090 ProxyCAUTION

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: "T1090_proxy"
description: "Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to ..."
category: "configuration"
version: "18.1"
author: "cyberstrike-official"
tags:
  - mitre-attack
  - enterprise
  - t1090
  - command-and-control
  - esxi
  - linux
  - macos
  - network-devices
  - windows
technique_id: "T1090"
tactic: "command-and-control"
all_tactics:
  - command-and-control
platforms:
  - ESXi
  - Linux
  - macOS
  - Network Devices
  - Windows
mitre_url: "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090"
tech_stack:
  - esxi
  - linux
  - macos
  - network devices
  - windows
cwe_ids:
  - CWE-300
chains_with:
  - T1090.001
  - T1090.002
  - T1090.003
  - T1090.004
prerequisites: []
severity_boost:
  T1090.001: "Chain with T1090.001 for deeper attack path"
  T1090.002: "Chain with T1090.002 for deeper attack path"
  T1090.003: "Chain with T1090.003 for deeper attack path"
---

# T1090 Proxy

## High-Level Description

Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.

Adversaries can also take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) to proxy command and control traffic.

## Kill Chain Phase

- Command and Control (TA0011)

**Platforms:** ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows

## What to Check

- [ ] Identify if Proxy technique is applicable to target environment
- [ ] Check ESXi systems for indicators of Proxy
- [ ] Check Linux systems for indicators of Proxy
- [ ] Check macOS systems for indicators of Proxy
- [ ] Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (3 known mitigations)
- [ ] Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)

## How to Test

### Manual Testing

1. **Identify Attack Surface**: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Proxy by examining the target platforms (ESXi, Linux, macOS).

2. **Assess Existing Defenses**: Review whether mitigations for T1090 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.

3. **Execute Test**: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below.

> **Note**: No Atomic Red Team tests available for this technique. See [Atomic Red Team GitHub](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team) for updates.

## Remediation Guide

### M1037 Filter Network Traffic

Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network allow and block lists. It should be noted that this kind of blocking may be circumvented by other techniques like Domain Fronting.

### M1031 Network Intrusion Prevention

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific C2 protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.

### M1020 SSL/TLS Inspection

If it is possible to inspect HTTPS traffic, the captures can be analyzed for connections that appear to be domain fronting.

## Detection

### Detection of Proxy Infrastructure Setup and Traffic Bridging

## Risk Assessment

| Finding                    | Severity | Impact              |
| -------------------------- | -------- | ------------------- |
| Proxy technique applicable | Medium   | Command And Control |

## CWE Categories

| CWE ID  | Title                              |
| ------- | ---------------------------------- |
| CWE-300 | Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint |

## References

- [University of Birmingham C2](https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf)
- [Trend Micro APT Attack Tools](http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/)
- [Atomic Red Team - T1090](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/tree/master/atomics/T1090)
- [MITRE ATT&CK - T1090](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090)

CAUTIONgrade B · trust 89/100 Install with care. The audit found things worth knowing before you trust its output.

What the source does

Filesystem

none-observed

Network

none-observed

Shell

none-observed

Dependencies

pinned

Secrets in source

none-found

Findings (5)

packages/app/public/apple-touch-icon-v3.png

packages/app/public/apple-touch-icon.png

packages/app/public/favicon-96x96-v3.png

packages/app/public/favicon-96x96.png

packages/app/public/favicon-v3.ico

Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.

[![ModelsAtlas audit: T1090 Proxy](https://modelsatlas.com/skills/cyberstrikeus/t1090-proxy/badge.svg)](https://modelsatlas.com/skills/cyberstrikeus/t1090-proxy/)

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