Atlas / Skills / cyberstrikeus / T0895 Autorun Image

T0895 Autorun ImageCAUTION

skills/cyberstrikeus/t0895-autorun-image

Agent skill by cyberstrikeus · agents · ai hacking · ai penetration testing · Audited 2026-10-18

⚑ Report / re-scan Source ↗

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Verdict

CAUTION

Grade

Trust score

89 /100

Version

18.1

Hosts

—

License

AGPL-3.0

Stars

3,185

Overview

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Read from source at commit eaf7d03223fcOBSERVED · 2026-10-18

What it tells the agent

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: "T0895_autorun-image"
description: "Adversaries may leverage AutoRun functionality or scripts to execute malicious code."
category: "input-validation"
version: "18.1"
author: "cyberstrike-official"
tags:
  - mitre-attack
  - ics
  - t0895
  - execution
technique_id: "T0895"
tactic: "execution"
all_tactics:
  - execution
platforms:
  - ICS
mitre_url: "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0895"
tech_stack:
  - ics
cwe_ids:
  - CWE-94
chains_with: []
prerequisites: []
severity_boost: {}
---

# T0895 Autorun Image

## High-Level Description

Adversaries may leverage AutoRun functionality or scripts to execute malicious code. Devices configured to enable AutoRun functionality or legacy operating systems may be susceptible to abuse of these features to run malicious code stored on various forms of removeable media (i.e., USB, Disk Images [.ISO]). Commonly, AutoRun or AutoPlay are disabled in many operating systems configurations to mitigate against this technique. If a device is configured to enable AutoRun or AutoPlay, adversaries may execute code on the device by mounting the removable media to the device, either through physical or virtual means. This may be especially relevant for virtual machine environments where disk images may be dynamically mapped to a guest system on a hypervisor.

An example could include an adversary gaining access to a hypervisor through the management interface to modify a virtual machine’s hardware configuration. They could then deploy an iso image with a malicious AutoRun script to cause the virtual machine to automatically execute the code contained on the disk image. This would enable the execution of malicious code within a virtual machine without needing any prior remote access to that system.

## Kill Chain Phase

- Execution (TA0104)

**Platforms:** ICS

## What to Check

- [ ] Identify if Autorun Image technique is applicable to target ICS environment
- [ ] Check ICS/SCADA systems for indicators of Autorun Image
- [ ] Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (1 known mitigations)
- [ ] Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)

## How to Test

### Identify Attack Surface

Determine if the target ICS/SCADA environment is susceptible to Autorun Image by examining operational technology systems and network architecture.

### Assess Existing Defenses

Review whether mitigations for T0895 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable in the ICS environment.

## Remediation Guide

### M0928 Operating System Configuration

Configure operating systems to disable the autorun of any specific file types or drives.

## Detection

### Detection of Autorun Image

## Risk Assessment

| Finding                            | Severity | Impact    |
| ---------------------------------- | -------- | --------- |
| Autorun Image technique applicable | Low      | Execution |

## CWE Categories

| CWE ID | Title                                  |
| ------ | -------------------------------------- |
| CWE-94 | Improper Control of Generation of Code |

## References

- [MITRE ATT&CK ICS - T0895](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0895)

Trust audit

CAUTIONgrade B · trust 89/100 Install with care. The audit found things worth knowing before you trust its output.

Layer	What it checks	Result
L0	Provenance & inventory	WARN
L1	Static analysis of the code	NA
L2	Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)	PASS
L3	Class-specific surface	PASS
L4	Behavioural (sandbox)	SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem: none-observed
Network: none-observed
Shell: none-observed
Dependencies: pinned
Secrets in source: none-found