Atlas / Skills / cyberstrikeus / T0889 Modify Program

T0889 Modify ProgramCAUTION

skills/cyberstrikeus/t0889-modify-program

Agent skill by cyberstrikeus · agents · ai hacking · ai penetration testing · Audited 2026-10-18

⚑ Report / re-scan Source ↗

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Verdict

CAUTION

Grade

Trust score

89 /100

Version

18.1

Hosts

—

License

AGPL-3.0

Stars

3,185

Overview

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Read from source at commit eaf7d03223fcOBSERVED · 2026-10-18

What it tells the agent

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: "T0889_modify-program"
description: "Adversaries may modify or add a program on a controller to affect how it interacts with the physical process, peripheral devices and other hosts on the network."
category: "configuration"
version: "18.1"
author: "cyberstrike-official"
tags:
  - mitre-attack
  - ics
  - t0889
  - persistence
technique_id: "T0889"
tactic: "persistence"
all_tactics:
  - persistence
platforms:
  - ICS
mitre_url: "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0889"
tech_stack:
  - ics
cwe_ids:
  - CWE-276
chains_with: []
prerequisites: []
severity_boost: {}
---

# T0889 Modify Program

## High-Level Description

Adversaries may modify or add a program on a controller to affect how it interacts with the physical process, peripheral devices and other hosts on the network. Modification to controller programs can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and program append.

Program modification encompasses the addition and modification of instructions and logic contained in Program Organization Units (POU) and similar programming elements found on controllers. This can include, for example, adding new functions to a controller, modifying the logic in existing functions and making new calls from one function to another.

Some programs may allow an adversary to interact directly with the native API of the controller to take advantage of obscure features or vulnerabilities.

## Kill Chain Phase

- Persistence (TA0110)

**Platforms:** ICS

## What to Check

- [ ] Identify if Modify Program technique is applicable to target ICS environment
- [ ] Check ICS/SCADA systems for indicators of Modify Program
- [ ] Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (4 known mitigations)
- [ ] Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)

## How to Test

### Identify Attack Surface

Determine if the target ICS/SCADA environment is susceptible to Modify Program by examining operational technology systems and network architecture.

### Assess Existing Defenses

Review whether mitigations for T0889 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable in the ICS environment.

## Remediation Guide

### M0947 Audit

Provide the ability to verify the integrity of control logic or programs loaded on a controller. While techniques like CRCs and checksums are commonly used, they are not cryptographically strong and can be vulnerable to collisions. Preferably cryptographic hash functions (e.g., SHA-2, SHA-3) should be used.

### M0945 Code Signing

Utilize code signatures to verify the integrity and authenticity of programs installed on safety or control assets.

### M0800 Authorization Enforcement

All field controllers should restrict the modification of programs to only certain users (e.g., engineers, field technician), preferably through implementing a role-based access mechanism.

### M0804 Human User Authentication

All field controllers should require users to authenticate for all remote or local management sessions. The authentication mechanisms should also support Account Use Policies, Password Policies, and User Account Management.

## Detection

### Detection of Modify Program

## Risk Assessment

| Finding                             | Severity | Impact      |
| ----------------------------------- | -------- | ----------- |
| Modify Program technique applicable | Low      | Persistence |

## CWE Categories

| CWE ID  | Title                         |
| ------- | ----------------------------- |
| CWE-276 | Incorrect Default Permissions |

## References

- [IEC February 2013](https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/4552)
- [MITRE ATT&CK ICS - T0889](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0889)

Trust audit

CAUTIONgrade B · trust 89/100 Install with care. The audit found things worth knowing before you trust its output.

Layer	What it checks	Result
L0	Provenance & inventory	WARN
L1	Static analysis of the code	NA
L2	Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)	PASS
L3	Class-specific surface	PASS
L4	Behavioural (sandbox)	SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem: none-observed
Network: none-observed
Shell: none-observed
Dependencies: pinned
Secrets in source: none-found