Atlas / Skills / cyberstrikeus / T0879 Damage To Property

T0879 Damage To PropertyCAUTION

skills/cyberstrikeus/t0879-damage-to-property

Agent skill by cyberstrikeus · agents · ai hacking · ai penetration testing · Audited 2026-10-18

⚑ Report / re-scan Source ↗

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Verdict

CAUTION

Grade

Trust score

89 /100

Version

18.1

Hosts

—

License

AGPL-3.0

Stars

3,185

Overview

Open-source AI-powered offensive security harness for automated penetration testing.

Read from source at commit eaf7d03223fcOBSERVED · 2026-10-18

What it tells the agent

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: "T0879_damage-to-property"
description: "Adversaries may cause damage and destruction of property to infrastructure, equipment, and the surrounding environment when attacking control systems."
category: "business-logic"
version: "18.1"
author: "cyberstrike-official"
tags:
  - mitre-attack
  - ics
  - t0879
  - impact
technique_id: "T0879"
tactic: "impact"
all_tactics:
  - impact
platforms:
  - ICS
mitre_url: "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0879"
tech_stack:
  - ics
cwe_ids:
  - CWE-400
chains_with: []
prerequisites: []
severity_boost: {}
---

# T0879 Damage to Property

## High-Level Description

Adversaries may cause damage and destruction of property to infrastructure, equipment, and the surrounding environment when attacking control systems. This technique may result in device and operational equipment breakdown, or represent tangential damage from other techniques used in an attack. Depending on the severity of physical damage and disruption caused to control processes and systems, this technique may result in Loss of Safety. Operations that result in Loss of Control may also cause damage to property, which may be directly or indirectly motivated by an adversary seeking to cause impact in the form of Loss of Productivity and Revenue.

The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel mill under an incidents affecting business section of its 2014 IT Security Report. These targeted attacks affected industrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control system components and even entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns, massive impact and damage resulted from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace.

A Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland. Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. This resulted in damage to impacted trams, people, and the surrounding property. Reportedly, four trams were derailed and were forced to make emergency stops. Commands issued by the student may have also resulted in tram collisions, causing harm to those on board and the environment outside.

## Kill Chain Phase

- Impact (TA0105)

**Platforms:** ICS

## What to Check

- [ ] Identify if Damage to Property technique is applicable to target ICS environment
- [ ] Check ICS/SCADA systems for indicators of Damage to Property
- [ ] Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (3 known mitigations)
- [ ] Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)

## How to Test

### Identify Attack Surface

Determine if the target ICS/SCADA environment is susceptible to Damage to Property by examining operational technology systems and network architecture.

### Assess Existing Defenses

Review whether mitigations for T0879 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable in the ICS environment.

## Remediation Guide

### M0807 Network Allowlists

Use host-based allowlists to prevent devices from accepting connections from unauthorized systems. For example, allowlists can be used to ensure devices can only connect with master stations or known management/engineering workstations.

### M0812 Safety Instrumented Systems

Ensure that all SIS are segmented from operational networks to prevent them from being targeted by additional adversarial behavior.

### M0805 Mechanical Protection Layers

Protection devices should have minimal digital components to prevent exposure to related adversarial techniques. Examples include interlocks, rupture disks, release valves, etc.

## Detection

### Detection of Damage to Property

## Risk Assessment

| Finding                                 | Severity | Impact |
| --------------------------------------- | -------- | ------ |
| Damage to Property technique applicable | High     | Impact |

## CWE Categories

| CWE ID  | Title                             |
| ------- | --------------------------------- |
| CWE-400 | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption |

## References

- [Bruce Schneier January 2008](https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking_the_pol.html)
- [BSI State of IT Security 2014](https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-in-Germany-2014.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3)
- [John Bill May 2017](https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/)
- [Shelley Smith February 2008](https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen_hacker_in_poland_plays_tr/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK ICS - T0879](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0879)

Trust audit

CAUTIONgrade B · trust 89/100 Install with care. The audit found things worth knowing before you trust its output.

Layer	What it checks	Result
L0	Provenance & inventory	WARN
L1	Static analysis of the code	NA
L2	Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)	PASS
L3	Class-specific surface	PASS
L4	Behavioural (sandbox)	SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem: none-observed
Network: none-observed
Shell: none-observed
Dependencies: pinned
Secrets in source: none-found