SecretsBLOCK
A framework for building agentic apps
Overview
A framework for building agentic apps
d31edd75948aOBSERVED · 2026-10-14What it tells the agent
The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.
---
name: secrets
description: >-
Connect external services and keep app credentials scoped. Use before adding
an API key, OAuth connection, provider setup, or server-side request that
needs a user's or workspace's credential.
scope: dev
---
# Secrets
## Rule
Credentials belong to the user, organization, workspace, or deployment that
owns them. Reuse the strongest shared connection or credential flow available;
never copy a value into app code or client-visible state.
## Choose the credential source
1. Check the workspace connection catalog first. If the provider is already
connected, request the app grant and resolve its vault-backed credential
reference through the workspace-connection API.
2. For OAuth, use the shared authorization and token flow. Do not store access
or refresh tokens as ordinary settings or API-key values.
3. If the app truly needs its own API key, register it with the shared secrets
surface. Do not build a parallel key form or storage table.
4. Use deployment configuration only for a secret owned by the deployed app,
such as a webhook verification secret. LLM inference keys are an app-owned
exception: self-hosted apps may use provider keys from deployment env as a
shared fallback, while scoped user or organization keys take precedence.
Hosted-workspace deployments backed by a shared database must not share
those env keys across apps or tenants. This exception does not authorize
using env credentials to access user-owned provider data.
## Register an app-local API key
Register the key once so Settings can manage it and the app can describe why it
is needed. Supported scopes are `user`, `org`, and `workspace`; choose the
narrowest scope that matches who owns the credential and how the app resolves
it. Put the registration in a server module imported by a loaded server plugin.
```ts
import { registerRequiredSecret } from "@agent-native/core/secrets";
registerRequiredSecret({
key: "EXAMPLE_SERVICE_API_KEY",
label: "Example service API key",
description: "Connects this app to the example service.",
docsUrl: "https://example.com/api-keys",
scope: "user",
kind: "api-key",
required: true,
});
```
Use `kind: "oauth"` for an OAuth-backed connection and set `oauthProvider` and
`oauthConnectUrl` for the shared Connect flow. Set `required` only when the app
cannot perform its primary workflow without that connection. A validator may
check a key before save; never log or include the value in a validation error.
## Resolve credentials on the server
Resolve credentials only inside server-side actions or server helpers, using
the request's user and organization context. Keep a missing key separate from
a failed credential-store lookup: ask the user to connect the provider only
when the credential is absent; make a store failure retryable.
For an app-local key, use `resolveSecretDetailed()` from
`@agent-native/core/server` in the request context. Check `lookupFailed` before
checking `value`; do not turn a failed lookup into a setup prompt.
Never read a user's or workspace's API key from `process.env`, or add a raw
environment fallback to a scoped lookup. Do not put credentials in action
arguments or results, agent messages or hidden context, application state,
browser storage, client bundles, logs, or error text. Send them only in the
provider request that needs them, and redact provider responses before
returning an error.
## Related skills
- `security` — protect access to app data and external requests.
- `actions` — expose server-side operations to both the agent and UI.Trust audit
BLOCKgrade D · trust 69/100 Do not install this without reading the findings. The audit found something that could harm you or your machine.
| Layer | What it checks | Result |
|---|---|---|
| L0 | Provenance & inventory | WARN |
| L1 | Static analysis of the code | NA |
| L2 | Instruction surface (what it tells the agent) | FAIL |
| L3 | Class-specific surface | PASS |
| L4 | Behavioural (sandbox) | SKIPPED |
What the source does
- Filesystem
- none-observed
- Network
- none-observed
- Shell
- none-observed
- Dependencies
- pinned
- Secrets in source
- none-found
Findings (6)
Never read a user's or workspace's API key from `process.env`, or add a raw
.agents/skills/an
.agents/skills/content-product-development
.agents/skills/design-exploration
.agents/skills/turn-into-app
.agents/skills/visual-edit
Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.
d31edd75948afull audit observations/trust-audit/skill/builderio__secrets.json · Report an issue / request a re-scanAudit history
Every audit this skill has had.
| Date | Source | Verdict | Grade | Score | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-14 | d31edd75948a | BLOCK | D | 69 | first audit |
Questions
What does the Secrets skill do?
A framework for building agentic apps
Is Secrets safe to install?
No — not without reading the findings first. The audit graded it D (69/100) and found 1 critical or high issue in the source. Each one is listed on this page with the file and line it is on.
What can Secrets access on my machine?
The audit observed no filesystem, network or shell use at all in its source.
How current is this page?
The grade is for one exact copy of the source (d31edd75948a), read on 2026-10-14. The repository is watched, and a new audit runs when it changes — this is the first audit.
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