Agents HardenCAUTION

Official, AWS-supported MCP servers, skills, and plugins to help AI agents build on AWS

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: agents-harden
description: >
  Use when preparing your agent for production — IAM scoping, inbound
  auth (JWT, SigV4), secrets management, cold start optimization, session
  lifecycle, rate limiting, input validation, and quota guidance. Triggers
  on: "production checklist", "harden agent", "production ready", "secure
  agent", "inbound auth", "going live", "cold start optimization", "session
  lifecycle", "StopRuntimeSession", "quota", "throttling", "maxVms",
  "rate limit", "security audit of outbound API calls", "gateway target
  audit for production", "restrict who can call", "lock down endpoint",
  "only our app can call".
  Not for Cedar tool-restriction policies — use agents-connect. Not
  for quality measurement — use agents-optimize. Not for outbound
  credential storage or API key wiring — use agents-connect. Not for
  A2A agent-to-agent auth — use agents-build. Cold start observation
  and diagnosis (not optimization) routes to agents-debug.
allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob Bash
metadata:
  type: skill
  version: "1.0.0"
  author: aws-agentcore
  requires-cli: ">=0.9.0"
---

# harden

Prepare your AgentCore agent for production — security, reliability, and performance.

## When to use

- You're about to take an agent to production
- You want a checklist of what to review before launch
- You want to restrict who can call your agent
- You want to scope down IAM permissions from the defaults
- You're hitting throttling or quota errors (loads [`references/limits.md`](references/limits.md))
- You need to tune session lifecycle for your workload
- You're running long-running background work in your agent

## Input

No arguments required. The skill reads your project config and produces a checklist with specific findings for your project.

## Process

### Step 0: Verify CLI version

Run `agentcore --version`. This skill requires v0.9.0 or later. If the version is older, tell the developer to run `agentcore update` before proceeding.

### Step 1: Read the project

Read `agentcore/agentcore.json` to understand:

- What resources are configured (memory, gateway, credentials, evaluators)
- What framework is being used
- What network mode is configured (PUBLIC or VPC)

### Step 2: Run through the checklist

Work through each category and report findings specific to the project.

---

## IAM: Scope down permissions

The auto-created execution role has broad Bedrock access (`arn:aws:bedrock:*::foundation-model/*`). For production, scope it to the specific models your agent uses.

**Check the current execution role:**

```bash
agentcore status --json | jq -r '.runtimes[0].executionRoleArn'
```

**Recommended production Bedrock policy:**

```json
{
  "Effect": "Allow",
  "Action": [
    "bedrock:InvokeModel",
    "bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream"
  ],
  "Resource": [
    "arn:aws:bedrock:<REGION>::foundation-model/anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929-v1:0"
  ]
}
```

Replace the resource ARN with the specific model(s) your agent uses.

**ECR access:** Scope to your specific repository:

```json
{
  "Effect": "Allow",
  "Action": ["ecr:BatchGetImage", "ecr:GetDownloadUrlForLayer"],
  "Resource": "arn:aws:ecr:<REGION>:<YOUR_ACCOUNT_ID>:repository/bedrock-agentcore-<AGENT_NAME>-*"
}
```

**Trust policy:** Verify the execution role's trust policy is scoped to your account:

```json
{
  "Principal": {"Service": "bedrock-agentcore.amazonaws.com"},
  "Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
  "Condition": {
    "StringEquals": {"aws:SourceAccount": "<YOUR_ACCOUNT_ID>"},
    "ArnLike": {"aws:SourceArn": "arn:aws:bedrock-agentcore:<REGION>:<YOUR_ACCOUNT_ID>:*"}
  }
}
```

**Runtime resource-based policies** (API-only): For fine-grained control over which principals can invoke your runtime — beyond what IAM roles and JWT auth provide — use `PutAgentRuntimeResourcePolicy` via boto3. This is not exposed in the CLI or `agentcore.json`. Use the `awsknowledge` MCP server if available to look up the current API shape.

---

## Shell Access: Scope `InvokeAgentRuntimeCommand` separately

If your project uses `InvokeAgentRuntimeCommand` (see [`agents-build/references/integrate.md`](../agents-build/references/integrate.md)), audit its IAM permissions separately from `InvokeAgentRuntime`. The two actions have different blast radii: `InvokeAgentRuntimeCommand` is arbitrary shell execution inside a live microVM with the runtime's full execution role — callers can read/write the filesystem, reach any network resource the agent can reach, and access the execution role's credentials.

**Check which principals have the permission:**

```bash
# List customer-managed policies in your account, then inspect each for InvokeAgentRuntimeCommand
aws iam list-policies --scope Local \
  --query 'Policies[*].[PolicyName, Arn, DefaultVersionId]' \
  --output table
# Then for each policy of interest:
aws iam get-policy-version \
  --policy-arn <POLICY_ARN> \
  --version-id <VERSION_ID> \
  --query 'PolicyVersion.Document'
```

Alternatively, use the IAM console: **IAM → Policies → Filter by type: Customer managed** → search for `InvokeAgentRuntimeCommand` in the policy JSON editor.

**Separate IAM policy for command callers** — keep this distinct from the policy granting `InvokeAgentRuntime`:

```json
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [{
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Action": "bedrock-agentcore:InvokeAgentRuntimeCommand",
    "Resource": "arn:aws:bedrock-agentcore:<REGION>:<YOUR_ACCOUNT_ID>:runtime/<RUNTIME_NAME>-*"
  }]
}
```

**Enable CloudTrail alerting.** Create an EventBridge rule to notify your security team when `InvokeAgentRuntimeCommand` is called:

```bash
aws events put-rule \
  --name AgentCoreCommandExecution \
  --event-pattern '{"source":["aws.bedrock-agentcore"],"detail-type":["AWS API Call via CloudTrail"],"detail":{"eventName":["InvokeAgentRuntimeCommand"]}}' \
  --state ENABLED
```

**If commands are constructed from user input anywhere in calling code:** validate before passing — reject strings contain

CAUTIONgrade B · trust 89/100 Install with care. The audit found things worth knowing before you trust its output.

What the source does

Filesystem

none-observed

Network

none-observed

Shell

none-observed

Dependencies

pinned

Secrets in source

none-found

Findings (1)

If your project uses `InvokeAgentRuntimeCommand` (see [`agents-build/references/integrate.md`](../agents-build/references/integrate.md)), audit its IAM permissions separately from `InvokeAgentRuntime`

Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.

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