Atlas / MCP servers / sbd-toe / @shiftleftpt/sbd-toe-mcp

@shiftleftpt/sbd-toe-mcpBLOCK

mcp/sbd-toe/sbd-toe-mcp

PoC para um MCP sobre o knowledge base do SbD-ToE

Verdict
BLOCK
Grade
D
Trust score
69 /100
Exposed tools
30 26r · 4w · 0d
Transport
—
License
Apache-2.0
Stars
0
01

Overview

From the repository's own README, as read at the audited commit. Badges and raw HTML are left out.

MCP server for the SbD-ToE (Security by Design — Theory of Everything) security manual — structured tools for Claude, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Windsurf, Zed and any MCP-compatible client.

[](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@shiftleftpt/sbd-toe-mcp) [](LICENSE)

Quick Start

Zero configuration required. Works out-of-the-box with npx:

Claude Code:

claude mcp add sbd-toe -- npx -y @shiftleftpt/sbd-toe-mcp

Claude Desktop / Cursor / Windsurf — add to your MCP config:

{
"mcpServers": {
"sbd-toe": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@shiftleftpt/sbd-toe-mcp"]
}
}
}

VS Code + GitHub Copilot — add to .vscode/mcp.json:

{
"servers": {
"sbdToe": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@shiftleftpt/sbd-toe-mcp"]
}
}
}

For full installation instructions for all clients see docs/installation.md.

Requirements: Node.js ≥ 20.9.0

What it does

This MCP server gives any AI client structured access to the SbD-ToE security manual — a 15-chapter (00–14) framework for Security by Design — Theory of Everything.

All data is bundled locally. No Algolia, no internet connection required at runtime, no API keys.

Tools

Read from source at commit f1374a9be1adOBSERVED · 2026-10-12
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02

Connect

Built from this server's own package name, version and transport as found in its source — not copied from anyone's documentation, so it cannot drift against a page we do not control.

claude-code
claude mcp add sbd-toe-mcp -- npx -y @shiftleftpt/[email protected]
claude-desktop
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "sbd-toe-mcp": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "@shiftleftpt/[email protected]"
      ]
    }
  }
}
03

Exposed tools (30)

26 read · 4 write · 0 destructive.

ToolRiskDescription
answer_sbd_toe_manualreadDOES NOT ANSWER — serves manual context for the CLIENT model to answer via MCP sampling; the judgement stays with the asker. Requires sampling support; without it, falls back to formatted retrieval output (same as search_sbd_toe_manual), the better choice on clients without sampling.
ask_sbd_toe_manualreadMCP prompt to guide the AI chat to answer questions about the SbD-ToE manual with grounding.
concernsreadConcerns DECLARADOS do vocabulário fechado (
explain_sbd_toe_topicreadCONSULT reading —
generate_sbd_toe_skillreadGenerates from the published guide without validating your environment: it installs, configures and verifies nothing — it returns text for YOU to install. Use for
get_guide_by_rolereadRuntime-grounded practices, assignments and user stories for a risk level, optionally filtered by role and/or lifecycle phase. Each assignment carries its required ARTIFACTS (the requirement→evidence link, served from the bundle). Roles resolve via canonical aliases (e.g.
get_sbd_toe_chapter_briefreadOperational summary of a chapter: title, objective, role, phases, artefacts (fields are present when the substrate carries them).
get_sbd_toe_chapter_capabilityreadIMPL reading —
get_sbd_toe_chapter_implementation_checklistreadThe
get_sbd_toe_macro_processesreadPROGRAMME reading —
get_sbd_toe_operating_modelreadThe operating model — RACI, decision rights, governance cadences, org model — from the rollout playbook (implementation profile). Retrieval-grounded prose; coverage-preserving; nothing invented. Answers
get_sbd_toe_playbookreadNORMATIVE path for cross-checks and playbooks:
get_sbd_toe_verification_matrixreadThe EXPECTED side of verification: per requirement/control at a risk level, the validation method, expected evidence and EvidencePattern reference from the published patterns (totals declared). Cited per row; coverage-preserving — declares requirements with no pattern. Answers
includeRegulatoryOverlayreadWhen true, asks the tool to surface regulatory overlay context.
inspect_sbd_toe_retrievalreadInspects retrieval, context selection and the final prompt without requesting an answer from the client model.
list_sbd_toe_chaptersreadLists the manual chapters: id, canonical title, clean readableTitle, graduated applicability (every chapter applies at every level) and derived demand_by_level.
map_sbd_toe_review_scopewriteGiven a set of changed files, maps which SbD-ToE knowledge bundles should be reviewed, with explicit reasoning per path.
modereadcodegen | review | test-plan. Defaults to codegen.
plan_sbd_toe_rolloutwriteServes the PUBLISHED phase sequence — it does not plan for you: the order of phases the manual publishes, mapped to the chapters each traverses; the roadmap is yours. Phase-ordered; the dependency DAG is deferred (declared, not faked). Grounded in the published runtime; nothing invented. Answers
prepare_grounded_codegenreadMCP prompt that bundles the grounded-codegen guide with a user task and instructs the
projectRolereadProject role or description (optional).
query_sbd_toe_entitiesreadQueries manual entities by text, entity type, chapter or risk level.
questionreadQuestion about the SbD-ToE manual.
regulatoryFrameworksreadOptional regulatory framework short codes or IDs (e.g.
riskLevelreadProject risk level: L1, L2 or L3.
select_sbd_toe_requirementswriteSTART HERE. DECLARATIVE FIRST: DECLARE what you read — risk_level, concerns, exposure, data_sensitivity, technologies, changed_files, or structure (chapters, categories); the server never interprets prose (vocabulary: sbd://toe/activation-vocabulary).
setup_sbd_toe_agentwriteSTART HERE — entry point (2a chamada, após leres sbd://toe/agent-guide): MCP PROMPT (clientes sem suporte de prompts não o expõem — alternativa: activadores estruturados directos no select) to configure an agent with SbD-ToE manual context and rules for a given risk level.
stackreadStack hint (e.g.
taskreadConcrete coding task (e.g.
trace_sbd_toe_requirement_sourcesreadWhere each requirement
04

Trust audit

BLOCKgrade D · trust 69/100 Do not install this without reading the findings. The audit found something that could harm you or your machine.

LayerWhat it checksResult
L0Provenance & inventoryFAIL
L1Static analysis of the codePASS
L2Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)PASS
L3Class-specific surfacePASS
L4Behavioural (sandbox)SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem
declared (3 observation(s))
Network
declared (2 observation(s))
Shell
declared (2 observation(s))
Dependencies
not all pinned
Secrets in source
none-found

Findings (16)

HIGHInventory / provenance · inv.suspicious_name · CWE-1104
scripts/measure-codegen-payload.mjs
measure-codegen-payload.mjs
Why it matters. member named after an attack tool
Fix. remove or justify
HIGHInventory / provenance · inv.suspicious_name · CWE-1104
src/serving/payload-ceilings.ts
payload-ceilings.ts
Why it matters. member named after an attack tool
Fix. remove or justify
LOWInventory / provenance · inv.suspicious_name · CWE-1104
src/serving/payload-ceilings.test.ts
payload-ceilings.test.ts
Why it matters. member named after an attack tool
Fix. remove or justify
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/release-checklist.yml:16
Referência: Manual SbD-ToE Cap. 10 + [`politica-testes.md`](../../docs/SecurityByDesign/politica-testes.md)
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/security-incident.yml:14
> Para reportar uma vulnerabilidade em privado, consulta [SECURITY.md](../../SECURITY.md).
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
scripts/measure/cost-ceiling-matrix.mjs:32
const after = await load(new URL("../../dist", import.meta.url).pathname);
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
scripts/measure/s5-form-projection.mjs:19
import { handlePrepareCodegenContext } from "../../dist/tools/prepare-codegen-context.js";
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
scripts/measure/s5-form-projection.mjs:20
import { getOntologyData } from "../../dist/tools/ontology-loader.js";
LOWSupply chain · supply.unpinned · CWE-829, CWE-1357
package.json
oxigraph, yaml, @types/node, @vitest/coverage-v8, @vitest/ui, typescript, vitest
Why it matters. 7 dependency range(s) float
Fix. pin exact versions or ship a lockfile
LOWPrompt injection · prompt.transfer_instruction · CWE-94, CWE-1427
CHANGELOG.md:4336
antes→depois: «Endpoint de upload com sessão e token» = 57 selected vs «Receber
Why it matters. an instruction to move sensitive data to an outside destination
Fix. remove; a skill never needs the user's secrets off the machine
LOWPrompt injection · prompt.transfer_instruction · CWE-94, CWE-1427
agentic/briefs/2026-09-04-pontifex-0.19.0-ronda3-estabilidade.md:5
- **Caso reproduzido**: «Endpoint de upload com sessão e token» 57 selected vs «Receber ficheiros dos utilizadores autenticados» 8 (trace 100% task_term; razão do narrowed soava a regra). **Depois**:
Why it matters. an instruction to move sensitive data to an outside destination
Fix. remove; a skill never needs the user's secrets off the machine
INFOInventory / provenance · inv.oversize · CWE-1104
agentic/decisions/0006-activadores-largos-trazem-contexto.md
agentic/decisions/0006-activadores-largos-trazem-contexto.md
Why it matters. 5105250 bytes not read
INFOInventory / provenance · inv.oversize · CWE-1104
data/publish/indexes/canonical_chunks.jsonl
data/publish/indexes/canonical_chunks.jsonl
Why it matters. 11025341 bytes not read
INFOInventory / provenance · inv.oversize · CWE-1104
data/publish/indexes/chunk_entity_mentions.jsonl
data/publish/indexes/chunk_entity_mentions.jsonl
Why it matters. 2869815 bytes not read
INFOInventory / provenance · inv.oversize · CWE-1104
data/publish/indexes/chunk_relation_hints.jsonl
data/publish/indexes/chunk_relation_hints.jsonl
Why it matters. 1201492 bytes not read
INFOInventory / provenance · inv.oversize · CWE-1104
data/publish/indexes/cross_layer_referrals.jsonl
data/publish/indexes/cross_layer_referrals.jsonl
Why it matters. 3229979 bytes not read

Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.

Audited 2026-10-12 · audit v0.4.1 · source sha f1374a9be1adfull audit observations/trust-audit/mcp-server/sbd-toe__sbd-toe-mcp.json · Report an issue / request a re-scan
05

Audit history

Every audit this server has had. A grade with a past is a grade somebody is still checking.

DateSourceVerdictGradeScoreChange
2026-10-12f1374a9be1adBLOCKD69first audit
06

Questions

What is the @shiftleftpt/sbd-toe-mcp MCP server?

PoC para um MCP sobre o knowledge base do SbD-ToE

What tools does @shiftleftpt/sbd-toe-mcp expose?

30 in total: 26 read-only, 4 that write, and 0 that can delete or overwrite. Every one is listed on this page with its risk.

Is @shiftleftpt/sbd-toe-mcp safe to connect to an agent?

No — not without reading the findings first. The audit graded it D (69/100) and found 2 critical or high issues in the source. Each one is listed on this page with the file and line it is on.

What credentials does @shiftleftpt/sbd-toe-mcp need?

No credential environment variables were found in its source, so it appears to need none.

How current is this page?

The grade is for one exact copy of the source (f1374a9be1ad), read on 2026-10-12. The repository is watched and re-audited when it changes.

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