Atlas / MCP servers / jfarcand / Mirroir

MirroirBLOCK

mcp/jfarcand/mirroir

MCP server for controlling a real iPhone via macOS iPhone Mirroring...and any MacOs app. Screenshot, tap, swipe, type — from any MCP client.

Verdict
BLOCK
Grade
D
Trust score
69 /100
Exposed tools
—
Transport
stdio
License
Apache-2.0
Stars
245
01

Overview

From the repository's own README, as read at the audited commit. Badges and raw HTML are left out.

[](https://www.npmjs.com/package/mirroir-mcp) [](https://github.com/jfarcand/mirroir-mcp/actions/workflows/build.yml) [](https://github.com/jfarcand/mirroir-mcp/actions/workflows/install.yml) [](https://github.com/jfarcand/mirroir-mcp/actions/workflows/installers.yml) [](https://github.com/jfarcand/mirroir-mcp/actions/workflows/mcp-compliance.yml) [](LICENSE) [](https://support.apple.com/en-us/105071) [](https://discord.gg/jVDBbMjPMf)

Give your AI eyes, hands, and a real iPhone. An MCP server that lets any AI agent see the screen, tap what it needs, and figure the rest out — through macOS iPhone Mirroring. Experimental support for macOS windows. 38 tools, any MCP client.

Vision: agents that test — and play

mirroir is growing archetype-aware coverage for games. A game splits into two surfaces. The shell — menu, shop, loadout, settings, win/lose screens — is ordinary text-labelled UI that today's skills already drive. The scene — the playfield — is a vision-driven loop an agent follows one touch at a time. The honest targets are game QA smoke tests, tutorial walkthroughs, and scripted demos, not real-time play: iPhone Mirroring exposes a single pointer, so twin-

Read from source at commit 137cba822e5cOBSERVED · 2026-10-07
02

Connect

Built from this server's own package name, version and transport as found in its source — not copied from anyone's documentation, so it cannot drift against a page we do not control. Replace the environment placeholders with a token scoped to the least it needs.

claude-code (npm)
claude mcp add mirroir-mcp -- npx -y [email protected]
03

Trust audit

BLOCKgrade D · trust 69/100 Do not install this without reading the findings. The audit found something that could harm you or your machine.

LayerWhat it checksResult
L0Provenance & inventoryPASS
L1Static analysis of the codeWARN
L2Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)FAIL
L3Class-specific surfacePASS
L4Behavioural (sandbox)SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem
declared (9 observation(s))
Network
declared (5 observation(s))
Shell
declared (5 observation(s))
Dependencies
not all pinned
Secrets in source
none-found

Findings (20)

HIGHPrompt injection · prompt.override · CWE-94, CWE-1427
docs/faq.md:34
Yes. The MCP server operates at the screen level through macOS iPhone Mirroring — it taps, swipes, and types as if a human were interacting with the phone. No source code access, no app SDK, and no ja
Why it matters. asks the agent to drop prior instructions or safety
Fix. remove the instruction
HIGHPrompt injection · prompt.override · CWE-94, CWE-1427
llms.txt:7
mirroir-mcp gives AI agents eyes and hands on a real iPhone. Any LLM with MCP support can screenshot the phone, read the screen via OCR, decide what to do, and execute taps, types, and swipes — no jai
Why it matters. asks the agent to drop prior instructions or safety
Fix. remove the instruction
MEDIUMNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
.claude/skills/mirroir-onboard/SKILL.md:75
bind `[::1]` only, so `http://127.0.0.1:PORT` is refused while
LOWInventory / provenance · inv.hidden_file · CWE-1104
.envrc.example
.envrc.example
Why it matters. hidden member outside the usual dotfiles
Fix. review its purpose
LOWInventory / provenance · inv.hidden_file · CWE-1104
.gitmodules
.gitmodules
Why it matters. hidden member outside the usual dotfiles
Fix. review its purpose
LOWInventory / provenance · inv.symlink · CWE-1104
.claude/CLAUDE.md
.claude/CLAUDE.md
Why it matters. link not followed
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
.claude/skills/bilan/test.sh:174
REAL_GATES="$HERE/../../../.registre/limitation-gates.sh"
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
.claude/skills/carnet/test.sh:645
root=$(cd "$here/../../.." && pwd)
LOWNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
.github/workflows/runner.yml:415
if curl -sf http://127.0.0.1:11434/api/version > /dev/null; then
LOWNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
.github/workflows/runner.yml:421
curl -sf http://127.0.0.1:11434/api/version | tee /tmp/ollama-version.json
LOWNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
.github/workflows/runner.yml:517
curl -sf http://127.0.0.1:11434/api/version > /dev/null && break
LOWNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
runner/docs/archetype-authoring.md:121
url_root: http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/path/
LOWSupply chain · supply.unpinned · CWE-829, CWE-1357
website/package.json
astro
Why it matters. 1 dependency range(s) float
Fix. pin exact versions or ship a lockfile
LOWPrompt injection · prompt.transfer_instruction · CWE-94, CWE-1427
runner/samples/web-fixture/public/login.html:28
const VALID = { email: '[email protected]', password: 'correct-horse' };
Why it matters. an instruction to move sensitive data to an outside destination
Fix. remove; a skill never needs the user's secrets off the machine
LOWInventory / provenance · mcp.no_tools_extracted · CWE-1104
server.json
Why it matters. the tool list is enumerated at runtime by tools/list, not declared in source
Fix. the page says so rather than showing an empty table
INFOInventory / provenance · inv.oversize · CWE-1104
website/public/video1-expo-login.mp4
website/public/video1-expo-login.mp4
Why it matters. 1608408 bytes not read
INFOInventory / provenance · inv.oversize · CWE-1104
website/public/video2-waze-slack.mp4
website/public/video2-waze-slack.mp4
Why it matters. 2591166 bytes not read
INFOPrompt injection · prompt.credential_read · CWE-94, CWE-1427
AGENTS.md:449
- NEVER log: access tokens, refresh tokens, API keys, passwords, client secrets
Why it matters. asks the agent to read credentials
INFOPrompt injection · prompt.credential_read · CWE-94, CWE-1427
CONTRIBUTING.md:586
- Never log access tokens, API keys, passwords, or secrets
Why it matters. asks the agent to read credentials
INFOSupply chain · prompt.pipe_to_shell · CWE-829, CWE-1357
runner/docs/judge-profiles.md:150
curl -fsSL https://ollama.com/install.sh | sh

Gates applied: instruction_override, no_behavioural_pass.

Audited 2026-10-07 · audit v0.4.1 · source sha 137cba822e5cfull audit observations/trust-audit/mcp-server/jfarcand__mirroir.json · Report an issue / request a re-scan
04

Audit history

Every audit this server has had. A grade with a past is a grade somebody is still checking.

DateSourceVerdictGradeScoreChange
2026-10-07137cba822e5cBLOCKD69first audit
05

Questions

What is the Mirroir MCP server?

MCP server for controlling a real iPhone via macOS iPhone Mirroring...and any MacOs app. Screenshot, tap, swipe, type — from any MCP client.

Is Mirroir safe to connect to an agent?

No — not without reading the findings first. The audit graded it D (69/100) and found 2 critical or high issues in the source. Each one is listed on this page with the file and line it is on.

What credentials does Mirroir need?

It reads GITHUB_TOKEN from the environment. Give it a token scoped to the least it needs — an agent that can be talked into calling a tool can be talked into calling it with your credentials.

How does Mirroir run?

It speaks stdio, so it runs as a local process your client starts. It is published on npm as mirroir-mcp-website at 0.0.1.

How current is this page?

The grade is for one exact copy of the source (137cba822e5c), read on 2026-10-07. The repository is watched and re-audited when it changes.

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