Atlas / MCP servers / casperjuel / Aula

AulaSAFE

Name: Aula
Author: casperjuel

mcp/casperjuel/aula

MCP server by casperjuel · ai agents · aula · bun · Audited 2026-10-08

MCP server for Denmark's Aula school platform — TypeScript MitID auth, no headless browser. Exposes profiles, calendar, messages, ugeplaner to AI agents (Claude/Cursor/etc) via Model Context Protocol.

Verdict

SAFE

Grade

Trust score

89 /100

Exposed tools

25 24r · 1w · 0d

Transport

sse · stdio · streamable-http

License

MIT

Stars

Overview

From the repository's own README, as read at the audited commit. Badges and raw HTML are left out.

[](https://github.com/Casperjuel/aula-mcp/actions) [](./LICENSE) [](https://bun.sh) [](https://pnpm.io) [](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) [](#udvikling)

*Hvad det her er — og hvad det ikke er:*

aula-mcp er en server der sidder mellem en MCP-klient (LLM) og Aula — et interface, ikke meget mere. LLM'en er ikke en del af projektet. Du vælger selv klient (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, ChatGPT, Cursor, Ollama, LM Studio osv.), og den kører hvor den nu kører — i Anthropic/OpenAI's cloud, eller lokalt hvis du bruger Ollama el.lign.

Projektet er altså ikke en garanti for at børnenes data kun bliver lokalt. Om dataen forbliver lokal afhænger 100 % af hvilken klient du tilkobler — det er dit eget ansvar, ikke noget aula-mcp selv kan love.

⚠️ Brug det med omtanke Hobby-eksperiment, ingen garantier. Det rør ved MitID og dine børns skoledata — kig koden igennem (eller få en udvikler-bekendt til det) før du kobler en LLM på. Eget ansvar.

⚠️ Det er klienten der får dataen at se — ikke serveren Serveren her kører lokalt og sender intet videre på egen hånd. Men den MCP-klient du tilkobler — Claude, ChatGPT, en anden cloud-LLM — får alt det den læser sendt videre til provideren (Anthropic, OpenAI osv.) for at kunne svare dig. Det er ikke "alt sammen lokalt" bare fordi serveren er det. Sådan fungerer MCP: klienten ræsonnerer, serveren henter data. | | Hvor det går hen | | --- | --- | | MitID-credentials og OAuth-tokens | Forbliver lokalt — macOS Keychain eller AES-256-GCM-krypteret fil. Bruges kun til at

Read from source at commit c6b2104ff031OBSERVED · 2026-10-08

Connect

Built from this server's own package name, version and transport as found in its source — not copied from anyone's documentation, so it cannot drift against a page we do not control. Replace the environment placeholders with a token scoped to the least it needs.

claude-code

claude mcp add mcp-server --env AULA_MCP_KEY=${AULA_MCP_KEY} --env AULA_MCP_NO_KEYCHAIN=${AULA_MCP_NO_KEYCHAIN} -- npx -y @aula-mcp/mcp-server

claude-desktop

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "mcp-server": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "@aula-mcp/mcp-server"
      ],
      "env": {
        "AULA_MCP_KEY": "${AULA_MCP_KEY}",
        "AULA_MCP_NO_KEYCHAIN": "${AULA_MCP_NO_KEYCHAIN}"
      }
    }
  }
}

Exposed tools (25)

24 read · 1 write · 0 destructive.

Tool	Risk	Description
`Matematik`	read	Sider 12-15
`aula.calendar.events`	read
`aula.discover`	read
`aula.huskelisten.systematic`	read
`aula.lektier.easyiq`	read
`aula.messages.get_attachment`	read
`aula.messages.get_thread`	read
`aula.messages.list_threads`	read
`aula.messages.mark_read`	read
`aula.notifications.list`	read
`aula.opgaver.minuddannelse`	read
`aula.posts.get_attachment`	read
`aula.posts.list`	read
`aula.presence.report_sick`	read
`aula.presence.set_template`	write
`aula.presence.templates`	read
`aula.presence.today`	read
`aula.profiles.list`	read
`aula.raw_request`	read
`aula.ugebrev.minuddannelse`	read
`aula.ugeplan.easyiq`	read
`aula.ugeplan.easyiq_skoleportal`	read
`aula.ugeplan.meebook`	read
`aula.utils.extract_pdf_text`	read
`echo`	read

Trust audit

SAFEgrade B · trust 89/100 Nothing in the source contradicts what it says it does. Grade A is reserved for packages that have also passed the behavioural sandbox.

Layer	What it checks	Result
L0	Provenance & inventory	PASS
L1	Static analysis of the code	PASS
L2	Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)	PASS
L3	Class-specific surface	PASS
L4	Behavioural (sandbox)	SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem: declared (1 observation(s))
Network: declared (5 observation(s))
Shell: none-observed
Dependencies: not all pinned
Secrets in source: none-found

Findings (17)

LOWInventory / provenance · inv.hidden_file · CWE-1104

.release-please-manifest.json

.release-please-manifest.json

Why it matters. hidden member outside the usual dotfiles

Fix. review its purpose

LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml:9

Before filing: if this is a token-handling or MitID-flow vulnerability, do **not** open a public issue — see [SECURITY.md](../../SECURITY.md).

LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59

packages/mcp-server/src/server.test.ts:65

{ file: { name: '../../etc/pas swd.pdf', url: 'https://cdn.test/c' } },

LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59

packages/mcp-server/src/server.test.ts:607

expect(out.filename).toBe('../../etc/pas swd.pdf');