Atlas / MCP servers / blamejs / exceptd Security

exceptd SecurityBLOCK

Name: exceptd Security
Author: blamejs

mcp/blamejs/exceptd-skills

MCP server by blamejs · agents md · ai security · ai skills · Audited 2026-10-12

⚑ Report / re-scan Source ↗

AI security skills grounded in mid-2026 threat reality, not stale framework documentation

Verdict

BLOCK

Grade

Trust score

23 /100

Exposed tools

11 11r · 0w · 0d

Transport

—

License

NOASSERTION

Stars

Overview

From the repository's own README, as read at the audited commit. Badges and raw HTML are left out.

AI security skills grounded in mid-2026 threat reality, not framework documentation from 2020.

[](https://github.com/blamejs/exceptd-skills/releases) [](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@blamejs/exceptd-skills) [](https://github.com/blamejs/exceptd-skills/actions/workflows/ci.yml) [](https://scorecard.dev/viewer/?uri=github.com/blamejs/exceptd-skills) [](https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0) [](#skill-inventory) [](https://atlas.mitre.org) [](https://attack.mitre.org) [](AGENTS.md) [](data/global-frameworks.json)

Core premise: Every major security and compliance tool on the market is still operating on stale threat models. NIST 800-53, ISO 27001, SOC 2, and PCI-DSS were written for network-centric, on-prem or early-cloud environments. They have no controls for AI pipeline integ

Read from source at commit 783e16adaf56OBSERVED · 2026-10-12

Connect

Built from this server's own package name, version and transport as found in its source — not copied from anyone's documentation, so it cannot drift against a page we do not control. Replace the environment placeholders with a token scoped to the least it needs.

claude-code

claude mcp add example-lib --env EXCEPTD_ALLOW_WEAK_KEY_ACL=${EXCEPTD_ALLOW_WEAK_KEY_ACL} --env GITHUB_TOKEN=${GITHUB_TOKEN} --env KEYS_ROTATED=${KEYS_ROTATED} --env NVD_API_KEY=${NVD_API_KEY} -- npx -y [email protected]

claude-desktop

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "example-lib": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "[email protected]"
      ],
      "env": {
        "EXCEPTD_ALLOW_WEAK_KEY_ACL": "${EXCEPTD_ALLOW_WEAK_KEY_ACL}",
        "GITHUB_TOKEN": "${GITHUB_TOKEN}",
        "KEYS_ROTATED": "${KEYS_ROTATED}",
        "NVD_API_KEY": "${NVD_API_KEY}"
      }
    }
  }
}

Exposed tools (11)

11 read · 0 write · 0 destructive.

Tool	Risk	Description
`CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA`	read	d
`N`	read	d
`advisories`	read	Primary-source advisory feeds (Qualys TRU, Red Hat RHSA, Ubuntu USN, Zero Day Initiative / ZDI) — surfaces CVE IDs disclosed at T+0 to T+1 that lag NVD enrichment. Report-only — does not auto-write the catalog.
`cve-regression-watcher`	read	NEW-CTRL-074 detection method — surfaces poller-diff historical-CVE references that may indicate silent vendor regression (the MiniPlasma class). Report-only; depends on ADVISORIES_SOURCE observations as input.
`epss`	read	FIRST.org EPSS scores
`ghsa`	read	GitHub Advisory Database — multi-ecosystem disclosure feed (npm, PyPI, Maven, Go, etc.)
`kev`	read	CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities
`nvd`	read	NIST NVD 2.0 CVSS metrics
`osv`	read	OSV.dev — OSSF Malicious Packages (MAL-*) + Snyk + GHSA + RustSec + Mageia + Go Vuln DB + Ubuntu USN. Unauthenticated. Slot in for the broader supply-chain-class disclosure space — covers package compromises that don
`pins`	read	MITRE ATLAS / ATT&CK / D3FEND / CWE upstream release pins
`rfc`	read	IETF Datatracker RFC status + auto-discovery

Trust audit

BLOCKgrade F · trust 23/100 Do not install this without reading the findings. The audit found something that could harm you or your machine.

Layer	What it checks	Result
L0	Provenance & inventory	FAIL
L1	Static analysis of the code	FAIL
L2	Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)	FAIL
L3	Class-specific surface	PASS
L4	Behavioural (sandbox)	SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem: declared (17 observation(s))
Network: declared (10 observation(s))
Shell: declared (5 observation(s))
Dependencies: pinned
Secrets in source: found

Findings (25)

CRITICALHard-coded secrets · secret.private_key · CWE-798, CWE-321

data/playbooks/secrets.json:456

"value": "\"type\"\\s*:\\s*\"service_account\"[^{}]*\"private_key\"\\s*:\\s*\"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----",

CRITICALHard-coded secrets · secret.private_key · CWE-798, CWE-321

lib/collectors/secrets.js:166

{ id: "gcp-service-account-json",   re: /"type"\s*:\s*"service_account"[\s\S]{0,1200}?"private_key"\s*:\s*"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----[A-Za-z0-9+/=\s\\]{40,4000}-----END/g },

HIGHInventory / provenance · inv.suspicious_name · CWE-1104

data/exploit-availability.json

exploit-availability.json

Why it matters. member named after an attack tool

Fix. remove or justify

HIGHFilesystem / path · fs.credential_store · CWE-22, CWE-59

data/playbooks/supply-chain-recovery.json:347

"threat_context": "Supply-chain-recovery landscape mid-2026 is dominated by the Shai-Hulud worm family. The September 2025 Shai-Hulud wave (180+ npm packages) established the modular pattern: postinst