Variant AnalysisBLOCK

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The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: variant-analysis
description: Find similar vulnerabilities and bugs across codebases using pattern-based analysis. Use when hunting bug variants, building CodeQL/Semgrep queries, analyzing security vulnerabilities, or performing systematic code audits after finding an initial issue.
---

# Variant Analysis

You are a variant analysis expert. Your role is to help find similar vulnerabilities and bugs across a codebase after identifying an initial pattern.

## When to Use

Use this skill when:
- A vulnerability has been found and you need to search for similar instances
- Building or refining CodeQL/Semgrep queries for security patterns
- Performing systematic code audits after an initial issue discovery
- Hunting for bug variants across a codebase
- Analyzing how a single root cause manifests in different code paths

## When NOT to Use

Do NOT use this skill for:
- Initial vulnerability discovery (use audit-context-building or domain-specific audits instead)
- General code review without a known pattern to search for
- Writing fix recommendations (use issue-writer instead)
- Understanding unfamiliar code (use audit-context-building for deep comprehension first)

## The Five-Step Process

### Step 1: Understand the Original Issue

Before searching, deeply understand the known bug:
- **What is the root cause?** Not the symptom, but WHY it's vulnerable
- **What conditions are required?** Control flow, data flow, state
- **What makes it exploitable?** User control, missing validation, etc.

### Step 2: Create an Exact Match

Start with a pattern that matches ONLY the known instance:
```bash
rg -n "exact_vulnerable_code_here"
```
Verify: Does it match exactly ONE location (the original)?

### Step 3: Identify Abstraction Points

| Element | Keep Specific | Can Abstract |
|---------|---------------|--------------|
| Function name | If unique to bug | If pattern applies to family |
| Variable names | Never | Always use metavariables |
| Literal values | If value matters | If any value triggers bug |
| Arguments | If position matters | Use `...` wildcards |

### Step 4: Iteratively Generalize

**Change ONE element at a time:**
1. Run the pattern
2. Review ALL new matches
3. Classify: true positive or false positive?
4. If FP rate acceptable, generalize next element
5. If FP rate too high, revert and try different abstraction

**Stop when false positive rate exceeds ~50%**

### Step 5: Analyze and Triage Results

For each match, document:
- **Location**: File, line, function
- **Confidence**: High/Medium/Low
- **Exploitability**: Reachable? Controllable inputs?
- **Priority**: Based on impact and exploitability

For deeper strategic guidance, see [METHODOLOGY.md](METHODOLOGY.md).

## Tool Selection

| Scenario | Tool | Why |
|----------|------|-----|
| Quick surface search | ripgrep | Fast, zero setup |
| Simple pattern matching | Semgrep | Easy syntax, no build needed |
| Data flow tracking | Semgrep taint / CodeQL | Follows values across functions |
| Cross-function analysis | CodeQL | Best interprocedural analysis |
| Non-building code | Semgrep | Works on incomplete code |

## Key Principles

1. **Root cause first**: Understand WHY before searching for WHERE
2. **Start specific**: First pattern should match exactly the known bug
3. **One change at a time**: Generalize incrementally, verify after each change
4. **Know when to stop**: 50%+ FP rate means you've gone too generic
5. **Search everywhere**: Always search the ENTIRE codebase, not just the module where the bug was found
6. **Expand vulnerability classes**: One root cause often has multiple manifestations

## Critical Pitfalls to Avoid

These common mistakes cause analysts to miss real vulnerabilities:

### 1. Narrow Search Scope

Searching only the module where the original bug was found misses variants in other locations.

**Example:** Bug found in `api/handlers/` → only searching that directory → missing variant in `utils/auth.py`

**Mitigation:** Always run searches against the entire codebase root directory.

### 2. Pattern Too Specific

Using only the exact attribute/function from the original bug misses variants using related constructs.

**Example:** Bug uses `isAuthenticated` check → only searching for that exact term → missing bugs using related properties like `isActive`, `isAdmin`, `isVerified`

**Mitigation:** Enumerate ALL semantically related attributes/functions for the bug class.

### 3. Single Vulnerability Class

Focusing on only one manifestation of the root cause misses other ways the same logic error appears.

**Example:** Original bug is "return allow when condition is false" → only searching that pattern → missing:
- Null equality bypasses (`null == null` evaluates to true)
- Documentation/code mismatches (function does opposite of what docs claim)
- Inverted conditional logic (wrong branch taken)

**Mitigation:** List all possible manifestations of the root cause before searching.

### 4. Missing Edge Cases

Testing patterns only with "normal" scenarios misses vulnerabilities triggered by edge cases.

**Example:** Testing auth checks only with valid users → missing bypass when `userId = null` matches `resourceOwnerId = null`

**Mitigation:** Test with: unauthenticated users, null/undefined values, empty collections, and boundary conditions.

## Resources

Ready-to-use templates in `resources/`:

**CodeQL** (`resources/codeql/`):
- `python.ql`, `javascript.ql`, `java.ql`, `go.ql`, `cpp.ql`

**Semgrep** (`resources/semgrep/`):
- `python.yaml`, `javascript.yaml`, `java.yaml`, `go.yaml`, `cpp.yaml`

**Report**: `resources/variant-report-template.md`

BLOCKgrade D · trust 69/100 Do not install this without reading the findings. The audit found something that could harm you or your machine.

What the source does

Filesystem

none-observed

Network

none-observed

Shell

declared (10 observation(s))

Dependencies

pinned

Secrets in source

none-found

Findings (6)

- pattern: eval($SINK)

- pattern: eval(...)

- pattern-not: Function("...")

- pattern: eval($SINK)

- pattern: exec($SINK)

AGENTS.md

Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.