Authentication PatternsSAFE
The most comprehensive toolkit for Claude Code -- 135 agents, 35 curated skills, 42 commands, 176+ plugins, 20 hooks, 15 rules, 7 templates, 14 MCP configs, 26 companion apps, 52 ecosystem entries, and more.
Overview
The most comprehensive toolkit for Claude Code -- 135 agents, 35 curated skills, 42 commands, 176+ plugins, 20 hooks, 15 rules, 7 templates, 14 MCP configs, 26 companion apps, 52 ecosystem entries, and more.
f03e77eaf446OBSERVED · 2026-10-11What it tells the agent
The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.
---
name: authentication-patterns
description: Authentication and authorization patterns including OAuth2, JWT, RBAC, session management, and PKCE flows
---
# Authentication Patterns
## JWT Access and Refresh Tokens
```typescript
import jwt from "jsonwebtoken";
interface TokenPayload {
sub: string;
email: string;
roles: string[];
}
function generateTokens(user: User) {
const accessToken = jwt.sign(
{ sub: user.id, email: user.email, roles: user.roles },
process.env.JWT_SECRET!,
{ expiresIn: "15m", issuer: "auth-service" }
);
const refreshToken = jwt.sign(
{ sub: user.id, tokenVersion: user.tokenVersion },
process.env.REFRESH_SECRET!,
{ expiresIn: "7d", issuer: "auth-service" }
);
return { accessToken, refreshToken };
}
function verifyAccessToken(token: string): TokenPayload {
return jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET!, {
issuer: "auth-service",
}) as TokenPayload;
}
```
Short-lived access tokens (15 minutes) with longer-lived refresh tokens (7 days). Store refresh tokens in HTTP-only cookies.
## Auth Middleware
```typescript
function authenticate(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) {
const header = req.headers.authorization;
if (!header?.startsWith("Bearer ")) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: "Missing authorization header" });
}
try {
const payload = verifyAccessToken(header.slice(7));
req.user = payload;
next();
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof jwt.TokenExpiredError) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: "Token expired" });
}
return res.status(401).json({ error: "Invalid token" });
}
}
function authorize(...roles: string[]) {
return (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
if (!req.user) return res.status(401).json({ error: "Not authenticated" });
if (!roles.some(role => req.user.roles.includes(role))) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: "Insufficient permissions" });
}
next();
};
}
app.get("/admin/users", authenticate, authorize("admin"), listUsers);
```
## OAuth2 Authorization Code Flow with PKCE
```typescript
import crypto from "crypto";
function generatePKCE() {
const verifier = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString("base64url");
const challenge = crypto
.createHash("sha256")
.update(verifier)
.digest("base64url");
return { verifier, challenge };
}
app.get("/auth/login", (req, res) => {
const { verifier, challenge } = generatePKCE();
req.session.codeVerifier = verifier;
const params = new URLSearchParams({
response_type: "code",
client_id: process.env.OAUTH_CLIENT_ID!,
redirect_uri: `${process.env.APP_URL}/auth/callback`,
scope: "openid profile email",
code_challenge: challenge,
code_challenge_method: "S256",
state: crypto.randomBytes(16).toString("hex"),
});
res.redirect(`${process.env.OAUTH_AUTHORIZE_URL}?${params}`);
});
app.get("/auth/callback", async (req, res) => {
const { code } = req.query;
const tokenResponse = await fetch(process.env.OAUTH_TOKEN_URL!, {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: new URLSearchParams({
grant_type: "authorization_code",
code: code as string,
redirect_uri: `${process.env.APP_URL}/auth/callback`,
client_id: process.env.OAUTH_CLIENT_ID!,
code_verifier: req.session.codeVerifier,
}),
});
const tokens = await tokenResponse.json();
const userInfo = jwt.decode(tokens.id_token);
req.session.user = { id: userInfo.sub, email: userInfo.email };
res.redirect("/dashboard");
});
```
## RBAC Model
```typescript
interface Permission {
resource: string;
action: "create" | "read" | "update" | "delete";
}
const ROLE_PERMISSIONS: Record<string, Permission[]> = {
viewer: [
{ resource: "posts", action: "read" },
{ resource: "comments", action: "read" },
],
editor: [
{ resource: "posts", action: "create" },
{ resource: "posts", action: "read" },
{ resource: "posts", action: "update" },
{ resource: "comments", action: "create" },
{ resource: "comments", action: "read" },
],
admin: [
{ resource: "*", action: "create" },
{ resource: "*", action: "read" },
{ resource: "*", action: "update" },
{ resource: "*", action: "delete" },
],
};
function hasPermission(roles: string[], resource: string, action: string): boolean {
return roles.some(role =>
ROLE_PERMISSIONS[role]?.some(
p => (p.resource === resource || p.resource === "*") && p.action === action
)
);
}
```
## Anti-Patterns
- Storing JWTs in `localStorage` (vulnerable to XSS; use HTTP-only cookies)
- Using symmetric secrets for JWTs across multiple services (use RS256 with key pairs)
- Not validating `iss`, `aud`, and `exp` claims on token verification
- Implementing custom password hashing instead of using bcrypt/argon2
- Missing CSRF protection on cookie-based authentication
- Returning different error messages for "user not found" vs "wrong password" (user enumeration)
## Checklist
- [ ] Access tokens are short-lived (15 minutes or less)
- [ ] Refresh tokens stored in HTTP-only, Secure, SameSite cookies
- [ ] Passwords hashed with bcrypt or argon2 (never MD5/SHA)
- [ ] OAuth2 PKCE flow used for public clients
- [ ] RBAC permissions checked at both route and data access layers
- [ ] Token revocation supported via version counter or blocklist
- [ ] CSRF protection enabled for cookie-based auth
- [ ] Authentication errors do not reveal whether the user existsTrust audit
SAFEgrade B · trust 89/100 Nothing in the source contradicts what it says it does. Grade A is reserved for packages that have also passed the behavioural sandbox.
| Layer | What it checks | Result |
|---|---|---|
| L0 | Provenance & inventory | PASS |
| L1 | Static analysis of the code | NA |
| L2 | Instruction surface (what it tells the agent) | PASS |
| L3 | Class-specific surface | PASS |
| L4 | Behavioural (sandbox) | SKIPPED |
What the source does
- Filesystem
- none-observed
- Network
- none-observed
- Shell
- none-observed
- Dependencies
- pinned
- Secrets in source
- none-found
Findings (0)
No findings outside the package's declared scope.
Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.
f03e77eaf446full audit observations/trust-audit/skill/rohitg00__authentication-patterns.json · Report an issue / request a re-scanAudit history
Every audit this skill has had.
| Date | Source | Verdict | Grade | Score | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-11 | f03e77eaf446 | SAFE | B | 89 | first audit |
Questions
What does the Authentication Patterns skill do?
The most comprehensive toolkit for Claude Code -- 135 agents, 35 curated skills, 42 commands, 176+ plugins, 20 hooks, 15 rules, 7 templates, 14 MCP configs, 26 companion apps, 52 ecosystem entries, and more.
Is Authentication Patterns safe to install?
The audit found nothing in the source that contradicts what it says it does, and graded it B (89/100). Grade A is held back for packages that have also passed a sandboxed behavioural run, which is why a clean skill reads B.
What can Authentication Patterns access on my machine?
The audit observed no filesystem, network or shell use at all in its source.
How current is this page?
The grade is for one exact copy of the source (f03e77eaf446), read on 2026-10-11. The repository is watched, and a new audit runs when it changes — this is the first audit.