Analyzing Slack Space And File System ArtifactsSAFE
817 structured cybersecurity skills for AI agents · Mapped to 6 frameworks: MITRE ATT&CK, NIST CSF 2.0, MITRE ATLAS, D3FEND, NIST AI RMF & MITRE F3 (Fight Fraud) · agentskills.io standard · Works with Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Codex CLI, Cursor, Gemini CLI & 20+ platforms · 29 security domains ·
Overview
817 structured cybersecurity skills for AI agents · Mapped to 6 frameworks: MITRE ATT&CK, NIST CSF 2.0, MITRE ATLAS, D3FEND, NIST AI RMF & MITRE F3 (Fight Fraud) · agentskills.io standard · Works with Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Codex CLI, Cursor, Gemini CLI & 20+ platforms · 29 security domains ·
6c59587be632OBSERVED · 2026-10-07Install
Commands as the repository documents them. They are shown, not run.
pip install analyzeMFT
pip install pyusn
pip install analyzeMFT
What it tells the agent
The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.
---
name: analyzing-slack-space-and-file-system-artifacts
description: Examine NTFS slack space, MFT entries, the USN Change Journal, and Alternate Data Streams (ADS) to recover hidden or residual data, reconstruct deleted-file metadata, and reconstruct available file-system change activity from USN records. Use during deep forensic analysis of an NTFS image when standard file recovery is insufficient, such as hunting for data hidden in ADS.
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: digital-forensics
tags:
- forensics
- slack-space
- ntfs
- mft
- usn-journal
- alternate-data-streams
- file-system-analysis
version: '1.0'
author: mahipal
license: Apache-2.0
nist_csf:
- RS.AN-03
- DE.AE-02
- RS.MA-01
mitre_attack:
- T1070.006
- T1564.004
- T1070.004
- T1005
- T1006
---
# Analyzing Slack Space and File System Artifacts
## When to Use
- When searching for hidden or residual data in file system slack space
- For analyzing NTFS Master File Table (MFT) entries for deleted file metadata
- When reconstructing file operations from the USN Change Journal
- For detecting Alternate Data Streams (ADS) used to hide data or malware
- During deep forensic analysis requiring examination beyond standard file recovery
## Prerequisites
- Forensic disk image with NTFS file system
- The Sleuth Kit (TSK) tools: istat, icat, fls, blkls, blkstat
- MFTECmd (Eric Zimmerman) for MFT parsing
- MFTExplorer for interactive MFT analysis
- Understanding of NTFS structures (MFT, $UsnJrnl, $LogFile, ADS)
- Python with analyzeMFT or mft library for automated parsing
## Workflow
### Step 1: Identify and Extract NTFS File System Artifacts
```bash
# Determine partition layout
mmls /cases/case-2024-001/images/evidence.dd
# Extract key NTFS system files
# $MFT - Master File Table
icat -o 2048 /cases/case-2024-001/images/evidence.dd 0 > /cases/case-2024-001/ntfs/MFT
# $UsnJrnl:$J - USN Change Journal
icat -o 2048 /cases/case-2024-001/images/evidence.dd 62-128 > /cases/case-2024-001/ntfs/UsnJrnl_J
# $LogFile - Transaction log
icat -o 2048 /cases/case-2024-001/images/evidence.dd 2 > /cases/case-2024-001/ntfs/LogFile
# Extract all slack space from the volume
blkls -s -o 2048 /cases/case-2024-001/images/evidence.dd > /cases/case-2024-001/ntfs/slack_space.raw
# Get file system information
fsstat -o 2048 /cases/case-2024-001/images/evidence.dd | tee /cases/case-2024-001/ntfs/fs_info.txt
```
### Step 2: Analyze the Master File Table (MFT)
```bash
# Parse MFT with MFTECmd (Eric Zimmerman)
MFTECmd.exe -f "C:\cases\ntfs\MFT" --csv "C:\cases\analysis\" --csvf mft_analysis.csv
# Parse with analyzeMFT (Python)
pip install analyzeMFT
analyzeMFT.py -f /cases/case-2024-001/ntfs/MFT \
-o /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/mft_analysis.csv \
-c
# Custom MFT analysis with Python
python3 << 'PYEOF'
from mft import PyMft
import csv
mft = PyMft(open('/cases/case-2024-001/ntfs/MFT', 'rb').read())
deleted_files = []
suspicious_files = []
for entry in mft.entries():
if entry is None:
continue
filename = entry.get_filename()
if filename is None:
continue
is_deleted = not entry.is_active()
is_directory = entry.is_directory()
created = entry.get_created_timestamp()
modified = entry.get_modified_timestamp()
mft_modified = entry.get_mft_modified_timestamp()
size = entry.get_file_size()
# Flag deleted files for recovery
if is_deleted and not is_directory and size > 0:
deleted_files.append({
'filename': filename,
'size': size,
'created': str(created),
'modified': str(modified),
'entry_number': entry.entry_number
})
# Detect timestomping (MFT modified time != $SI modified time)
si_modified = entry.get_si_modified_timestamp()
fn_modified = entry.get_fn_modified_timestamp()
if si_modified and fn_modified:
if abs((si_modified - fn_modified).total_seconds()) > 86400: # >1 day difference
suspicious_files.append({
'filename': filename,
'si_modified': str(si_modified),
'fn_modified': str(fn_modified),
'delta': str(si_modified - fn_modified)
})
print(f"=== DELETED FILES (recoverable metadata) ===")
print(f"Total: {len(deleted_files)}")
for f in deleted_files[:20]:
print(f" [{f['modified']}] {f['filename']} ({f['size']} bytes)")
print(f"\n=== POTENTIAL TIMESTOMPING ===")
print(f"Total suspicious: {len(suspicious_files)}")
for f in suspicious_files[:10]:
print(f" {f['filename']}: $SI={f['si_modified']}, $FN={f['fn_modified']} (delta: {f['delta']})")
PYEOF
```
### Step 3: Analyze Slack Space for Hidden Data
```bash
# Search slack space for strings
strings -a /cases/case-2024-001/ntfs/slack_space.raw > /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/slack_strings.txt
# Search for specific patterns in slack space
grep -iab "password\|secret\|confidential\|credit.card\|ssn" \
/cases/case-2024-001/ntfs/slack_space.raw > /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/slack_keywords.txt
# Analyze individual file slack
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import struct
# File slack consists of:
# 1. RAM slack: bytes between file end and next sector boundary (filled with RAM content or zeros)
# 2. Drive slack: remaining sectors in the cluster after the last file sector
# Analyze slack for specific MFT entries
# Using Sleuth Kit to get file slack for a specific file
import subprocess
# Get file details
result = subprocess.run(
['istat', '-o', '2048', '/cases/case-2024-001/images/evidence.dd', '14523'],
capture_output=True, text=True
)
print(result.stdout)
# The output shows data runs - the last cluster may contain slack data
# Calculate slack size: (allocated_size - file_size) bytes
PYEOF
# Search for file signatures in slack space (embedded files)
foremost -t jpg,pdf,zip -i /cases/case-2024-001/ntfs/slack_space.raw \
-o /cases/case-2024-001/carved/slack_carved/
# Use bulk_extractor to find structured data in slack
bulk_extractor -o /cases/Trust audit
SAFEgrade B · trust 89/100 Nothing in the source contradicts what it says it does. Grade A is reserved for packages that have also passed the behavioural sandbox.
| Layer | What it checks | Result |
|---|---|---|
| L0 | Provenance & inventory | PASS |
| L1 | Static analysis of the code | PASS |
| L2 | Instruction surface (what it tells the agent) | PASS |
| L3 | Class-specific surface | PASS |
| L4 | Behavioural (sandbox) | SKIPPED |
What the source does
- Filesystem
- none-observed
- Network
- none-observed
- Shell
- none-observed
- Dependencies
- pinned
- Secrets in source
- none-found
Findings (0)
No findings outside the package's declared scope.
Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.
6c59587be632full audit observations/trust-audit/skill/mukul975__analyzing-slack-space-and-file-system-artifacts.json · Report an issue / request a re-scanAudit history
Every audit this skill has had.
| Date | Source | Verdict | Grade | Score | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-07 | 6c59587be632 | SAFE | B | 89 | first audit |
Questions
What does the Analyzing Slack Space And File System Artifacts skill do?
817 structured cybersecurity skills for AI agents · Mapped to 6 frameworks: MITRE ATT&CK, NIST CSF 2.0, MITRE ATLAS, D3FEND, NIST AI RMF & MITRE F3 (Fight Fraud) · agentskills.io standard · Works with Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Codex CLI, Cursor, Gemini CLI & 20+ platforms · 29 security domains ·
Is Analyzing Slack Space And File System Artifacts safe to install?
The audit found nothing in the source that contradicts what it says it does, and graded it B (89/100). Grade A is held back for packages that have also passed a sandboxed behavioural run, which is why a clean skill reads B.
What can Analyzing Slack Space And File System Artifacts access on my machine?
The audit observed no filesystem, network or shell use at all in its source.
How current is this page?
The grade is for one exact copy of the source (6c59587be632), read on 2026-10-07. The repository is watched, and a new audit runs when it changes — this is the first audit.