Analyzing Mft For Deleted File RecoverySAFE

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The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: analyzing-mft-for-deleted-file-recovery
description: Analyze the NTFS Master File Table ($MFT) with MFTECmd, analyzeMFT,
  and X-Ways Forensics to recover metadata and content of deleted files by examining
  MFT record entries, $LogFile, $UsnJrnl, and MFT slack space. Use when recovering
  evidence of deleted files, reconstructing NTFS file-system timelines, or detecting
  anti-forensic timestomping during a Windows forensic examination.
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: digital-forensics
tags:
- mft
- ntfs
- deleted-files
- file-recovery
- mftecmd
- usn-journal
- logfile
- mft-slack-space
- file-system-forensics
- dfir
version: '1.0'
author: mahipal
license: Apache-2.0
nist_csf:
- RS.AN-03
- DE.AE-02
- RS.MA-01
mitre_attack:
- T1070.004
- T1070.006
- T1005
---

# Analyzing MFT for Deleted File Recovery

## Overview

The NTFS Master File Table ($MFT) is the central metadata repository for every file and directory on an NTFS volume. Each file is represented by at least one 1024-byte MFT record containing attributes such as $STANDARD_INFORMATION (timestamps, permissions), $FILE_NAME (name, parent directory, timestamps), and $DATA (file content or cluster run pointers). When a file is deleted, its MFT record is marked as inactive (InUse flag cleared) but the metadata remains until the entry is reallocated by a new file. This persistence makes MFT analysis a primary technique for recovering deleted file evidence, reconstructing file system timelines, and detecting anti-forensic activity such as timestomping.


## When to Use

- When investigating security incidents that require analyzing mft for deleted file recovery
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques

## Prerequisites

- Forensic disk image (E01, raw/dd, VMDK, or VHDX format)
- MFTECmd (Eric Zimmerman) or analyzeMFT (Python-based)
- FTK Imager, Arsenal Image Mounter, or similar for image mounting
- Timeline Explorer or Excel for CSV analysis
- Python 3.8+ for custom analysis scripts
- Understanding of NTFS file system internals

## MFT Structure and Record Layout

### MFT Record Header

Each MFT record begins with the signature "FILE" (0x46494C45) and contains:

| Offset | Size | Field |
|--------|------|-------|
| 0x00 | 4 bytes | Signature ("FILE") |
| 0x04 | 2 bytes | Offset to update sequence |
| 0x06 | 2 bytes | Size of update sequence |
| 0x08 | 8 bytes | $LogFile sequence number |
| 0x10 | 2 bytes | Sequence number |
| 0x12 | 2 bytes | Hard link count |
| 0x14 | 2 bytes | Offset to first attribute |
| 0x16 | 2 bytes | Flags (0x01 = InUse, 0x02 = Directory) |
| 0x18 | 4 bytes | Used size of MFT record |
| 0x1C | 4 bytes | Allocated size of MFT record |
| 0x20 | 8 bytes | Base file record reference |
| 0x28 | 2 bytes | Next attribute ID |

### Key MFT Attributes

| Type ID | Name | Description |
|---------|------|-------------|
| 0x10 | $STANDARD_INFORMATION | Timestamps, flags, owner ID, security ID |
| 0x30 | $FILE_NAME | Filename, parent MFT reference, timestamps |
| 0x40 | $OBJECT_ID | Unique GUID for the file |
| 0x50 | $SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR | ACL permissions |
| 0x60 | $VOLUME_NAME | Volume label (volume metadata files only) |
| 0x80 | $DATA | File content (resident if <700 bytes) or cluster run list |
| 0x90 | $INDEX_ROOT | B-tree index root for directories |
| 0xA0 | $INDEX_ALLOCATION | B-tree index entries for large directories |
| 0xB0 | $BITMAP | Allocation bitmap for index or MFT |

## Deleted File Recovery Techniques

### Technique 1: MFT Record Analysis with MFTECmd

```powershell
# Extract $MFT from forensic image using KAPE or FTK Imager
# Parse the $MFT with MFTECmd
MFTECmd.exe -f "C:\Evidence\$MFT" --csv C:\Output --csvf mft_full.csv

# Filter for deleted files (InUse = FALSE) in Timeline Explorer
# Look for entries where InUse column is False
```

**Identifying Deleted Files in CSV Output:**
- `InUse` = False indicates a deleted or reallocated record
- `ParentPath` shows original file location before deletion
- `FileSize` shows the original size (may still be recoverable)
- Timestamps in `$STANDARD_INFORMATION` and `$FILE_NAME` attributes persist

### Technique 2: USN Journal ($UsnJrnl:$J) Analysis

The USN Journal records all changes to files on an NTFS volume, including creation, deletion, rename, and data modification events.

```powershell
# Parse USN Journal with MFTECmd
MFTECmd.exe -f "C:\Evidence\$J" --csv C:\Output --csvf usn_journal.csv

# Key USN reason codes for deletion evidence:
# USN_REASON_FILE_DELETE     = 0x00000200
# USN_REASON_CLOSE           = 0x80000000
# USN_REASON_RENAME_OLD_NAME = 0x00001000
# USN_REASON_RENAME_NEW_NAME = 0x00002000
```

### Technique 3: $LogFile Transaction Analysis

The $LogFile stores NTFS transaction records that can reveal file operations even after the USN Journal has been cycled.

```powershell
# Parse $LogFile with LogFileParser
LogFileParser.exe -l "C:\Evidence\$LogFile" -o C:\Output

# Look for REDO and UNDO operations indicating file deletion:
# - DeallocateFileRecordSegment
# - DeleteAttribute
# - UpdateResidentValue (clearing InUse flag)
```

### Technique 4: MFT Slack Space Analysis

MFT slack space exists between the end of the used portion of an MFT record and the end of the allocated 1024 bytes. This area may contain remnants of previous file records.

```python
import struct

def parse_mft_slack(mft_path: str, output_path: str):
    """Extract and analyze MFT slack space for deleted file remnants."""
    with open(mft_path, "rb") as f:
        record_size = 1024
        record_num = 0
        slack_findings = []

        while True:
            record = f.read(record_size)
            if len(record) < record_size:
                break

            # Verify FILE signature
            if record[:4] != b"FILE":
                record_num += 1
                continue

  

SAFEgrade B · trust 89/100 Nothing in the source contradicts what it says it does. Grade A is reserved for packages that have also passed the behavioural sandbox.

What the source does

Filesystem

none-observed

Network

none-observed

Shell

none-observed

Dependencies

pinned

Secrets in source

none-found

Findings (0)

No findings outside the package's declared scope.

Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.