Analyzing Ios App Security With ObjectionBLOCK
817 structured cybersecurity skills for AI agents · Mapped to 6 frameworks: MITRE ATT&CK, NIST CSF 2.0, MITRE ATLAS, D3FEND, NIST AI RMF & MITRE F3 (Fight Fraud) · agentskills.io standard · Works with Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Codex CLI, Cursor, Gemini CLI & 20+ platforms · 29 security domains ·
Overview
817 structured cybersecurity skills for AI agents · Mapped to 6 frameworks: MITRE ATT&CK, NIST CSF 2.0, MITRE ATLAS, D3FEND, NIST AI RMF & MITRE F3 (Fight Fraud) · agentskills.io standard · Works with Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Codex CLI, Cursor, Gemini CLI & 20+ platforms · 29 security domains ·
6c59587be632OBSERVED · 2026-10-07What it tells the agent
The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.
--- name: analyzing-ios-app-security-with-objection description: >- Runtime iOS app security testing with Objection (Frida): inspect keychain and filesystem data, explore app internals at runtime, and validate/bypass client-side protections during authorized mobile assessments. domain: cybersecurity subdomain: mobile-security author: mahipal tags: - mobile-security - ios - objection - frida - owasp-mobile - penetration-testing version: 1.0.0 license: Apache-2.0 atlas_techniques: - AML.T0054 nist_ai_rmf: - MEASURE-2.7 - MANAGE-2.4 - GOVERN-6.2 - MAP-5.1 nist_csf: - PR.PS-01 - PR.AA-05 - ID.RA-01 - DE.CM-09 mitre_attack: - T1635 - T1414 - T1417.001 - T1409 --- # Analyzing iOS App Security with Objection ## When to Use Use this skill when: - Performing runtime security assessment of iOS applications during authorized penetration tests - Inspecting iOS keychain, filesystem, and memory for sensitive data exposure - Bypassing client-side security controls (SSL pinning, jailbreak detection) during security testing - Evaluating iOS app behavior at runtime without access to source code **Do not use** this skill on production devices without explicit authorization -- Objection modifies app runtime behavior and may trigger security monitoring. ## Prerequisites - Python 3.10+ with pip - Objection installed: `pip install objection` - Frida installed: `pip install frida-tools` - Target iOS device (jailbroken with Frida server, or non-jailbroken with repackaged IPA) - For non-jailbroken: `objection patchipa` to inject Frida gadget into IPA - macOS recommended for iOS testing (Xcode, ideviceinstaller) - USB connection to target device or network Frida server ## Workflow ### Step 1: Prepare the Testing Environment **For jailbroken devices:** ```bash # Install Frida server on device via Cydia/Sileo # SSH to device and start Frida server ssh root@<device_ip> "/usr/sbin/frida-server -D" # Verify Frida connectivity frida-ps -U # List processes on USB-connected device ``` **For non-jailbroken devices (authorized testing):** ```bash # Patch IPA with Frida gadget objection patchipa --source target.ipa --codesign-signature "Apple Development: [email protected]" # Install patched IPA ideviceinstaller -i target-patched.ipa ``` ### Step 2: Attach Objection to Target App ```bash # Attach to running app by bundle ID objection --gadget "com.target.app" explore # Or spawn the app fresh objection --gadget "com.target.app" explore --startup-command "ios hooking list classes" ``` Once attached, Objection provides an interactive REPL for runtime exploration. ### Step 3: Assess Data Storage Security (MASVS-STORAGE) ```bash # Dump iOS Keychain items accessible to the app ios keychain dump # List files in app sandbox ios plist cat Info.plist env # Show app environment paths # Inspect NSUserDefaults for sensitive data ios nsuserdefaults get # List SQLite databases sqlite connect app_data.db sqlite execute query "SELECT * FROM credentials" # Check for sensitive data in pasteboard ios pasteboard monitor ``` ### Step 4: Evaluate Network Security (MASVS-NETWORK) ```bash # Disable SSL/TLS certificate pinning ios sslpinning disable # Verify pinning is bypassed by observing traffic in Burp Suite proxy # Monitor network-related class method calls ios hooking watch class NSURLSession ios hooking watch class NSURLConnection ``` ### Step 5: Inspect Authentication and Authorization (MASVS-AUTH) ```bash # List all Objective-C classes ios hooking list classes # Search for authentication-related classes ios hooking search classes Auth ios hooking search classes Login ios hooking search classes Token # Hook authentication methods to observe parameters ios hooking watch method "+[AuthManager validateToken:]" --dump-args --dump-return # Monitor biometric authentication calls ios hooking watch class LAContext ``` ### Step 6: Assess Binary Protections (MASVS-RESILIENCE) ```bash # Check jailbreak detection implementation ios jailbreak disable # Simulate jailbreak detection bypass ios jailbreak simulate # List loaded frameworks and libraries memory list modules # Search memory for sensitive strings memory search "password" --string memory search "api_key" --string memory search "Bearer" --string # Dump specific memory regions memory dump all dump_output/ ``` ### Step 7: Review Platform Interaction (MASVS-PLATFORM) ```bash # List URL schemes registered by the app ios info binary ios bundles list_frameworks # Hook URL scheme handlers ios hooking watch method "-[AppDelegate application:openURL:options:]" --dump-args # Monitor clipboard access ios pasteboard monitor # Check for custom keyboard restrictions ios hooking search classes UITextField ``` ## Key Concepts | Term | Definition | |------|-----------| | **Objection** | Runtime mobile exploration toolkit built on Frida that provides pre-built scripts for common security testing tasks | | **Frida Gadget** | Shared library injected into app process to enable Frida instrumentation without jailbreak | | **Keychain** | iOS secure credential storage system; Objection can dump items accessible to the target app's keychain access group | | **SSL Pinning Bypass** | Runtime modification of certificate validation logic to allow proxy interception of HTTPS traffic | | **Method Hooking** | Intercepting Objective-C/Swift method calls at runtime to observe arguments, return values, and modify behavior | ## Tools & Systems - **Objection**: High-level Frida-powered mobile security exploration toolkit with pre-built commands - **Frida**: Dynamic instrumentation framework providing JavaScript injection into native app processes - **Frida-tools**: CLI utilities for Frida including frida-ps, frida-trace, and frida-discover - **ideviceinstaller**: Cross-platform tool for installing/managing iOS apps via USB - **Burp Suite**: HTTP proxy for intercepting traffic after SSL pinning bypass ## Common Pitfalls - **App crashes on attach**: Some apps implement Frida detection.
Trust audit
BLOCKgrade D · trust 69/100 Do not install this without reading the findings. The audit found something that could harm you or your machine.
| Layer | What it checks | Result |
|---|---|---|
| L0 | Provenance & inventory | PASS |
| L1 | Static analysis of the code | PASS |
| L2 | Instruction surface (what it tells the agent) | FAIL |
| L3 | Class-specific surface | PASS |
| L4 | Behavioural (sandbox) | SKIPPED |
What the source does
- Filesystem
- none-observed
- Network
- none-observed
- Shell
- none-observed
- Dependencies
- pinned
- Secrets in source
- none-found
Findings (6)
- **Keychain access scope**: Objection can only dump keychain items within the app's access group. System keychain items require separate jailbreak-level tools.
- Bypassing client-side security controls (SSL pinning, jailbreak detection) during security testing
# Check jailbreak detection implementation
ios jailbreak disable
# Simulate jailbreak detection bypass
ios jailbreak simulate
Gates applied: instruction_override, no_behavioural_pass.
6c59587be632full audit observations/trust-audit/skill/mukul975__analyzing-ios-app-security-with-objection.json · Report an issue / request a re-scanAudit history
Every audit this skill has had.
| Date | Source | Verdict | Grade | Score | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-07 | 6c59587be632 | BLOCK | D | 69 | first audit |
Questions
What does the Analyzing Ios App Security With Objection skill do?
817 structured cybersecurity skills for AI agents · Mapped to 6 frameworks: MITRE ATT&CK, NIST CSF 2.0, MITRE ATLAS, D3FEND, NIST AI RMF & MITRE F3 (Fight Fraud) · agentskills.io standard · Works with Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Codex CLI, Cursor, Gemini CLI & 20+ platforms · 29 security domains ·
Is Analyzing Ios App Security With Objection safe to install?
No — not without reading the findings first. The audit graded it D (69/100) and found 6 critical or high issues in the source. Each one is listed on this page with the file and line it is on.
What can Analyzing Ios App Security With Objection access on my machine?
The audit observed no filesystem, network or shell use at all in its source.
How current is this page?
The grade is for one exact copy of the source (6c59587be632), read on 2026-10-07. The repository is watched, and a new audit runs when it changes — this is the first audit.