Phy K8s Security AuditSAFE

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The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: phy-k8s-security-audit
description: Kubernetes manifest security auditor (CIS Kubernetes Benchmark). Scans all YAML/JSON manifests in your repository for privileged containers, hostNetwork/hostPID/hostIPC, dangerous hostPath mounts, missing resource limits/probes, latest image tags, RBAC over-permission (cluster-admin bindings, wildcard verbs), secrets in env vars, missing NetworkPolicy, missing seccomp/AppArmor profiles. Maps findings to CIS Benchmark controls and PSS (Pod Security Standards). Zero dependencies beyond PyYAML. Zero competitors on ClawHub.
license: Apache-2.0
tags:
  - security
  - kubernetes
  - k8s
  - cis-benchmark
  - devsecops
  - cloud-security
  - rbac
  - container-security
metadata:
  author: PHY041
  version: "1.0.0"
---

# phy-k8s-security-audit

Static security auditor for **Kubernetes YAML manifests**. Scans every Deployment, StatefulSet, DaemonSet, Pod, Job, CronJob, Role, ClusterRole, RoleBinding, ClusterRoleBinding, ServiceAccount, and NetworkPolicy in your repository against the **CIS Kubernetes Benchmark v1.9** and **Pod Security Standards (PSS)**. No cluster access required — works entirely on local manifest files.

## Why Manifest Auditing Matters

- Tesla's Kubernetes cluster was cryptojacked because their dashboard had no auth and pods ran privileged
- Attackers with access to one container can escape to the node via `privileged: true` or `hostPath` mounts
- Over-permissive RBAC (`cluster-admin`) is the #1 post-exploit persistence technique
- `automountServiceAccountToken: true` (the default) leaks credentials into every pod

## Checks: Pod / Container Level

| Check | Severity | CIS / PSS |
|-------|----------|-----------|
| `privileged: true` | CRITICAL | CIS 5.2.1 / PSS Restricted |
| `allowPrivilegeEscalation: true` or missing (default true) | HIGH | CIS 5.2.5 / PSS Restricted |
| `runAsNonRoot` missing or false | HIGH | CIS 5.2.6 / PSS Baseline |
| `runAsUser: 0` (root) | HIGH | CIS 5.2.6 |
| `hostNetwork: true` | HIGH | CIS 5.2.4 / PSS Baseline |
| `hostPID: true` | HIGH | CIS 5.2.2 / PSS Baseline |
| `hostIPC: true` | HIGH | CIS 5.2.3 / PSS Baseline |
| `hostPath` volume mount | HIGH | CIS 5.2.11 |
| `capabilities.add` with dangerous caps (SYS_ADMIN, NET_ADMIN, ALL) | CRITICAL | CIS 5.2.8 |
| Missing `capabilities.drop: [ALL]` | MEDIUM | CIS 5.2.7 / PSS Restricted |
| Missing resource `requests` and `limits` | MEDIUM | CIS 5.2.13 |
| `image: *:latest` or no tag | MEDIUM | Best practice |
| `imagePullPolicy: Never` with mutable tag | MEDIUM | Best practice |
| Missing `readinessProbe` | LOW | Best practice |
| Missing `livenessProbe` | LOW | Best practice |
| Secrets in `env` values (plaintext) | HIGH | CIS 5.4.1 |
| Missing `seccompProfile` | MEDIUM | CIS 5.7.2 / PSS Restricted |
| Missing `securityContext` entirely | MEDIUM | CIS 5.7.1 |
| `readOnlyRootFilesystem: false` (or missing) | MEDIUM | PSS Restricted |

## Checks: RBAC Level

| Check | Severity | CIS |
|-------|----------|-----|
| ClusterRoleBinding to `cluster-admin` | CRITICAL | CIS 5.1.1 |
| Role/ClusterRole with `verbs: ["*"]` | HIGH | CIS 5.1.3 |
| Role/ClusterRole with `resources: ["*"]` | HIGH | CIS 5.1.3 |
| Role with `secrets` GET/LIST permission | HIGH | CIS 5.1.2 |
| ServiceAccount with `automountServiceAccountToken: true` in non-system namespace | MEDIUM | CIS 5.1.5 |
| Default service account used (no explicit serviceAccountName) | MEDIUM | CIS 5.1.5 |

## Checks: Network Level

| Check | Severity | CIS |
|-------|----------|-----|
| No NetworkPolicy in namespace (detected from file dir) | HIGH | CIS 5.3.2 |
| NetworkPolicy `podSelector: {}` (applies to all pods) without ingress rules | MEDIUM | Best practice |
| Service type `NodePort` without explicit justification comment | LOW | CIS 5.4.2 |
| Service type `LoadBalancer` exposing non-HTTP port | MEDIUM | CIS 5.4.2 |

## Pod Security Standards Classification

Each Pod/Deployment spec is classified against PSS:

| Profile | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| **Privileged** | No restrictions — flag all workloads at this level |
| **Baseline** | No privileged, no host namespaces, no hostPath — minimum for most apps |
| **Restricted** | All of Baseline + non-root, no privilege escalation, seccomp, drop ALL caps |

## Implementation

```python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
phy-k8s-security-audit — CIS Kubernetes Benchmark manifest scanner
Usage: python3 audit_k8s.py [path] [--json] [--ci] [--min-severity HIGH]

Requires: pip install pyyaml (almost always already installed)
"""
import argparse
import json
import os
import re
import sys
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Optional

try:
    import yaml
    HAS_YAML = True
except ImportError:
    HAS_YAML = False
    print("Warning: PyYAML not found. Install with: pip install pyyaml", file=sys.stderr)
    sys.exit(1)

CRITICAL, HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW = "CRITICAL", "HIGH", "MEDIUM", "LOW"
SEV_ORDER = {CRITICAL: 0, HIGH: 1, MEDIUM: 2, LOW: 3}
ICONS = {CRITICAL: "🔴", HIGH: "🟠", MEDIUM: "🟡", LOW: "⚪"}

# Capabilities that are effectively root
DANGEROUS_CAPS = {
    "SYS_ADMIN", "NET_ADMIN", "SYS_PTRACE", "SYS_MODULE", "SYS_RAWIO",
    "ALL", "SYSLOG", "DAC_READ_SEARCH", "LINUX_IMMUTABLE",
    "NET_BROADCAST", "IPC_LOCK", "WAKE_ALARM", "BLOCK_SUSPEND",
}

# RBAC verbs that indicate over-permission
SENSITIVE_RBAC_VERBS = {"*", "create", "delete", "deletecollection", "patch", "update"}
SECRET_VERBS = {"get", "list", "watch", "*"}

@dataclass
class Finding:
    file: str
    resource_kind: str
    resource_name: str
    check_id: str
    severity: str
    title: str
    detail: str
    remediation: str
    cis_ref: Optional[str] = None
    pss_profile: Optional[str] = None

def get_name(obj: dict) -> str:
    return obj.get("metadata", {}).get("name", "<unnamed>")

def get_namespace(obj: dict) -> str:
    return obj.get("metadata", {}).get("namespace", "default")

def check_container_security(
    container: dict,
    file

SAFEgrade B · trust 89/100 Nothing in the source contradicts what it says it does. Grade A is reserved for packages that have also passed the behavioural sandbox.

What the source does

Filesystem

none-observed

Network

none-observed

Shell

none-observed

Dependencies

pinned

Secrets in source

none-found

Findings (1)

<key>k5Ey9KFlkqpj+SDkUw+5ED9lTA3En/qUi0zdrydUCH3kMWTE3Eh65NXnFCaxlY2omY2JHnlEoK7Li7oOEvM7eG5VPdcO/sFlMfoCRdnLYdepJ+uLzYwOWR8W4yQVve/clxVFTVRL4DFleKInGdpAxIbHZT2yi4ADAMENls1N1XSLojRuqXePXDeAT/4Mv4TTx0s

Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.