Agent skill · Audited from source

langchain-middleware

skill · langchain-ai/langchain-skillsMIT licenceAudited 28 Oct 2026 · source a78b2e2257e3

★ 1,316pushed 2 days ago
✓SAFEGrade B · 89/100 · 28 Oct 2026 · a78b2e2
1,316repo stars · whole langchain-ai/langchain-skills

Is it safe? Yes — SAFE, grade B (89/100). We read this skill's source at commit a78b2e2257e3 and found no filesystem, network or shell access and no hard-coded secrets. What it does: INVOKE THIS SKILL when you need human-in-the-loop approval, custom middleware, or structured output. Covers HumanInTheLoopMiddleware for human approval of dangerous tool calls, creating custom middleware with hooks,…

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Cite this page

ModelsAtlas. “langchain-middleware (langchain-ai/langchain-skills)”. Retrieved 28 Oct 2026. https://modelsatlas.com/skills/langchain-ai/langchain-middleware

Trust audit

Audit 0.4.1 · source read 28 Oct 2026

Trust score89/100✓SAFE B
0 critical0 high0 medium0 low0 info

SAFE means nothing in the source contradicts what the skill says it does. Grade B is shared by 13,985 of 14,816 audited skills.

What the source does

  • FilesystemNone observedNo reads or writes in the source
  • NetworkNone observedNo outbound calls in the source
  • ShellNone observedNo commands run in the source
  • DependenciesPinnedNothing floats
  • SecretsNone foundNo keys in source

Five audit layers

LayerWhat we checkResultFindings
L0 ProvenanceRepo owner, licence, archive status, activityPASS0
L1 Static sourceSecrets, path traversal, supply chain, hidden codeNA0
L2 InstructionsPrompt injection, authority framing, hidden directivesPASS0
L3 InventoryThe files and declarations match the sourcePASS0
L4 SandboxRun in isolation and watch behaviourSKIPPED why0

Gates applied: no behavioural pass.

Findings (0)

No findings at any severity. We re-audit when the source changes.

Audit 0.4.1 · source sha a78b2e2257e3 · 28 Oct 2026Report an issue or request a re-scan

Provenance

Who published it, and what the verdict is pinned to

  • Publisherlangchain-ai GitHub organizationOwner of the repository this skill is read from
  • Source folderlangchain-ai/langchain-skills/config/skills/langchain-middlewareThe exact folder we audited
  • LicenceMITAs the repository states it
  • Commit pinned for this verdicta78b2e2257e3A new audit runs when the source changes
  • Repository statusNot archivedLast push 2 days ago
  • Sandboxed runNot runSkills are read, not executed; layer L4 is skipped

What it tells the agent

Full source on GitHub ↗

Its description: INVOKE THIS SKILL when you need human-in-the-loop approval, custom middleware, or structured output. Covers HumanInTheLoopMiddleware for human approval of dangerous tool calls, creating custom middleware with hooks,…

---
name: langchain-middleware
description: "INVOKE THIS SKILL when you need human-in-the-loop approval, custom middleware, or structured output. Covers HumanInTheLoopMiddleware for human approval of dangerous tool calls, creating custom middleware with hooks, Command resume patterns, and structured output with Pydantic/Zod."
---

<overview>
Middleware patterns for production LangChain agents:

- **HumanInTheLoopMiddleware** / **humanInTheLoopMiddleware**: Pause before dangerous tool calls for human approval
- **Custom middleware**: Intercept tool calls for error handling, logging, retry logic
- **Command resume**: Continue execution after human decisions (approve, edit, reject)

**Requirements:** Checkpointer + thread_id config for all HITL workflows.
</overview>

---

## Human-in-the-Loop

<ex-basic-hitl-setup>
<python>
Set up an agent with HITL middleware that pauses before sending emails for approval.

```python
from langchain.agents import create_agent
from langchain.agents.middleware import HumanInTheLoopMiddleware
from langgraph.checkpoint.memory import MemorySaver
from langchain.tools import tool

@tool
def send_email(to: str, subject: str, body: str) -> str:
    """Send an email."""
    return f"Email sent to {to}"

agent = create_agent(
    model="gpt-4.1",
    tools=[send_email],
    checkpointer=MemorySaver(),  # Required for HITL
    middleware=[
        HumanInTheLoopMiddleware(
            interrupt_on={
                "send_email": {"allowed_decisions": ["approve", "edit", "reject"]},
            }
        )
    ],
)
```
</python>
<typescript>
Set up an agent with HITL that pauses before sending emails for human approval.

```typescript
import { createAgent, humanInTheLoopMiddleware } from "langchain";
import { MemorySaver } from "@langchain/langgraph";
import { tool } from "@langchain/core/tools";
import { z } from "zod";

const sendEmail = tool(
  async ({ to, subject, body }) => `Email sent to ${to}`,
  {
    name: "send_email",
    description: "Send an email",
    schema: z.object({ to: z.string(), subject: z.string(), body: z.string() }),
  }
);

const agent = createAgent({
  model: "anthropic:claude-sonnet-4-5",
  tools: [sendEmail],
  checkpointer: new MemorySaver(),
  middleware: [
    humanInTheLoopMiddleware({
      interruptOn: { send_email: { allowedDecisions: ["approve", "edit", "reject"] } },
    }),
  ],
});
```
</typescript>
</ex-basic-hitl-setup>

<ex-running-with-interrupts>
<python>
Run the agent, detect an interrupt, then resume execution after human approval.

```python
from langgraph.types import Command

config = {"configurable": {"thread_id": "session-1"}}

# Step 1: Agent runs until it needs to call tool
result1 = agent.invoke({
    "messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "Send email to [email protected]"}]
}, config=config)

# Check for interrupt
if "__interrupt__" in result1:
    print(f"Waiting for approval: {result1['__interrupt__']}")

# Step 2: Human approves
result2 = agent.invoke(
    Command(resume={"decisions": [{"type": "approve"}]}),
    config=config
)
```
</python>
<typescript>
Run the agent, detect an interrupt, then resume execution after human approval.

```typescript
import { Command } from "@langchain/langgraph";

const config = { configurable: { thread_id: "session-1" } };

// Step 1: Agent runs until it needs to call tool
const result1 = await agent.invoke({
  messages: [{ role: "user", content: "Send email to [email protected]" }]
}, config);

// Check for interrupt
if (result1.__interrupt__) {
  console.log(`Waiting for approval: ${result1.__interrupt__}`);
}

// Step 2: Human approves
const result2 = await agent.invoke(
  new Command({ resume: { decisions: [{ type: "approve" }] } }),
  config
);
```
</typescript>
</ex-running-with-interrupts>

<ex-editing-tool-arguments>
<python>
Edit the tool arguments before approving when the original values need correction.

```python
# Human edits the arguments — edited_action must include name + args
result2 = agent.invoke(
    Command(resume={
        "decisions": [{
            "type": "edit",
            "edited_action": {
                "name": "send_email",
                "args": {
                    "to": "[email protected]",  # Fixed email
                    "subject": "Project Meeting - Updated",
                    "body": "...",
                },
            },
        }]
    }),
    config=config
)
```
</python>
<typescript>
Edit the tool arguments before approving when the original values need correction.

```typescript
// Human edits the arguments — editedAction must include name + args
const result2 = await agent.invoke(
  new Command({
    resume: {
      decisions: [{
        type: "edit",
        editedAction: {
          name: "send_email",
          args: {
            to: "[email protected]",  // Fixed email
            subject: "Project Meeting - Updated",
            body: "...",
          },
        },
      }]
    }
  }),
  config
);
```
</typescript>
</ex-editing-tool-arguments>

<ex-rejecting-with-feedback>
<python>
Reject a tool call and provide feedback explaining why it was rejected.

```python
# Human rejects
result2 = agent.invoke(
    Command(resume={
        "decisions": [{
            "type": "reject",
            "feedback": "Cannot delete customer data without manager approval",
        }]
    }),
    config=config
)
```
</python>
</ex-rejecting-with-feedback>

<ex-multiple-tools-different-policies>
<python>
Configure different HITL policies for each tool based on risk level.

```python
agent = create_agent(
    model="gpt-4.1",
    tools=[send_email, read_email, delete_email],
    checkpointer=MemorySaver(),
    middleware=[
        HumanInTheLoopMiddleware(
            interrupt_on={
                "send_email": {"allowed_decisions": ["approve", "edit", "reject"]},
                "delete_email": {"allowed_decisions": ["approve", "reject"]},  # No edit
                "read_email": False,  # No HITL for reading
            }
        )
    ]

Excerpt, first 6,000 characters of SKILL.md, verbatim from the audited commit. It is text from someone else’s repository, quoted so you can judge it before your agent reads it.

Install

Pinned to the audited commit a78b2e2

Download folder ↗
git clone https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain-skills
git -C langchain-skills checkout a78b2e2257e3

The author documents no install command, so this uses the repository directly. Our verdict covers commit a78b2e2257e3 only.

Works in

The author has not said which agents this skill supports, and we have not tested it in any.

Audit history

Every audit, every source change

  1. ✓SAFE B 89 / 100

    first audit · source a78b2e2257e3

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Questions about langchain-middleware

Is langchain-middleware safe to install?
The audit found nothing in the source that contradicts what it says it does, and graded it B (89/100). Grade A is held back for packages that have also passed a sandboxed behavioural run, which is why a clean skill reads B.
What can langchain-middleware access on my machine?
The audit observed no filesystem, network or shell use at all in its source.
How current is this page?
The grade is for one exact copy of the source (a78b2e2257e3), read on 2026-10-28. The repository is watched, and a new audit runs when it changes — this is the first audit.

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