Mistral Enterprise RbacSAFE
Model-agnostic agent-skills platform with a harness-free canonical layer, verified adapters, and the ccpi package manager. Explore at tonsofskills.com.
Overview
Model-agnostic agent-skills platform with a harness-free canonical layer, verified adapters, and the ccpi package manager. Explore at tonsofskills.com.
4f83675ca38aOBSERVED · 2026-10-09Host compatibility
What the documentation claims. We have not run a compatibility test.
| Host | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| claude-code | mentioned |
What it tells the agent
The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.
--- name: mistral-enterprise-rbac description: >- Design Mistral organization, workspace, role, service-account, workload-identity, and application RBAC boundaries. Use when governing enterprise access. Trigger with "Mistral RBAC", "manage Mistral workspaces", or "audit Mistral service access". allowed-tools: Read,Glob,Grep,Write,Edit argument-hint: "<organization> <workspace-model> <identity-source>" version: 1.14.0 license: MIT author: Jeremy Longshore <[email protected]> tags: [saas, mistral, rbac] model: inherit effort: high compatibility: "Designed for Claude Code; live or external Mistral actions require network access and explicit approval" --- # Mistral Enterprise Access Governance ## Overview Separate provider administration from application authorization. Provider controls govern resources/capacity; the application still enforces users, tenants, data, and tools. ## Prerequisites - An identity source, joiner/mover/leaver process, and access owner. - Organization/workspace inventory, role catalog, service identities, and break-glass policy. - Current roles, service-account, workload-identity, and audit evidence. ## Current Contract Mistral documents workspaces, groups, roles, service accounts, workload identity, keys, and audit logs. Exact entitlements and plan access come from current admin evidence. ## Authentication Prefer approved non-human service identities. API keys authenticate provider calls but never substitute for application user identity or tenant authorization. ## Instructions 1. Inventory users, groups, roles, service accounts, workload identities, keys, and membership. 2. Map least-privilege provider permissions and separate billing, security, and runtime duties. 3. Define app roles/tenant checks separately for prompts, files, retrieval, tools, and output. 4. Set provisioning, review, expiration, rotation, revocation, and break-glass controls. 5. Verify audit coverage for critical admin actions and evidence retention. 6. Test joiner, mover, leaver, compromised service, wrong workspace, and emergency access. ## Tool Discipline Use Read, Glob, and Grep to inspect code, locks, configuration, tests, and evidence. Use Write and Edit only for approved repository changes. Invocation alone does not authorize network calls, paid usage, uploads, stateful resources, admin mutations, deployments, or deletion. ## Approval Boundaries Any user, group, role, workspace, service account, workload identity, key, or break-glass mutation requires authorized administration. ## Error Handling - Broad workspace roles expose resources even when UI hides them. - Shared human keys defeat attribution/offboarding. - Provider RBAC cannot protect an app tool that skips app authorization. ## Output Return identity/workspace matrix, provider/app role separation, lifecycle controls, audit coverage, toxic combinations, approvals, and rollback. ## Examples - Give runtime only needed provider access while app enforces tenant retrieval. - Offboard a user and verify service credentials remain independently owned. ## Validation Review effective permissions, test cross-workspace and cross-tenant denial, rotate and revoke a test identity, and verify audit and break-glass expiry. Record every expected denial. ## Resources - [Current first-party evidence map](references/official-docs.md) — recheck dated sources before relying on mutable endpoints, models, limits, prices, preview status, or retention. - Record live account observations as environment-specific evidence, not universal Mistral guarantees.
Trust audit
SAFEgrade B · trust 89/100 Nothing in the source contradicts what it says it does. Grade A is reserved for packages that have also passed the behavioural sandbox.
| Layer | What it checks | Result |
|---|---|---|
| L0 | Provenance & inventory | PASS |
| L1 | Static analysis of the code | PASS |
| L2 | Instruction surface (what it tells the agent) | PASS |
| L3 | Class-specific surface | PASS |
| L4 | Behavioural (sandbox) | SKIPPED |
What the source does
- Filesystem
- none-observed
- Network
- none-observed
- Shell
- none-observed
- Dependencies
- pinned
- Secrets in source
- none-found
Findings (0)
No findings outside the package's declared scope.
Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.
4f83675ca38afull audit observations/trust-audit/skill/jeremylongshore__mistral-enterprise-rbac.json · Report an issue / request a re-scanAudit history
Every audit this skill has had.
| Date | Source | Verdict | Grade | Score | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-09 | 4f83675ca38a | SAFE | B | 89 | first audit |
Questions
What does the Mistral Enterprise Rbac skill do?
Model-agnostic agent-skills platform with a harness-free canonical layer, verified adapters, and the ccpi package manager. Explore at tonsofskills.com.
Is Mistral Enterprise Rbac safe to install?
The audit found nothing in the source that contradicts what it says it does, and graded it B (89/100). Grade A is held back for packages that have also passed a sandboxed behavioural run, which is why a clean skill reads B.
What can Mistral Enterprise Rbac access on my machine?
The audit observed no filesystem, network or shell use at all in its source.
Which assistants does Mistral Enterprise Rbac work with?
Its documentation mentions claude-code. That is what the text claims, not a compatibility test we ran.
How current is this page?
The grade is for one exact copy of the source (4f83675ca38a), read on 2026-10-09. The repository is watched, and a new audit runs when it changes — this is the first audit.