Atlas / Skills / h-mmer / Analyze

AnalyzeCAUTION

skills/h-mmer/analyze

Bug bounty agent framework for Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, Cursor, Windsurf, Copilot, and OpenClaw — 48 agents, 26 commands, 19 CLI tools, 2 MCP servers, autonomous hunt loops, exploit chain builder.

Verdict
CAUTION
Grade
B
Trust score
89 /100
Version
—
Hosts
—
License
—
Stars
1,004
01

Overview

Bug bounty agent framework for Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, Cursor, Windsurf, Copilot, and OpenClaw — 48 agents, 26 commands, 19 CLI tools, 2 MCP servers, autonomous hunt loops, exploit chain builder.

Read from source at commit be1723764604OBSERVED · 2026-10-13
02

What it tells the agent

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: analyze
description: "Analyze recon output with AI to suggest high-value targets and attack strategies. Usage: /analyze <target>"
disable-model-invocation: false
---
AI-powered analysis of recon data for: $ARGUMENTS

## Process
1. Read all recon data: `ls recon/` and read key files
2. Read brain data: `uv run python3 $CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR/tools/brain.py brief $ARGUMENTS`
3. Read tech stack intel: `uv run python3 $CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR/tools/intel_engine.py suggest <detected-stack>`
4. Read hacktivity patterns: `uv run python3 $CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR/tools/intel_engine.py analyze`

## Analysis Tasks (do all of these)

### Crown Jewel Mapping
What's the most valuable thing an attacker could access on this target?
- Financial data? → hunt IDOR on payment/billing endpoints
- User PII? → hunt IDOR on profile/export endpoints
- Admin access? → hunt auth bypass on admin endpoints
- Infrastructure? → hunt SSRF → cloud metadata

### Attack Path Ranking
Given the tech stack and recon output, rank the top 5 attack paths by:
1. Likelihood of vulnerability existing (based on tech stack patterns)
2. Impact if exploited (based on endpoint function)
3. Competition (based on hacktivity — avoid heavily-reported vuln classes)
4. Your past success (from brain patterns)

### Blind Spot Detection
What has NOT been tested? What endpoints have no brain data?
Cross-reference recon output against brain tested endpoints.
Flag untested high-value endpoints.

### Output
```
ANALYSIS: target.com
═════════════════════

Crown Jewels: [what's most valuable]

Top 5 Attack Paths:
1. [endpoint] × [vuln class] — likelihood: HIGH, impact: CRITICAL
2. ...

Blind Spots (untested P1 surface):
- /api/v2/payments/* — NO DATA in brain
- /api/v2/admin/* — NO DATA in brain

Recommendation: /hunt target.com --vuln-class [best bet]
```

## Top-Tier Operator Addendum

Treat `/analyze` as a thesis generator, not a summary command. The output must make the next hour of hunting obvious.

1. Build a weighted table before recommending anything:
   - `asset_value`: revenue, PII, admin, secrets, infrastructure, tenant boundary
   - `exploit_likelihood`: stack age, exposed methods, auth complexity, parser surface, prior bug class fit
   - `novelty`: low hacktivity overlap, new endpoint, changed JS, unusual integration, weak vendor pattern
   - `proof_path`: exact request needed to prove impact, required accounts, required evidence artifact
   - `policy_friction`: rate limits, forbidden data access, third-party scope, credential validation rules
2. Prefer attack paths with a short proof path over impressive theory. A boring IDOR with two accounts and a readback beats a speculative SSRF with no egress signal.
3. Include negative evidence. If `/api/admin/*` looks valuable but all routes are 403 with no differential, say that and explain what would change the ranking.
4. Separate `P1 now`, `P2 if time`, and `Kill for this session`. Top-tier analysis saves time by deleting tempting dead ends.
5. Every recommendation must name the next command and the exact first test: `/hunt target --vuln-class idor` plus the endpoint pair, account pair, and field to compare.
03

Trust audit

CAUTIONgrade B · trust 89/100 Install with care. The audit found things worth knowing before you trust its output.

LayerWhat it checksResult
L0Provenance & inventoryPASS
L1Static analysis of the codeNA
L2Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)FAIL
L3Class-specific surfacePASS
L4Behavioural (sandbox)SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem
none-observed
Network
none-observed
Shell
none-observed
Dependencies
pinned
Secrets in source
none-found

Findings (2)

HIGHPrompt injection · prompt.credential_read · CWE-94, CWE-1427
SKILL.md:62
- `policy_friction`: rate limits, forbidden data access, third-party scope, credential validation rules
Why it matters. asks the agent to read credentials
LOWInventory / provenance · inv.no_license · CWE-1104
Why it matters. no LICENSE file and no repo licence
Fix. add a licence

Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass, no_license.

Audited 2026-10-13 · audit v0.4.1 · source sha be1723764604full audit observations/trust-audit/skill/h-mmer__analyze.json · Report an issue / request a re-scan
04

Audit history

Every audit this skill has had.

DateSourceVerdictGradeScoreChange
2026-10-13be1723764604CAUTIONB89first audit
05

Questions

What does the Analyze skill do?

Bug bounty agent framework for Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, Cursor, Windsurf, Copilot, and OpenClaw — 48 agents, 26 commands, 19 CLI tools, 2 MCP servers, autonomous hunt loops, exploit chain builder.

Is Analyze safe to install?

With care. The audit graded it B (89/100) and found 2 things worth knowing before you trust this skill, listed below with the exact line each was found on.

What can Analyze access on my machine?

The audit observed no filesystem, network or shell use at all in its source.

How current is this page?

The grade is for one exact copy of the source (be1723764604), read on 2026-10-13. The repository is watched, and a new audit runs when it changes — this is the first audit.

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