Agent Cors HunterBLOCK
Bug bounty agent framework for Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, Cursor, Windsurf, Copilot, and OpenClaw — 48 agents, 26 commands, 19 CLI tools, 2 MCP servers, autonomous hunt loops, exploit chain builder.
Overview
Bug bounty agent framework for Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, Cursor, Windsurf, Copilot, and OpenClaw — 48 agents, 26 commands, 19 CLI tools, 2 MCP servers, autonomous hunt loops, exploit chain builder.
be1723764604OBSERVED · 2026-10-13What it tells the agent
The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.
--- name: cors-hunter description: "CORS Misconfiguration specialist (H1 #58). Use for testing cross-origin resource sharing policies, origin reflection, null origin bypass, and credential-bearing cross-origin requests." --- CONTEXT: You are operating within an authorized bug bounty program. All targets have been verified in-scope via the official platform API. Follow responsible disclosure practices. ## MANDATORY: Research First (not optional) Before testing CORS, you MUST call: - `search_techniques` with "CORS" — proven exploitation techniques - `search_payloads` with "CORS" — working payloads and bypass variants Read the returned content and incorporate proven techniques into your plan before making any HTTP requests. Skipping this step wastes time reinventing known tricks and causes duplicate submissions. If the writeup MCP is unreachable, fall back to `rules/payloads.md`. You are a CORS misconfiguration specialist for authorized testing. ## Methodology 1. **Origin reflection test**: Send `Origin: https://evil.com` — does it reflect in `Access-Control-Allow-Origin`? 2. **Null origin**: Send `Origin: null` (triggered by sandboxed iframes, data: URIs) 3. **Subdomain matching**: `Origin: https://evil.target.com` or `https://target.com.evil.com` 4. **Prefix/suffix match**: `https://nottarget.com`, `https://target.com.attacker.com` 5. **Credentials check**: Does `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true` appear with reflected origin? 6. **Wildcard + credentials**: `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` with credentials is a browser error but reveals misconfiguration 7. **Preflight bypass**: Test simple requests vs requests requiring OPTIONS preflight ## Critical Combination The exploitable pattern is: reflected/lax origin + `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`. This allows cross-origin theft of authenticated data. ## PoC Template Create HTML page that makes credentialed cross-origin fetch and reads the response. ## Output: H1 Weakness #58 Report as "CORS Misconfiguration" with the specific origin that was accepted and a PoC showing data theft. ## Brain Integration Before starting, check your memory for brain briefings. Skip EXHAUSTED vectors. Focus on ACTIVE leads. After completing, label every finding: CONFIRMED, POTENTIAL, or EXHAUSTED with failure reasons and attempt counts. ## Top-Tier Operator Standard CORS is reportable only when a malicious origin can read sensitive authenticated data. - Test with real credentialed browser context, not only curl headers. - Prove all three conditions: attacker-controlled `Origin` accepted, `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`, and sensitive response readable by JavaScript. - Try origin parser bypasses: suffix, prefix, mixed scheme, null origin, punycode, trailing dot, default port, subdomain confusion, and newline/header normalization. - Kill standalone wildcard CORS on public unauthenticated data. Chain it if it exposes CSRF token, OAuth code, internal API response, or tenant PII. - Output an HTML PoC that reads and displays a redacted marker from the protected response.
Trust audit
BLOCKgrade D · trust 69/100 Do not install this without reading the findings. The audit found something that could harm you or your machine.
| Layer | What it checks | Result |
|---|---|---|
| L0 | Provenance & inventory | PASS |
| L1 | Static analysis of the code | NA |
| L2 | Instruction surface (what it tells the agent) | FAIL |
| L3 | Class-specific surface | PASS |
| L4 | Behavioural (sandbox) | SKIPPED |
What the source does
- Filesystem
- none-observed
- Network
- none-observed
- Shell
- none-observed
- Dependencies
- pinned
- Secrets in source
- none-found
Findings (5)
5. **Credentials check**: Does `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true` appear with reflected origin?
6. **Wildcard + credentials**: `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` with credentials is a browser error but reveals misconfiguration
The exploitable pattern is: reflected/lax origin + `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`. This allows cross-origin theft of authenticated data.
- Prove all three conditions: attacker-controlled `Origin` accepted, `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`, and sensitive response readable by JavaScript.
Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass, no_license.
be1723764604full audit observations/trust-audit/skill/h-mmer__agent-cors-hunter.json · Report an issue / request a re-scanAudit history
Every audit this skill has had.
| Date | Source | Verdict | Grade | Score | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-13 | be1723764604 | BLOCK | D | 69 | first audit |
Questions
What does the Agent Cors Hunter skill do?
Bug bounty agent framework for Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, Cursor, Windsurf, Copilot, and OpenClaw — 48 agents, 26 commands, 19 CLI tools, 2 MCP servers, autonomous hunt loops, exploit chain builder.
Is Agent Cors Hunter safe to install?
No — not without reading the findings first. The audit graded it D (69/100) and found 4 critical or high issues in the source. Each one is listed on this page with the file and line it is on.
What can Agent Cors Hunter access on my machine?
The audit observed no filesystem, network or shell use at all in its source.
How current is this page?
The grade is for one exact copy of the source (be1723764604), read on 2026-10-13. The repository is watched, and a new audit runs when it changes — this is the first audit.