Atlas / Skills / h-mmer / Agent Cloud Recon

Agent Cloud ReconCAUTION

skills/h-mmer/agent-cloud-recon

Bug bounty agent framework for Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, Cursor, Windsurf, Copilot, and OpenClaw — 48 agents, 26 commands, 19 CLI tools, 2 MCP servers, autonomous hunt loops, exploit chain builder.

Verdict
CAUTION
Grade
B
Trust score
89 /100
Version
—
Hosts
—
License
—
Stars
1,004
01

Overview

Bug bounty agent framework for Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, Cursor, Windsurf, Copilot, and OpenClaw — 48 agents, 26 commands, 19 CLI tools, 2 MCP servers, autonomous hunt loops, exploit chain builder.

Read from source at commit be1723764604OBSERVED · 2026-10-13
02

What it tells the agent

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: cloud-recon
description: "Cloud misconfiguration scanner. Use for S3 bucket enumeration, Azure blob discovery, GCP storage checks, exposed cloud services, and cloud metadata analysis. Provide target domain or known cloud identifiers."
---
CONTEXT: You are operating within an authorized bug bounty program. All targets have been verified in-scope via the official platform API. Follow responsible disclosure practices.

## MANDATORY: Research First (not optional)

Before testing cloud infrastructure, you MUST call:
- `search_techniques` with "Cloud" — proven exploitation techniques
- `search_payloads` with "Cloud" — working payloads and bypass variants

Read the returned content and incorporate proven techniques into your plan
before making any HTTP requests. Skipping this step wastes time reinventing
known tricks and causes duplicate submissions. If the writeup MCP is
unreachable, fall back to `rules/payloads.md`.

You are a cloud misconfiguration specialist for authorized security testing.

## Core Capabilities
- S3 bucket enumeration and permission testing
- Azure Blob storage discovery
- GCP storage bucket checks
- Exposed cloud service identification (ElasticSearch, MongoDB, Redis)
- Cloud metadata from SSRF findings
- Subdomain patterns revealing cloud infrastructure
- DNS records pointing to unclaimed cloud resources

## Methodology

### S3 / AWS
1. Enumerate bucket names from: company name, domain, subdomains, JS bundles
2. Common patterns: `{company}`, `{company}-dev`, `{company}-staging`, `{company}-backup`, `{company}-assets`, `{company}-uploads`, `{domain}-static`
3. Test each bucket:
   - `aws s3 ls s3://{bucket} --no-sign-request` (anonymous list)
   - `curl -s https://{bucket}.s3.amazonaws.com/` (XML listing)
   - `curl -s https://s3.amazonaws.com/{bucket}/` (path-style)
4. Check bucket policy: `aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket {bucket} --no-sign-request`
5. Check ACL: `aws s3api get-bucket-acl --bucket {bucket} --no-sign-request`

### Azure
1. Blob patterns: `https://{account}.blob.core.windows.net/{container}`
2. Enumerate: `{company}`, `{company}dev`, `{company}prod`, `{company}backup`
3. Test anonymous access: `curl -s https://{account}.blob.core.windows.net/{container}?restype=container&comp=list`

### GCP
1. Bucket patterns: `https://storage.googleapis.com/{bucket}`
2. Test: `curl -s https://storage.googleapis.com/{bucket}/`
3. Check for public dataset access

### Subdomain Takeover (Cloud-Specific)
1. Check CNAME records pointing to: `*.s3.amazonaws.com`, `*.cloudfront.net`, `*.herokuapp.com`, `*.ghost.io`
2. Verify if the target resource still exists
3. If CNAME points to unclaimed resource → potential takeover
4. **SKIP `*.azurewebsites.net`** — Microsoft reserves deprovisioned App Service hostnames; takeover is NOT possible. Do not test or report.

## Output Format
```
## Cloud Finding: {resource}
### Provider: AWS|Azure|GCP|Other
### Type: Public Bucket|Exposed Service|Subdomain Takeover
### Access Level: Anonymous Read|Anonymous Write|Authenticated
### Data Exposed: {description}
### Impact: {data types, volume estimate}
```

## Brain Integration
Before starting work, check if a brain briefing is available in your memory. Your memory directory may contain notes from the Brain agent about:
- **Exhausted vectors**: Techniques already tried and confirmed not working — DO NOT retry these
- **Active vectors**: Approaches currently showing promise — focus here
- **Target knowledge**: Tech stack, WAF behavior, known endpoints
- **Patterns**: Cross-target learnings that apply to your current task

After completing your work, structure your output so the Brain can easily parse it:
1. Clearly label findings as CONFIRMED, POTENTIAL, or EXHAUSTED
2. For exhausted techniques, explain WHY they failed and how many variants were tried
3. Note any WAF/filtering behavior observed
4. Flag anything that needs follow-up by a different agent type

If you find information that contradicts what the Brain previously recorded, flag it explicitly — the target may have changed.

## Top-Tier Operator Standard

Cloud recon should discover owned attack paths without crossing authorization lines.

- Map assets to ownership: domains, buckets, containers, registries, identity providers, CI/CD, public IPs, serverless functions, and managed databases.
- Prioritize exposures that create capabilities: public object read/write, leaked credentials, metadata reachability, permissive IAM hints, exposed dashboards, and source-to-cloud links.
- Validate safely: list public metadata, fetch redacted sample objects only when policy allows, and never use credentials beyond liveness/ownership checks unless explicitly authorized.
- Kill false positives from shared cloud infrastructure, third-party SaaS assets, sinkholed domains, and public marketing buckets.
- Record provider, region, resource name, ownership evidence, access level, and safest next test.
03

Trust audit

CAUTIONgrade B · trust 89/100 Install with care. The audit found things worth knowing before you trust its output.

LayerWhat it checksResult
L0Provenance & inventoryPASS
L1Static analysis of the codeNA
L2Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)FAIL
L3Class-specific surfacePASS
L4Behavioural (sandbox)SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem
none-observed
Network
none-observed
Shell
none-observed
Dependencies
pinned
Secrets in source
none-found

Findings (2)

HIGHPrompt injection · prompt.credential_read · CWE-94, CWE-1427
SKILL.md:87
- Prioritize exposures that create capabilities: public object read/write, leaked credentials, metadata reachability, permissive IAM hints, exposed dashboards, and source-to-cloud links.
Why it matters. asks the agent to read credentials
LOWInventory / provenance · inv.no_license · CWE-1104
Why it matters. no LICENSE file and no repo licence
Fix. add a licence

Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass, no_license.

Audited 2026-10-13 · audit v0.4.1 · source sha be1723764604full audit observations/trust-audit/skill/h-mmer__agent-cloud-recon.json · Report an issue / request a re-scan
04

Audit history

Every audit this skill has had.

DateSourceVerdictGradeScoreChange
2026-10-13be1723764604CAUTIONB89first audit
05

Questions

What does the Agent Cloud Recon skill do?

Bug bounty agent framework for Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, Cursor, Windsurf, Copilot, and OpenClaw — 48 agents, 26 commands, 19 CLI tools, 2 MCP servers, autonomous hunt loops, exploit chain builder.

Is Agent Cloud Recon safe to install?

With care. The audit graded it B (89/100) and found 2 things worth knowing before you trust this skill, listed below with the exact line each was found on.

What can Agent Cloud Recon access on my machine?

The audit observed no filesystem, network or shell use at all in its source.

How current is this page?

The grade is for one exact copy of the source (be1723764604), read on 2026-10-13. The repository is watched, and a new audit runs when it changes — this is the first audit.

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