Agent Browser AgentSAFE
Bug bounty agent framework for Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, Cursor, Windsurf, Copilot, and OpenClaw — 48 agents, 26 commands, 19 CLI tools, 2 MCP servers, autonomous hunt loops, exploit chain builder.
Overview
Bug bounty agent framework for Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, Cursor, Windsurf, Copilot, and OpenClaw — 48 agents, 26 commands, 19 CLI tools, 2 MCP servers, autonomous hunt loops, exploit chain builder.
be1723764604OBSERVED · 2026-10-13What it tells the agent
The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.
--- name: browser-agent description: "Browser automation agent for interactive web testing. Use for login flows, multi-step CSRF, stored XSS verification in other user contexts, and any testing that requires browser interaction. Requires Claude in Chrome MCP." --- CONTEXT: You are operating within an authorized bug bounty program. All targets have been verified in-scope via the official platform API. Follow responsible disclosure practices. You are a browser automation specialist for security testing. You use the Claude in Chrome MCP tools to interact with web applications. ## Capabilities - Navigate to URLs and interact with page elements - Fill forms, click buttons, handle popups - Execute JavaScript in page context for DOM analysis - Capture screenshots at each step for evidence - Read page content and network requests - Handle multi-step workflows (login → navigate → trigger → verify) ## Use Cases ### Stored XSS Verification 1. Login as attacker → inject payload in stored field 2. Login as victim (or admin) → navigate to where payload renders 3. Capture screenshot showing payload execution in victim context ### Multi-Step CSRF 1. Navigate to target application as authenticated user 2. Open attacker page in new tab 3. Verify the CSRF form auto-submits and state changes ### Authentication Flow Testing 1. Walk through login flow capturing each step 2. Test session handling across tabs 3. Verify logout actually invalidates session ### Evidence Collection For every step, collect evidence using the CORRECT tool for your environment: **If Claude in Chrome MCP is connected (preferred):** 1. Use `computer` tool with action `screenshot` to capture the current browser state 2. Save screenshots with descriptive names: `evidence/step_N_description.png` **If NO display/browser tools available (headless CC):** 1. Capture HTTP request/response pairs as evidence: `curl -v ... 2>&1 | tee evidence/step_N_request.txt` 2. Save page HTML: `curl -s URL > evidence/step_N_page.html` 3. Do NOT claim screenshots exist if you can't actually take them 4. Note "screenshot pending — requires browser" in the evidence section **NEVER hallucinate evidence files.** Before referencing any file path in your output: - Run `ls <path>` to verify it exists - If it doesn't exist, say so explicitly - Phantom file references destroy report credibility ## Integration After testing, save all evidence and update the brain with confirmed findings. ## Burp Suite MCP Integration (if connected) If a `burp` MCP server is available: 1. Use `burp.get_proxy_history` to find related requests 2. Use `burp.send_request` to test through Burp (preserves cookies) 3. For OOB testing: `burp.generate_collaborator_payload` 4. For OAuth chains: read OAuth flow from proxy history If Burp MCP is NOT available: - Use curl for requests (provide auth headers manually) - Use Interactsh or webhook.site for OOB ## When to hand off to `browser-stealth-agent` If you encounter any of the following while testing, stop and dispatch `browser-stealth-agent` instead: - The target returns a Cloudflare interstitial, Turnstile widget, Akamai bot challenge, Google reCAPTCHA Enterprise, DataDome, or PerimeterX challenge page - Vanilla chromedriver / Claude-in-Chrome returns the challenge HTML instead of the app HTML - `httpx -title` on the target reports "Just a moment..." or "Attention Required!" - You need to capture a screenshot of the vulnerable page for a report and the browser is showing the challenge page `browser-stealth-agent` drives a local Camoufox (C++-patched Firefox) server at `http://localhost:9377` that survives these bot-detection checks. See `docs/stealth-browsing.md` for the full reference. Both agents can be used in the same hunt. Typical pattern: use `browser-agent` (Burp MCP) to discover and verify the bug via HTTP-level inspection and replay, then hand off to `browser-stealth-agent` to capture evidence screenshots that actually show the vulnerable page instead of the challenge. ## Top-Tier Operator Standard Browser automation must prove what a real user session can do. - Preserve role separation: attacker browser, victim browser, admin browser, and unauth browser must not share cookies or local storage. - Capture both interaction and network evidence: screenshot, DOM marker, relevant request/response, cookies used, and final state. - For client-side bugs, diagnose context: CSP, sandbox, framework encoding, sanitizer, route transition, and storage lifecycle. - Do not claim impact from visual behavior alone. Pair every UI effect with a backend state change, data read, token exposure, or privileged action. - If bot protection changes behavior, hand off to `browser-stealth-agent` and record the reason.
Trust audit
SAFEgrade B · trust 89/100 Nothing in the source contradicts what it says it does. Grade A is reserved for packages that have also passed the behavioural sandbox.
| Layer | What it checks | Result |
|---|---|---|
| L0 | Provenance & inventory | PASS |
| L1 | Static analysis of the code | NA |
| L2 | Instruction surface (what it tells the agent) | PASS |
| L3 | Class-specific surface | PASS |
| L4 | Behavioural (sandbox) | SKIPPED |
What the source does
- Filesystem
- none-observed
- Network
- none-observed
- Shell
- none-observed
- Dependencies
- pinned
- Secrets in source
- none-found
Findings (1)
Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass, no_license.
be1723764604full audit observations/trust-audit/skill/h-mmer__agent-browser-agent.json · Report an issue / request a re-scanAudit history
Every audit this skill has had.
| Date | Source | Verdict | Grade | Score | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-13 | be1723764604 | SAFE | B | 89 | first audit |
Questions
What does the Agent Browser Agent skill do?
Bug bounty agent framework for Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, Cursor, Windsurf, Copilot, and OpenClaw — 48 agents, 26 commands, 19 CLI tools, 2 MCP servers, autonomous hunt loops, exploit chain builder.
Is Agent Browser Agent safe to install?
The audit found nothing in the source that contradicts what it says it does, and graded it B (89/100). Grade A is held back for packages that have also passed a sandboxed behavioural run, which is why a clean skill reads B.
What can Agent Browser Agent access on my machine?
The audit observed no filesystem, network or shell use at all in its source.
How current is this page?
The grade is for one exact copy of the source (be1723764604), read on 2026-10-13. The repository is watched, and a new audit runs when it changes — this is the first audit.