Hunt AspnetSAFE

A Claude Code skill bundle for bug hunting and external red-team work - 82 skills, 15 slash commands, 681 disclosed-report patterns curated across 24 core vulnerability classes, plus enterprise identity + infrastructure attack matrices.

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: hunt-aspnet
description: Hunt ASP.NET-specific surface — ViewState deserialization (signed-only vs encrypted), machineKey recovery, dual-parser MAC-bypass anti-pattern, request-validator bypass, trace.axd/elmah.axd disclosure, load-balanced ViewState cross-node failures, SafeControl enumeration via reflection, customErrors mode=Off stack-trace leaks, classic Webforms .aspx/.asmx/.svc surface. Built for ASP.NET Webforms + WCF + SharePoint farms.
sources: github, authorized-engagement
report_count: 1
---

## Crown Jewel Targets

ASP.NET deserialization bugs pay among the highest amounts in bug bounty when they reach RCE. Even when patched, the disclosure-tier findings (signed-only ViewState, dual-parser differential, request-validator quirks) reliably pay Low-Medium.

**Highest-value targets:**

- **SharePoint farms** (any version — 2013/2016/2019/SE) — sign-only ViewState + permissive ToolPane.aspx + anonymous FormDigest creates the CVE-2025-53770 ToolShell precondition chain
- **Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX** — `Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd` is a documented RCE sink when keys leak (CVE-2017-11317, CVE-2017-11357, CVE-2019-18935)
- **Classic ASP.NET Webforms enterprise apps** — banking portals, dealer portals, HR systems left on .NET Framework 4.x
- **WCF services** (`*.svc?WSDL`) — often forgotten admin endpoints with looser auth than the main app
- **Sitecore CMS** — ViewState + Sitecore-specific deserialization chains (CVE-2021-42237)
- **DotNetNuke (DNN)** — historic ViewState RCE chains
- **Umbraco CMS** — ViewState + custom deserialization sinks

**Asset types that pay most:** internet-reachable ASP.NET Webforms apps > WCF admin services > Telerik-integrated sites > Classic ASP.NET MVC with VSF (very rare)

---

## Attack Surface Signals

**Response headers indicating ASP.NET:**
```
X-AspNet-Version: 4.0.30319          (classic — disclosure on its own)
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-AspNetMvc-Version: 5.2
Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=...
Set-Cookie: .ASPXAUTH=...            (Forms auth cookie)
Set-Cookie: .ASPXFORMSAUTH=...
Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=...; SameSite=None  (suggests cross-origin embedding)
```

**Body signals (in form HTML):**
```
<input type="hidden" name="__VIEWSTATE" id="__VIEWSTATE" value="..." />
<input type="hidden" name="__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR" id="__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR" value="..." />
<input type="hidden" name="__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED" id="__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED" value="" />
                                        ↑ EMPTY = signed-only, not encrypted = exploitable if key leaks
<input type="hidden" name="__EVENTVALIDATION" id="__EVENTVALIDATION" value="..." />
<input type="hidden" name="__REQUESTDIGEST" id="__REQUESTDIGEST" value="0x...,...">
                                        ↑ SharePoint CSRF token; if anon-issued, see hunt-sharepoint
```

**URL patterns to probe:**
```
/trace.axd                            (per-app trace viewer; sometimes anon-accessible)
/elmah.axd                            (ELMAH error log viewer)
/elmah.axd/?id=...                    (ELMAH RCE / stack-trace leak)
/*.svc                                (WCF services)
/*.svc?wsdl                           (WCF WSDL)
/*.svc/mex                            (Metadata Exchange)
/*.asmx                               (legacy SOAP)
/*.asmx?WSDL                          (legacy SOAP description)
/*.asmx?disco                         (legacy discovery)
/Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd       (Telerik AJAX components)
/ChartImg.axd                         (DataVisualization controls; historic deserialization)
/ScriptResource.axd                   (script resource handler; sometimes leaks paths)
/WebResource.axd                      (web resource handler)
/_vti_bin/*                           (SharePoint Web Service Forwarder)
/api/                                 (Web API 2.x is ASP.NET on classic framework)
/signin                               (often FedAuth / WS-Federation)
```

**Tech-stack signals:**
- `Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0` (or `/8.5`, `/7.5`) — confirmed Windows + IIS
- `X-AspNet-Version` header — classic .NET Framework (4.x); .NET Core/5+ does NOT emit this
- Cookies with `ASP.NET_SessionId`, `.ASPXAUTH`, `FedAuth` — Forms or claims auth
- `__VIEWSTATE` in form bodies — Webforms (NOT MVC, NOT Razor Pages, NOT Blazor)
- `MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices` header (sometimes stripped by ELB but leaks in `start.aspx` body) — SharePoint

---

## Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology

1. **Fingerprint the framework version.** Trigger any 500 error (stale ViewState POST is a reliable way) and look for `Version Information: Microsoft .NET Framework Version:X.X.XXXXX; ASP.NET Version:X.X.XXXX.X` in the error body. This banner discloses both the runtime and ASP.NET-version-specific patch level. .NET 4.0.30319 + ASP.NET 4.8.x is the most common modern combination.

2. **Locate every form with `__VIEWSTATE`.** Spider the target and grep for `name="__VIEWSTATE"`. Each is a candidate sink for deserialization attacks if MAC / encryption is bypassable.

3. **Check `__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED` value.** Empty (`value=""`) means ViewState is signed-only via `<machineKey>` but NOT encrypted. Recovery of the validation key → arbitrary deserialization. Non-empty (`value="something"`) means ViewState is BOTH signed and encrypted; both keys needed to forge.

4. **Test the ViewState parser-error differential** (the dual-parser anti-pattern). Send 7+ ViewState shapes and classify responses:
   - Trivial garbage (`AAAA`) → `"Validation of viewstate MAC failed"`
   - Real prefix from current page → `"Validation of viewstate MAC failed"`
   - Flipped-bit real ViewState → `"Validation of viewstate MAC failed"`
   - Oversize (`A * 100000`) → `"Validation of viewstate MAC failed"`
   - XML-shaped (`<xss/>`) → **"The state information is invalid for this page and might be corrupted"** ← different parser path
   - LosFormatter-style prefix (`/wEPDwUKMTcxNzgyOTQwMmRkkz9p4lzA...`) → **"The state informatio

SAFEgrade B · trust 89/100 Nothing in the source contradicts what it says it does. Grade A is reserved for packages that have also passed the behavioural sandbox.

What the source does

Filesystem

none-observed

Network

none-observed

Shell

none-observed

Dependencies

pinned

Secrets in source

none-found

Findings (0)

No findings outside the package's declared scope.

Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.