Atlas / Skills / elementalsouls / Bug Bounty

Bug BountyBLOCK

skills/elementalsouls/bug-bounty

A Claude Code skill bundle for bug hunting and external red-team work - 82 skills, 15 slash commands, 681 disclosed-report patterns curated across 24 core vulnerability classes, plus enterprise identity + infrastructure attack matrices.

Verdict
BLOCK
Grade
D
Trust score
69 /100
Version
—
Hosts
4 documented
License
MIT
Stars
4,862
01

Overview

A Claude Code skill bundle for bug hunting and external red-team work - 82 skills, 15 slash commands, 681 disclosed-report patterns curated across 24 core vulnerability classes, plus enterprise identity + infrastructure attack matrices.

Read from source at commit c84f314844f2OBSERVED · 2026-10-10
02

Install

Commands as the repository documents them. They are shown, not run.

git clone https://github.com/shuvonsec/claude-bug-bounty.git ~/.claude/skills/bug-bounty
03

Host compatibility

What the documentation claims. We have not run a compatibility test.

HostStatusNotes
claude-codementioned
codexmentioned
cursormentioned
gemini-climentioned
04

What it tells the agent

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: bug-bounty
description: Complete bug bounty workflow — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use for ANY bug bounty task — starting a new target, doing recon, hunting specific vulns, auditing source code, testing AI features, validating findings, or writing reports. 中文触发词:漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
sources: community, public_research
---

# Bug Bounty Master Workflow

Full pipeline: Recon -> Learn -> Hunt -> Validate -> Report. One skill for everything.

## THE ONLY QUESTION THAT MATTERS

> **"Can an attacker do this RIGHT NOW against a real user who has taken NO unusual actions -- and does it cause real harm (stolen money, leaked PII, account takeover, code execution)?"**
>
> If the answer is NO -- **STOP. Do not write. Do not explore further. Move on.**

### Theoretical Bug = Wasted Time. Kill These Immediately:

| Pattern | Kill Reason |
|---|---|
| "Could theoretically allow..." | Not exploitable = not a bug |
| "An attacker with X, Y, Z conditions could..." | Too many preconditions |
| "Wrong implementation but no practical impact" | Wrong but harmless = not a bug |
| Dead code with a bug in it | Not reachable = not a bug |
| Source maps without secrets | No impact |
| SSRF with DNS-only callback | Need data exfil or internal access |
| Open redirect alone | Need ATO or OAuth chain |
| "Could be used in a chain if..." | Build the chain first, THEN report |

**You must demonstrate actual harm. "Could" is not a bug. Prove it works or drop it.**

---

## CRITICAL RULES

1. **READ FULL SCOPE FIRST** -- verify every asset/domain is owned by the target org
2. **NO THEORETICAL BUGS** -- "Can an attacker steal funds, leak PII, takeover account, or execute code RIGHT NOW?" If no, STOP.
3. **KILL WEAK FINDINGS FAST** -- run the 7-Question Gate BEFORE writing any report
4. **Validate before writing** -- check CHANGELOG, design docs, deployment scripts FIRST
5. **One bug class at a time** -- go deep, don't spray
6. **Verify data isn't already public** -- check web UI in incognito before reporting API "leaks"
7. **5-MINUTE RULE** -- if a target shows nothing after 5 min probing (all 401/403/404), MOVE ON
8. **IMPACT-FIRST HUNTING** -- ask "what's the worst thing if auth was broken?" If nothing valuable, skip target
9. **CREDENTIAL LEAKS need exploitation proof** -- finding keys isn't enough, must PROVE what they access
10. **STOP SHALLOW RECON SPIRALS** -- don't probe 403s, don't grep for analytics keys, don't check staging domains that lead nowhere
11. **BUSINESS IMPACT over vuln class** -- severity depends on CONTEXT, not just vuln type
12. **UNDERSTAND THE TARGET DEEPLY** -- before hunting, learn the app like a real user
13. **DON'T OVER-RELY ON AUTOMATION** -- automated scans hit WAFs, trigger rate limits, find the same bugs everyone else finds
14. **HUNT LESS-SATURATED VULN CLASSES** -- XSS/SSRF/XXE have the most competition. Expand into: cache poisoning, Android/mobile vulns, business logic, race conditions, OAuth/OIDC chains, CI/CD pipeline attacks
15. **ONE-HOUR RULE** -- stuck on one target for an hour with no progress? SWITCH CONTEXT
16. **TWO-EYE APPROACH** -- combine systematic testing (checklist) with anomaly detection (watch for unexpected behavior)
17. **T-SHAPED KNOWLEDGE** -- go DEEP in one area and BROAD across everything else

> **For the full hunting methodology** — 5-phase non-linear workflow, developer psychology framework, session discipline, tool routing by phase, and Wide/Deep route selection — see **`skills/bb-methodology/SKILL.md`**.

---

## A->B BUG SIGNAL METHOD (Cluster Hunting)

**When you find bug A, systematically hunt for B and C nearby.** This is one of the most powerful methodologies in bug bounty. Single bugs pay. Chains pay 3-10x more.

### Known A->B->C Chains

| Bug A (Signal) | Hunt for Bug B | Escalate to C |
|----------------|---------------|---------------|
| IDOR (read) | PUT/DELETE on same endpoint | Full account data manipulation |
| SSRF (any) | Cloud metadata 169.254.169.254 | IAM credential exfil -> RCE |
| XSS (stored) | Check if HttpOnly is set on session cookie | Session hijack -> ATO |
| Open redirect | OAuth redirect_uri accepts your domain | Auth code theft -> ATO |
| S3 bucket listing | Enumerate JS bundles | Grep for OAuth client_secret -> OAuth chain |
| Rate limit bypass | OTP brute force | Account takeover |
| GraphQL introspection | Missing field-level auth | Mass PII exfil |
| Debug endpoint | Leaked environment variables | Cloud credential -> infrastructure access |
| CORS reflects origin | Test with credentials: include | Credentialed data theft |
| Host header injection | Password reset poisoning | ATO via reset link |

### Cluster Hunt Protocol (6 Steps)

```
1. CONFIRM A     Verify bug A is real with an HTTP request
2. MAP SIBLINGS  Find all endpoints in the same controller/module/API group
3. TEST SIBLINGS Ap
05

Trust audit

BLOCKgrade D · trust 69/100 Do not install this without reading the findings. The audit found something that could harm you or your machine.

LayerWhat it checksResult
L0Provenance & inventoryPASS
L1Static analysis of the codeNA
L2Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)FAIL
L3Class-specific surfacePASS
L4Behavioural (sandbox)SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem
none-observed
Network
none-observed
Shell
none-observed
Dependencies
pinned
Secrets in source
none-found

Findings (14)

CRITICALPrompt injection · prompt.transfer_instruction · CWE-94, CWE-1427
SKILL.md:721
{"query": "{ login(email: \"[email protected]\", password: \"pass1\") }"},
Why it matters. an instruction to move sensitive data to an outside destination
Fix. remove; a skill never needs the user's secrets off the machine
CRITICALPrompt injection · prompt.transfer_instruction · CWE-94, CWE-1427
SKILL.md:722
{"query": "{ login(email: \"[email protected]\", password: \"pass2\") }"},
Why it matters. an instruction to move sensitive data to an outside destination
Fix. remove; a skill never needs the user's secrets off the machine
HIGHNetwork egress · net.metadata_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
SKILL.md:67
| SSRF (any) | Cloud metadata 169.254.169.254 | IAM credential exfil -> RCE |
Why it matters. cloud metadata endpoint: the classic SSRF credential grab
HIGHNetwork egress · net.metadata_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
SKILL.md:533
- [ ] Try cloud metadata: `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`
Why it matters. cloud metadata endpoint: the classic SSRF credential grab
HIGHNetwork egress · net.metadata_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
SKILL.md:549
| Redirect chain | `http://attacker.com/302->http://169.254.169.254` | Check each hop |
Why it matters. cloud metadata endpoint: the classic SSRF credential grab
HIGHNetwork egress · net.metadata_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
SKILL.md:1242
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
Why it matters. cloud metadata endpoint: the classic SSRF credential grab
HIGHNetwork egress · net.metadata_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
SKILL.md:1244
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME
Why it matters. cloud metadata endpoint: the classic SSRF credential grab
HIGHPrompt injection · prompt.hidden_comment · CWE-94, CWE-1427
SKILL.md:1100
1. **Trigger + prompt source** — `issues: opened` → AI triage bot reads `github.event.issue.body`. The body IS the prompt. HTML comments (`<!-- ignore previous instructions -->`) are invisible in GitH
Why it matters. directive hidden in a comment the user does not see rendered
Fix. remove the comment
MEDIUMNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
SKILL.md:533
- [ ] Try cloud metadata: `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`
MEDIUMNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
SKILL.md:534
- [ ] Try internal services: `http://127.0.0.1:6379/` (Redis), `:9200` (Elasticsearch), `:27017` (MongoDB)
MEDIUMNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
SKILL.md:549
| Redirect chain | `http://attacker.com/302->http://169.254.169.254` | Check each hop |
MEDIUMNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
SKILL.md:551
| URL encoding | `http://127.0.0.1%[email protected]` | Parser confusion |
MEDIUMNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
SKILL.md:1242
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
LOWPrompt injection · prompt.override · CWE-94, CWE-1427
SKILL.md:1100
1. **Trigger + prompt source** — `issues: opened` → AI triage bot reads `github.event.issue.body`. The body IS the prompt. HTML comments (`<!-- ignore previous instructions -->`) are invisible in GitH
Why it matters. asks the agent to drop prior instructions or safety
Fix. remove the instruction

Gates applied: critical_finding, no_behavioural_pass, undeclared_transfer.

Audited 2026-10-10 · audit v0.4.1 · source sha c84f314844f2full audit observations/trust-audit/skill/elementalsouls__bug-bounty.json · Report an issue / request a re-scan
06

Audit history

Every audit this skill has had.

DateSourceVerdictGradeScoreChange
2026-10-10c84f314844f2BLOCKD69first audit
07

Questions

What does the Bug Bounty skill do?

A Claude Code skill bundle for bug hunting and external red-team work - 82 skills, 15 slash commands, 681 disclosed-report patterns curated across 24 core vulnerability classes, plus enterprise identity + infrastructure attack matrices.

Is Bug Bounty safe to install?

No — not without reading the findings first. The audit graded it D (69/100) and found 8 critical or high issues in the source. Each one is listed on this page with the file and line it is on.

What can Bug Bounty access on my machine?

The audit observed no filesystem, network or shell use at all in its source.

Which assistants does Bug Bounty work with?

Its documentation mentions claude-code, codex, cursor and gemini-cli. That is what the text claims, not a compatibility test we ran.

How current is this page?

The grade is for one exact copy of the source (c84f314844f2), read on 2026-10-10. The repository is watched, and a new audit runs when it changes — this is the first audit.

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