Apk Redteam PipelineBLOCK
A Claude Code skill bundle for bug hunting and external red-team work - 82 skills, 15 slash commands, 681 disclosed-report patterns curated across 24 core vulnerability classes, plus enterprise identity + infrastructure attack matrices.
Overview
A Claude Code skill bundle for bug hunting and external red-team work - 82 skills, 15 slash commands, 681 disclosed-report patterns curated across 24 core vulnerability classes, plus enterprise identity + infrastructure attack matrices.
c84f314844f2OBSERVED · 2026-10-10Install
Commands as the repository documents them. They are shown, not run.
pip install --break-system-packages frida-tools objection
pip install --break-system-packages frida-tools objection
What it tells the agent
The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.
---
name: apk-redteam-pipeline
description: End-to-end Android APK red-team pipeline — automated APK acquisition (Play Store + apkpure + apkmirror fallback), jadx decompilation, secret/URL/JWT/Firebase grep, pinned-cert extraction, exported-component enumeration, Frida runtime instrumentation templates, intent-injection probes. Built from an authorized external red-team engagement where 7 APKs were pulled manually, 4 download attempts truncated, and a hardcoded JWT + 30 internal API endpoints were recovered from one of the apps. Use when target has a mobile app catalogue (Play Store developer page), when you find an APK URL hosted on a web server, or when post-recon mentions "mobile app" in scope.
sources: authorized-engagement
report_count: 1
---
## When to use this skill
Trigger when:
- Recon surfaces 1+ mobile apps under the target's developer name (Play Store dev page)
- A web app hosts `*.apk` files directly (e.g. `Recruitz.apk` found on a subdomain during one engagement)
- APK package IDs leaked via stealer logs (e.g. `com.<brand>.app`, `com.<brand>.<sub-brand>` patterns in stealer dump format)
- Customer-facing app, dealer/partner portal, or employee mobile companion app is in scope
- Bug bounty program lists Android in scope
DO NOT use for:
- iOS-only targets (different pipeline — IPA reverse, MobSF, frida-ios-dump)
- React Native / Flutter web apps already covered by JS bundle analysis
- Server-side only assessments
---
## Stage 0 — Inventory all org-owned apps
### Play Store developer-page scrape
```bash
# Find developer page from the target's brand name
curl -sk -A "Mozilla/5.0" "https://play.google.com/store/apps/developer?id=<Brand+Name>" -o /tmp/dev.html
# Extract package IDs
grep -oE 'id=[a-zA-Z0-9._]+' /tmp/dev.html | sort -u
```
Example output (anonymized — 7 packages typical for a multi-brand conglomerate):
```
com.events.<brand>build
com.<corp>.<sub-brand-1>
com.<corp>.<sub-brand-2>
com.<corp>.<flagship>
com.<corp>.<product-line-1>
com.<corp>.<product-line-2>
com.<corp>.<sub-brand-3>
```
### Cross-reference with stealer logs
Stealer-log format includes package names like `*@com.<corp>.<app>` — extract these from `creds_userpass.txt` if you have a leaked dump.
### Brand permutation guesses (multi-brand conglomerate patterns)
```
com.<brand>.app
com.<brand>.mobile
com.<brand>.android
com.<brand>connect.app
in.<brand>.dealer
in.co.<brand>.app
```
---
## Stage 1 — APK acquisition
### Primary: APKPure direct (no auth required)
```bash
# Follow 302 redirects to actual download
curl -sk -L --max-time 60 \
"https://d.apkpure.net/b/APK/<package_id>?version=latest" \
-o "<package_id>.apk"
# Or via the legacy d-XX.winudf.com mirror chain (we saw this work)
```
### Secondary: APKMirror search
```bash
curl -sk -A "Mozilla/5.0" "https://www.apkmirror.com/?post_type=app_release&searchtype=apk&s=<brand>" \
| grep -oE 'href="[^"]+\.apk[^"]*"' | sort -u
```
### Tertiary: APKPure web search
```bash
curl -sk "https://apkpure.com/search?q=<brand>" | grep -oE 'data-dt-app="[^"]+"'
```
### XAPK vs APK
- `.xapk` = a zip containing multiple split APKs (base + config.armeabi-v7a + config.en + etc.)
- Unzip outer first, then unzip the inner `base.apk` or `<package>.apk`
- Some apkpure downloads return truncated XAPK with missing EOCD signature — symptom of CDN rate-limiting; rotate IP and retry, OR use `7z x` which is more lenient than `unzip`
```bash
# Standard unzip (works for clean APK)
unzip -o <package>.apk -d extracted_<package>/
# For truncated/repaired XAPK
7z x -y <package>.apk -o"extracted_<package>"
# For nested XAPK
for inner in extracted_<package>/*.apk; do
mkdir -p "extracted_<package>/$(basename "$inner" .apk)"
unzip -o "$inner" -d "extracted_<package>/$(basename "$inner" .apk)"
done
```
---
## Stage 2 — DEX decompilation (jadx)
```bash
# Install
brew install jadx # macOS
# or
wget https://github.com/skylot/jadx/releases/latest/download/jadx-1.5.x.zip
# Decompile
jadx -d decompiled_<package>/ <package>.apk
# For XAPK that contains multiple APKs
for inner in extracted_<package>/*.apk; do
jadx -d decompiled_<package>_$(basename "$inner" .apk)/ "$inner"
done
```
For a fast "strings only" pass without full decompilation:
```bash
find extracted_<package> -name "classes*.dex" -exec strings -8 {} \; > strings_<package>.txt
```
---
## Stage 3 — Secret grep (the 60-pattern catalog)
```bash
# URL grep — owned-domain references
grep -oE 'https?://[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.(target1|target2|target3)\.(com|io|net|in)[a-zA-Z0-9./_?=&%-]*' strings_<package>.txt | sort -u
# Internal IP / port URLs
grep -oE 'https?://(10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\.|192\.168\.|127\.)[0-9.]+(:[0-9]+)?[a-zA-Z0-9./_?=&-]*' strings_<package>.txt
# Cloud credentials
grep -oE 'AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}' # AWS Access Key
grep -oE 'aws_secret_access_key[\s:=]+[A-Za-z0-9/+=]{40}' # AWS Secret
grep -oE 'AIza[A-Za-z0-9_-]{35}' # Google API key
grep -oE 'ya29\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+' # Google OAuth refresh token
grep -oE 'gh[ps]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}' # GitHub PAT
grep -oE 'glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20}' # GitLab PAT
grep -oE 'xox[pbar]-[A-Za-z0-9-]+' # Slack token
grep -oE 'sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{48}' # OpenAI API key
grep -oE 'sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{90,}' # Anthropic API key
grep -oE 'AC[a-f0-9]{32}' # Twilio Account SID
grep -oE 'sk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{24}' # Stripe live key
grep -oE 'pk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{24}' # Stripe publishable
grep -oE 'mailgun-[A-Za-z0-9-]{40}' # Mailgun
grep -oE 'SG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}' # SendGrid
# JWT (any algorithm)
grep -oE 'eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]*' strings_<package>.txt
# Firebase
grep -oE '"(api_key|project_id|database_url|storage_bucket|client_id|mobilesdk_app_id|google_app_id|gcm_Trust audit
BLOCKgrade D · trust 69/100 Do not install this without reading the findings. The audit found something that could harm you or your machine.
| Layer | What it checks | Result |
|---|---|---|
| L0 | Provenance & inventory | PASS |
| L1 | Static analysis of the code | NA |
| L2 | Instruction surface (what it tells the agent) | FAIL |
| L3 | Class-specific surface | PASS |
| L4 | Behavioural (sandbox) | SKIPPED |
What the source does
- Filesystem
- none-observed
- Network
- none-observed
- Shell
- none-observed
- Dependencies
- pinned
- Secrets in source
- none-found
Findings (2)
description: End-to-end Android APK red-team pipeline — automated APK acquisition (Play Store + apkpure + apkmirror fallback), jadx decompilation, secret/URL/JWT/Firebase grep, pinned-cert extraction,
| Expired JWT | Inspect path tokens / API endpoint structure — useful intel for post-VPN |
Gates applied: critical_finding, no_behavioural_pass, undeclared_transfer.
c84f314844f2full audit observations/trust-audit/skill/elementalsouls__apk-redteam-pipeline.json · Report an issue / request a re-scanAudit history
Every audit this skill has had.
| Date | Source | Verdict | Grade | Score | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-10 | c84f314844f2 | BLOCK | D | 69 | first audit |
Questions
What does the Apk Redteam Pipeline skill do?
A Claude Code skill bundle for bug hunting and external red-team work - 82 skills, 15 slash commands, 681 disclosed-report patterns curated across 24 core vulnerability classes, plus enterprise identity + infrastructure attack matrices.
Is Apk Redteam Pipeline safe to install?
No — not without reading the findings first. The audit graded it D (69/100) and found 2 critical or high issues in the source. Each one is listed on this page with the file and line it is on.
What can Apk Redteam Pipeline access on my machine?
The audit observed no filesystem, network or shell use at all in its source.
How current is this page?
The grade is for one exact copy of the source (c84f314844f2), read on 2026-10-10. The repository is watched, and a new audit runs when it changes — this is the first audit.