Atlas / Skills / cursor / Interrogate

InterrogateSAFE

skills/cursor/interrogate

Cursor plugin specification and official plugins

Verdict
SAFE
Grade
B
Trust score
89 /100
Version
—
Hosts
1 documented
License
—
Stars
10,928
01

Overview

Cursor plugin specification and official plugins

Read from source at commit 890eaf6b2dddOBSERVED · 2026-10-12
02

Host compatibility

What the documentation claims. We have not run a compatibility test.

HostStatusNotes
cursormentioned
03

What it tells the agent

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: interrogate
description: "Use for \"interrogate\", \"adversarial review\", \"multi-model review\", \"challenge this\", \"stress test this code\", \"find blind spots\", or \"tear this apart\". Multiple LLM reviewers challenge changes from independent angles."
disable-model-invocation: true
---

# Interrogate

Spawn one reviewer per configured model to adversarially review code changes. The adversarial signal comes from model diversity, not assigned personas. The deliverable is a synthesized verdict. Do NOT auto-apply changes.

## Step 1, Scope

Identify what to review from context:

- If the user points at specific files or a diff, use that.
- If on a feature branch, run `git diff main...HEAD` (or the appropriate base branch) for the full changeset.
- If the user's message references recent work, gather the relevant files.

Package the diff or file contents with any surrounding context files the reviewers need to understand the code.

## Step 2, Intent

Before spawning reviewers, state the intent in one clear paragraph from the user's message, commit messages, the PR description if one exists, and the code. If you're unsure about the intent, ask the user before proceeding.

## Step 3, Spawn Reviewers

Launch all reviewers in a single message with the Task tool, one per entry on the `interrogate reviewers` line in `~/.cursor/rules/pstack-models.mdc`, labeled Reviewer A, B, and so on to match the entry count. If the rule or that line is missing, use the table defaults.

| Subagent | Default model |
|----------|---------------|
| Reviewer A | `claude-opus-5-5-xhigh` |
| Reviewer B | `grok-4.7-xhigh-fast` |

Each reviewer gets `subagent_type: generalPurpose`, `readonly: true`, and `model` set to its configured entry, or its table default when there is no configured line. Omit `model` for an `auto` or `inherit-parent` entry, so that reviewer runs on the parent model.

If the Task tool rejects a configured entry, run that reviewer on its family's table default and say so. Families go by prefix: `claude-*` and `grok-*`. With no family match, use Reviewer A's default. If it rejects a table default, spawn with the closest equivalent from the valid slugs in its error message (prefer the same family and reasoning tier), and open a separate PR to update the default table. Do not block the review on the slug issue. Never treat an alias entry as a rejected slug or apply either fallback to it.

Read `references/reviewer-prompt.md` and fill in the same template for every reviewer with the stated intent, the diff or file contents, the rubric from `references/rubric.md`, and the code-quality lens from `references/code-quality-review.md`.

## Step 4, Synthesize

As results come back, build a unified picture. Parse every reviewer's findings. Merge findings that describe the same issue differently, and note which models raised each one. Findings two or more models raised independently are the highest signal. Read a lone model's finding, but weight it accordingly. Note disagreements. If one model flags something and another explicitly says the opposite, that is context for the verdict.

## Step 5, Lead Judgment

You are the lead reviewer, a pragmatic senior engineer, not a neutral aggregator. Read `references/lead-judgment.md` for the full framework. Put every finding in one of four buckets, with the model(s) that raised it and a one-line rationale.

- **Act on**. Real issues affecting correctness, security, or maintainability given the actual goals. They would block a real PR.
- **Consider**. Legitimate, but you're not sure they outweigh the cost of addressing them now. Worth the user's attention.
- **Noted**. Technically valid but not actionable. Context-dependent, premature optimization, or low-impact at this stage.
- **Dismissed**. Wrong, nitpicky, or missing context, with a brief reason.

## Output Format

### Intent
> [The stated intent paragraph from Step 2]

### Reviewers
- Reviewer [label]: [model name], [N findings] (one bullet per reviewer)

### Act On
[Each: description, which models raised it, why it matters.]

### Consider
[Each: description, which models raised it, the tradeoff.]

### Noted
[Brief list.]

### Dismissed
[Each with a brief rationale.]

### Agreement Map
[Where models agreed and diverged, and what that pattern tells us.]
04

Trust audit

SAFEgrade B · trust 89/100 Nothing in the source contradicts what it says it does. Grade A is reserved for packages that have also passed the behavioural sandbox.

LayerWhat it checksResult
L0Provenance & inventoryPASS
L1Static analysis of the codeNA
L2Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)PASS
L3Class-specific surfacePASS
L4Behavioural (sandbox)SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem
none-observed
Network
none-observed
Shell
none-observed
Dependencies
pinned
Secrets in source
none-found

Findings (2)

INFOPrompt injection · prompt.authority_framing · CWE-94, CWE-1427
SKILL.md:46
You are the lead reviewer, a pragmatic senior engineer, not a neutral aggregator. Read `references/lead-judgment.md` for the full framework. Put every finding in one of four buckets, with the model(s)
INFOPrompt injection · prompt.authority_framing · CWE-94, CWE-1427
references/lead-judgment.md:3
You are the lead reviewer. The configured reviewers have produced their findings. Apply pragmatic engineering judgment. Don't aggregate. Filter, contextualize, and decide.

Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.

Audited 2026-10-12 · audit v0.4.1 · source sha 890eaf6b2dddfull audit observations/trust-audit/skill/cursor__interrogate.json · Report an issue / request a re-scan
05

Audit history

Every audit this skill has had.

DateSourceVerdictGradeScoreChange
2026-10-12890eaf6b2dddSAFEB89first audit
06

Questions

What does the Interrogate skill do?

Cursor plugin specification and official plugins

Is Interrogate safe to install?

The audit found nothing in the source that contradicts what it says it does, and graded it B (89/100). Grade A is held back for packages that have also passed a sandboxed behavioural run, which is why a clean skill reads B.

What can Interrogate access on my machine?

The audit observed no filesystem, network or shell use at all in its source.

Which assistants does Interrogate work with?

Its documentation mentions cursor. That is what the text claims, not a compatibility test we ran.

How current is this page?

The grade is for one exact copy of the source (890eaf6b2ddd), read on 2026-10-12. The repository is watched, and a new audit runs when it changes — this is the first audit.

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