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Agent skill · Audited from source

aws-auth

skill · aws/agent-toolkit-for-awsApache-2.0 licenceAudited 13 Nov 2026 · source 25e39fea93f3

★ 3,477pushed todayversion 1
✕BLOCKGrade D · 69/100 · 8 findings · 25e39fe
3,477repo stars · whole aws/agent-toolkit-for-aws

Is it safe? No — BLOCK, grade D (69/100). We read this skill's source at commit 25e39fea93f3 and found no filesystem, network or shell access and no hard-coded secrets. The audit raised 8 findings, 1 critical or high. What it does: Adds user authentication to web and mobile apps with Amazon Cognito (user pools and identity pools) and the AWS Amplify client auth libraries. Covers sign-up/sign-in flows and the login page (Cognito-hosted UI / managed…

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Cite this page

ModelsAtlas. “aws-auth (aws/agent-toolkit-for-aws)”. Retrieved 13 Nov 2026. https://modelsatlas.com/skills/aws/aws-auth

Blocked. The page stays public so you can check this skill if someone recommended it to you. The audit found 1 critical or high finding, starting with “Prompt injection” in SKILL.md:93. Do not install it without reading them.

Trust audit

Audit 0.4.1 · source read 13 Nov 2026

Trust score69/100✕BLOCK D
1 critical0 high0 medium7 low0 info

BLOCK means the audit found something that could harm you or your machine. Grade D is shared by 749 of 18,389 audited skills.

What the source does

  • FilesystemNone observedNo reads or writes in the source
  • NetworkNone observedNo outbound calls in the source
  • ShellNone observedNo commands run in the source
  • DependenciesPinnedNothing floats
  • SecretsNone foundNo keys in source

Five audit layers

LayerWhat we checkResultFindings
L0 ProvenanceRepo owner, licence, archive status, activityPASS0
L1 Static sourceSecrets, path traversal, supply chain, hidden codeNA1
L2 InstructionsPrompt injection, authority framing, hidden directivesFAIL7
L3 InventoryThe files and declarations match the sourcePASS0
L4 SandboxRun in isolation and watch behaviourSKIPPED why0

Gates applied: critical finding, no behavioural pass, undeclared transfer.

Findings (8)

CRITICALPrompt injectionprompt.transfer_instruction · SKILL.md:93
F-01 Prompt injectionCWE-94 · CWE-1427Layer L2
| Users get 401 from API Gateway with a valid token | Wrong token type or audience/issuer mismatch | HTTP JWT authorizer: issuer `https://cognito-idp.{region}.amazonaws.com/{userPoolId}`, audience = a
Why
an instruction to move sensitive data to an outside destination
Fix
remove; a skill never needs the user's secrets off the machine
LOWNetwork egressnet.raw_ip · references/managed-login-oauth.md:280
F-04 Network egressCWE-200 · CWE-319Layer L1
`http://127.0.0.1`, and `http://[::1]` — for local dev; every other web URL must be HTTPS.
Why
No further detail recorded for this rule.
Fix
—
LOWPrompt injectionprompt.credential_read · references/identity-pools.md:6
F-01 Prompt injectionCWE-94 · CWE-1427Layer L2
token, or a social access token) for **temporary AWS credentials** from AWS STS. Use it only when
Why
asks the agent to read credentials
Fix
—
LOWPrompt injectionprompt.credential_read · references/identity-pools.md:103
F-01 Prompt injectionCWE-94 · CWE-1427Layer L2
| `Access denied` after getting credentials | Authenticated role policy too narrow, or trust policy wrong | Fix the role's permissions (see `aws-iam`); ensure the role trusts `cognito-identity.amazona
Why
asks the agent to read credentials
Fix
—
LOWPrompt injectionprompt.credential_read · references/troubleshooting.md:53
F-01 Prompt injectionCWE-94 · CWE-1427Layer L2
| `Access denied` after credentials returned | Authenticated role policy too narrow / trust policy wrong | Fix the role (see `aws-iam`); ensure it trusts `cognito-identity.amazonaws.com` for the pool
Why
asks the agent to read credentials
Fix
—
LOWPrompt injectionprompt.transfer_instruction · references/managed-login-oauth.md:166
F-01 Prompt injectionCWE-94 · CWE-1427Layer L2
curl -X POST https://<domain>/oauth2/token \
Why
an instruction to move sensitive data to an outside destination
Fix
remove; a skill never needs the user's secrets off the machine
LOWPrompt injectionprompt.transfer_instruction · references/tokens-and-sessions.md:12
F-01 Prompt injectionCWE-94 · CWE-1427Layer L2
| **ID token** | Identity claims (name, email, etc.) | Proving **who** the user is (identity) to your app; identity-based checks you run yourself. NOT the credential for scope-based API authorization
Why
an instruction to move sensitive data to an outside destination
Fix
remove; a skill never needs the user's secrets off the machine
LOWPrompt injectionprompt.transfer_instruction · references/troubleshooting.md:30
F-01 Prompt injectionCWE-94 · CWE-1427Layer L2
| API returns 401 with a "valid" token | Issuer/audience mismatch or wrong token type | Issuer `https://cognito-idp.<region>.amazonaws.com/<pool-id>`, audience = client id; send the expected token (se
Why
an instruction to move sensitive data to an outside destination
Fix
remove; a skill never needs the user's secrets off the machine

Audit 0.4.1 · source sha 25e39fea93f3 · 13 Nov 2026Report an issue or request a re-scan

Provenance

Who published it, and what the verdict is pinned to

  • Publisheraws GitHub organizationOwner of the repository this skill is read from
  • Source folderaws/agent-toolkit-for-aws/skills/core-skills/aws-authThe exact folder we audited
  • LicenceApache-2.0As the repository states it
  • Commit pinned for this verdict25e39fea93f3A new audit runs when the source changes
  • Repository statusNot archivedPushed today
  • Sandboxed runNot runSkills are read, not executed; layer L4 is skipped

What it tells the agent

Full source on GitHub ↗

Its description: Adds user authentication to web and mobile apps with Amazon Cognito (user pools and identity pools) and the AWS Amplify client auth libraries. Covers sign-up/sign-in flows and the login page (Cognito-hosted UI / managed…

---
name: aws-auth
description: >
  Adds user authentication to web and mobile apps with Amazon Cognito (user pools and identity
  pools) and the AWS Amplify client auth libraries. Covers sign-up/sign-in flows and the login
  page (Cognito-hosted UI / managed login), MFA, password policies, OAuth 2.0 / OIDC flows
  (auth-code + PKCE, client credentials), social/SAML federation, tokens (ID/access/refresh,
  rotation, revocation, storage), Cognito Lambda triggers, identity pools (temp AWS creds), and
  gating API Gateway (or ALB) routes to signed-in users via Cognito/JWT authorizers. Applies when
  adding a login or sign-up page, configuring a user pool or app client, choosing user pool vs
  identity pool, wiring social/SAML, refreshing tokens, requiring sign-in on an API Gateway or
  ALB, or debugging redirect_uri/token/MFA/CORS/federation errors. Does NOT cover Amplify Gen2
  backend definitions (defineAuth, npx ampx → aws-amplify), IAM/STS/Identity Center (→ aws-iam),
  or API Gateway/Lambda resource config beyond the authorizer (→ aws-serverless).
metadata:
  version: "1"
---

# AWS Auth (Amazon Cognito)

Application-level user authentication and authorization with Amazon Cognito and the Amplify
client auth libraries. Verify specific limits, quotas, and exact API shapes against official AWS
documentation when precision matters; trust the docs over memory when they conflict.

**Recommended:** The AWS MCP server provides streamlined access to the AWS APIs used in this skill (Cognito user pool/app client/identity pool setup, API Gateway authorizers). If it is unavailable, the AWS CLI commands shown throughout work directly — the skill has no hard dependency on MCP.

**When NOT to use:** Amplify Gen2 backend code (`defineAuth`, `amplify/auth.ts`, `npx ampx`); IAM
policy/role/trust-policy authoring, STS, or IAM Identity Center console SSO; API Gateway
route/integration setup or Lambda function implementation (this skill covers only the Cognito/JWT
authorizer configuration and the purpose of Cognito Lambda triggers).

## User Pool vs Identity Pool — pick first

These are different services that are frequently confused. Most apps need a **user pool**; add an
**identity pool only if** the client must call AWS services directly.

| You need... | Use | Why |
|-------------|-----|-----|
| Sign-up / sign-in, user directory, issue JWTs | **User pool** | It authenticates users and is an OIDC IdP |
| The signed-in client to call S3/DynamoDB/etc. directly with AWS credentials | **Identity pool** | It exchanges a token for temporary AWS credentials via STS |
| Both (sign in, then hit AWS resources from the browser/app) | User pool → identity pool | Identity pool trusts the user pool as its IdP |

If your app only calls your own backend/API, you do **not** need an identity pool — send the user
pool token to your API. See [identity-pools.md](references/identity-pools.md).

## Critical Warnings

**`update-user-pool-client` and `set-identity-pool-roles` are FULL REPLACE, not partial updates**: Any field you omit is reset to its default — calling `update-user-pool-client` with only the fields you want to change silently wipes `ExplicitAuthFlows`, token validity, `EnableTokenRevocation`, refresh-token rotation, and read/write attributes; `set-identity-pool-roles` likewise replaces the whole roles + `RoleMappings` structure. **Always read-modify-write**: `describe-user-pool-client` (or `get-identity-pool-roles`) first, then re-send every existing field plus your change. In an agent context the wipe is invisible — the call succeeds and only breaks later when a user hits the missing flow. See [managed-login-oauth.md](references/managed-login-oauth.md) and [identity-pools.md](references/identity-pools.md).

**Don't use the implicit grant for new apps**: The implicit grant (`response_type=token`) is legacy and returns tokens in the URL fragment. Use the **authorization code grant with PKCE** (`response_type=code` + `code_challenge`) for SPAs and mobile — public clients, no client secret. See [managed-login-oauth.md](references/managed-login-oauth.md).

**Don't store refresh tokens in localStorage for high-value apps**: `localStorage` is readable by any injected script (XSS). The Amplify client library defaults to `localStorage`; switch to `cookieStorage`, keep refresh-token lifetime short, and enable **refresh token rotation** + **token revocation** on the app client. See [tokens-and-sessions.md](references/tokens-and-sessions.md).

**Access-token claim customization needs a paid feature plan**: The pre token generation trigger customizes the **ID token** on the entry-level plan (V1), but customizing the **access token** (V2/V3) requires a **paid feature plan** — check the [Cognito feature plans documentation](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cognito/latest/developerguide/cognito-sign-in-feature-plans.html) for which plan currently includes this, as plan names and inclusions can change. Don't assume access-token claims work on the entry-level plan. See [lambda-triggers.md](references/lambda-triggers.md).

**App client secret + SPA = broken auth**: A public client (browser/mobile) must have **no client secret**. If a secret is set, token calls fail unless a `SECRET_HASH` is sent, which a browser cannot protect. Generate a secret only for confidential (server-side) clients.

**Don't bulk `admin-confirm-sign-up` UNCONFIRMED users**: When users are stuck `UNCONFIRMED`, prefer `resend-confirmation-code` so each user re-verifies via `confirm-sign-up` and proves email ownership (the code likely expired or went to spam). `admin-confirm-sign-up` flips the status instantly but confirms the account **without verifying the email** — the attribute stays unverified, which is dangerous when email drives password reset or account linking. Reserve it for trusted/migrated accounts. See [troubleshooting.md](references/troubleshooting.md).

## Quick Navigation

| You want to... | Go to |
|----------------|-------|
| Create a user pool, s

Excerpt, first 6,000 characters of SKILL.md, verbatim from the audited commit. It is text from someone else’s repository, quoted so you can judge it before your agent reads it.

Install

Pinned to the audited commit 25e39fe

git clone https://github.com/aws/agent-toolkit-for-aws
git -C agent-toolkit-for-aws checkout 25e39fea93f3

The author documents no install command, so this uses the repository directly. Our verdict covers commit 25e39fea93f3 only.

Works in

The author has not said which agents this skill supports, and we have not tested it in any.

Audit history

Every audit, every source change

  1. ✕BLOCK D 69 / 100

    first audit · source 25e39fea93f3

README badge

For maintainers · shows the latest audit

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Questions about aws-auth

What does the aws-auth skill do?
Official, AWS-supported MCP servers, skills, and plugins to help AI agents build on AWS
Is aws-auth safe to install?
No — not without reading the findings first. The audit graded it D (69/100) and found 1 critical or high issue in the source. Each one is listed on this page with the file and line it is on.
What can aws-auth access on my machine?
The audit observed no filesystem, network or shell use at all in its source.
How current is this page?
The grade is for one exact copy of the source (25e39fea93f3), read on 2026-11-13. The repository is watched, and a new audit runs when it changes — this is the first audit.

Sources

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