Agent skill · Audited from source
aws-auth
skill · aws/agent-toolkit-for-awsApache-2.0 licenceAudited 13 Nov 2026 · source 25e39fea93f3
Is it safe? No — BLOCK, grade D (69/100). We read this skill's source at commit 25e39fea93f3 and found no filesystem, network or shell access and no hard-coded secrets. The audit raised 8 findings, 1 critical or high. What it does: Adds user authentication to web and mobile apps with Amazon Cognito (user pools and identity pools) and the AWS Amplify client auth libraries. Covers sign-up/sign-in flows and the login page (Cognito-hosted UI / managed…
Cite
Cite this page
ModelsAtlas. “aws-auth (aws/agent-toolkit-for-aws)”. Retrieved 13 Nov 2026. https://modelsatlas.com/skills/aws/aws-auth
Blocked. The page stays public so you can check this skill if someone recommended it to you. The audit found 1 critical or high finding, starting with “Prompt injection” in SKILL.md:93. Do not install it without reading them.
Trust audit
Audit 0.4.1 · source read 13 Nov 2026
BLOCK means the audit found something that could harm you or your machine. Grade D is shared by 749 of 18,389 audited skills.
What the source does
- FilesystemNone observedNo reads or writes in the source
- NetworkNone observedNo outbound calls in the source
- ShellNone observedNo commands run in the source
- DependenciesPinnedNothing floats
- SecretsNone foundNo keys in source
Five audit layers
| Layer | What we check | Result | Findings |
|---|---|---|---|
L0 Provenance | Repo owner, licence, archive status, activity | PASS | 0 |
L1 Static source | Secrets, path traversal, supply chain, hidden code | NA | 1 |
L2 Instructions | Prompt injection, authority framing, hidden directives | FAIL | 7 |
L3 Inventory | The files and declarations match the source | PASS | 0 |
L4 Sandbox | Run in isolation and watch behaviour | SKIPPED why | 0 |
Gates applied: critical finding, no behavioural pass, undeclared transfer.
Findings (8)
CRITICALPrompt injectionprompt.transfer_instruction · SKILL.md:93
| Users get 401 from API Gateway with a valid token | Wrong token type or audience/issuer mismatch | HTTP JWT authorizer: issuer `https://cognito-idp.{region}.amazonaws.com/{userPoolId}`, audience = a- Why
- an instruction to move sensitive data to an outside destination
- Fix
- remove; a skill never needs the user's secrets off the machine
LOWNetwork egressnet.raw_ip · references/managed-login-oauth.md:280
`http://127.0.0.1`, and `http://[::1]` — for local dev; every other web URL must be HTTPS.
- Why
- No further detail recorded for this rule.
- Fix
- —
LOWPrompt injectionprompt.credential_read · references/identity-pools.md:6
token, or a social access token) for **temporary AWS credentials** from AWS STS. Use it only when
- Why
- asks the agent to read credentials
- Fix
- —
LOWPrompt injectionprompt.credential_read · references/identity-pools.md:103
| `Access denied` after getting credentials | Authenticated role policy too narrow, or trust policy wrong | Fix the role's permissions (see `aws-iam`); ensure the role trusts `cognito-identity.amazona
- Why
- asks the agent to read credentials
- Fix
- —
LOWPrompt injectionprompt.credential_read · references/troubleshooting.md:53
| `Access denied` after credentials returned | Authenticated role policy too narrow / trust policy wrong | Fix the role (see `aws-iam`); ensure it trusts `cognito-identity.amazonaws.com` for the pool
- Why
- asks the agent to read credentials
- Fix
- —
LOWPrompt injectionprompt.transfer_instruction · references/managed-login-oauth.md:166
curl -X POST https://<domain>/oauth2/token \
- Why
- an instruction to move sensitive data to an outside destination
- Fix
- remove; a skill never needs the user's secrets off the machine
LOWPrompt injectionprompt.transfer_instruction · references/tokens-and-sessions.md:12
| **ID token** | Identity claims (name, email, etc.) | Proving **who** the user is (identity) to your app; identity-based checks you run yourself. NOT the credential for scope-based API authorization
- Why
- an instruction to move sensitive data to an outside destination
- Fix
- remove; a skill never needs the user's secrets off the machine
LOWPrompt injectionprompt.transfer_instruction · references/troubleshooting.md:30
| API returns 401 with a "valid" token | Issuer/audience mismatch or wrong token type | Issuer `https://cognito-idp.<region>.amazonaws.com/<pool-id>`, audience = client id; send the expected token (se
- Why
- an instruction to move sensitive data to an outside destination
- Fix
- remove; a skill never needs the user's secrets off the machine
Audit 0.4.1 · source sha 25e39fea93f3 · 13 Nov 2026Report an issue or request a re-scan
Provenance
Who published it, and what the verdict is pinned to
- Publisheraws GitHub organizationOwner of the repository this skill is read from
- Source folderaws/agent-toolkit-for-aws/skills/core-skills/aws-authThe exact folder we audited
- LicenceApache-2.0As the repository states it
- Commit pinned for this verdict25e39fea93f3A new audit runs when the source changes
- Repository statusNot archivedPushed today
- Sandboxed runNot runSkills are read, not executed; layer L4 is skipped
What it tells the agent
Full source on GitHub ↗Its description: Adds user authentication to web and mobile apps with Amazon Cognito (user pools and identity pools) and the AWS Amplify client auth libraries. Covers sign-up/sign-in flows and the login page (Cognito-hosted UI / managed…
--- name: aws-auth description: > Adds user authentication to web and mobile apps with Amazon Cognito (user pools and identity pools) and the AWS Amplify client auth libraries. Covers sign-up/sign-in flows and the login page (Cognito-hosted UI / managed login), MFA, password policies, OAuth 2.0 / OIDC flows (auth-code + PKCE, client credentials), social/SAML federation, tokens (ID/access/refresh, rotation, revocation, storage), Cognito Lambda triggers, identity pools (temp AWS creds), and gating API Gateway (or ALB) routes to signed-in users via Cognito/JWT authorizers. Applies when adding a login or sign-up page, configuring a user pool or app client, choosing user pool vs identity pool, wiring social/SAML, refreshing tokens, requiring sign-in on an API Gateway or ALB, or debugging redirect_uri/token/MFA/CORS/federation errors. Does NOT cover Amplify Gen2 backend definitions (defineAuth, npx ampx → aws-amplify), IAM/STS/Identity Center (→ aws-iam), or API Gateway/Lambda resource config beyond the authorizer (→ aws-serverless). metadata: version: "1" --- # AWS Auth (Amazon Cognito) Application-level user authentication and authorization with Amazon Cognito and the Amplify client auth libraries. Verify specific limits, quotas, and exact API shapes against official AWS documentation when precision matters; trust the docs over memory when they conflict. **Recommended:** The AWS MCP server provides streamlined access to the AWS APIs used in this skill (Cognito user pool/app client/identity pool setup, API Gateway authorizers). If it is unavailable, the AWS CLI commands shown throughout work directly — the skill has no hard dependency on MCP. **When NOT to use:** Amplify Gen2 backend code (`defineAuth`, `amplify/auth.ts`, `npx ampx`); IAM policy/role/trust-policy authoring, STS, or IAM Identity Center console SSO; API Gateway route/integration setup or Lambda function implementation (this skill covers only the Cognito/JWT authorizer configuration and the purpose of Cognito Lambda triggers). ## User Pool vs Identity Pool — pick first These are different services that are frequently confused. Most apps need a **user pool**; add an **identity pool only if** the client must call AWS services directly. | You need... | Use | Why | |-------------|-----|-----| | Sign-up / sign-in, user directory, issue JWTs | **User pool** | It authenticates users and is an OIDC IdP | | The signed-in client to call S3/DynamoDB/etc. directly with AWS credentials | **Identity pool** | It exchanges a token for temporary AWS credentials via STS | | Both (sign in, then hit AWS resources from the browser/app) | User pool → identity pool | Identity pool trusts the user pool as its IdP | If your app only calls your own backend/API, you do **not** need an identity pool — send the user pool token to your API. See [identity-pools.md](references/identity-pools.md). ## Critical Warnings **`update-user-pool-client` and `set-identity-pool-roles` are FULL REPLACE, not partial updates**: Any field you omit is reset to its default — calling `update-user-pool-client` with only the fields you want to change silently wipes `ExplicitAuthFlows`, token validity, `EnableTokenRevocation`, refresh-token rotation, and read/write attributes; `set-identity-pool-roles` likewise replaces the whole roles + `RoleMappings` structure. **Always read-modify-write**: `describe-user-pool-client` (or `get-identity-pool-roles`) first, then re-send every existing field plus your change. In an agent context the wipe is invisible — the call succeeds and only breaks later when a user hits the missing flow. See [managed-login-oauth.md](references/managed-login-oauth.md) and [identity-pools.md](references/identity-pools.md). **Don't use the implicit grant for new apps**: The implicit grant (`response_type=token`) is legacy and returns tokens in the URL fragment. Use the **authorization code grant with PKCE** (`response_type=code` + `code_challenge`) for SPAs and mobile — public clients, no client secret. See [managed-login-oauth.md](references/managed-login-oauth.md). **Don't store refresh tokens in localStorage for high-value apps**: `localStorage` is readable by any injected script (XSS). The Amplify client library defaults to `localStorage`; switch to `cookieStorage`, keep refresh-token lifetime short, and enable **refresh token rotation** + **token revocation** on the app client. See [tokens-and-sessions.md](references/tokens-and-sessions.md). **Access-token claim customization needs a paid feature plan**: The pre token generation trigger customizes the **ID token** on the entry-level plan (V1), but customizing the **access token** (V2/V3) requires a **paid feature plan** — check the [Cognito feature plans documentation](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cognito/latest/developerguide/cognito-sign-in-feature-plans.html) for which plan currently includes this, as plan names and inclusions can change. Don't assume access-token claims work on the entry-level plan. See [lambda-triggers.md](references/lambda-triggers.md). **App client secret + SPA = broken auth**: A public client (browser/mobile) must have **no client secret**. If a secret is set, token calls fail unless a `SECRET_HASH` is sent, which a browser cannot protect. Generate a secret only for confidential (server-side) clients. **Don't bulk `admin-confirm-sign-up` UNCONFIRMED users**: When users are stuck `UNCONFIRMED`, prefer `resend-confirmation-code` so each user re-verifies via `confirm-sign-up` and proves email ownership (the code likely expired or went to spam). `admin-confirm-sign-up` flips the status instantly but confirms the account **without verifying the email** — the attribute stays unverified, which is dangerous when email drives password reset or account linking. Reserve it for trusted/migrated accounts. See [troubleshooting.md](references/troubleshooting.md). ## Quick Navigation | You want to... | Go to | |----------------|-------| | Create a user pool, s
Excerpt, first 6,000 characters of SKILL.md, verbatim from the audited commit. It is text from someone else’s repository, quoted so you can judge it before your agent reads it.
Install
Pinned to the audited commit 25e39fe
git clone https://github.com/aws/agent-toolkit-for-aws git -C agent-toolkit-for-aws checkout 25e39fea93f3
The author documents no install command, so this uses the repository directly. Our verdict covers commit 25e39fea93f3 only.
Works in
The author has not said which agents this skill supports, and we have not tested it in any.
Audit history
Every audit, every source change
- ✕BLOCK D 69 / 100
first audit · source
25e39fea93f3
README badge
For maintainers · shows the latest audit
[](https://modelsatlas.com/skills/aws/aws-auth/)
The badge shows our verdict and grade for this skill, and links back to this page. It changes when the audit does.
Similar skills
All devops & cloud skills →mattpocock/skills
A relentless interview to sharpen a plan or design.
affaan-m/everything-claude-code
Django testing strategies with pytest-django, TDD methodology, factory_boy, mocking, coverage, and testing Django REST Framework APIs. Use when writing Django or DRF tests with pytest-django, or driving a Django feature…
affaan-m/ECC
Docker and Docker Compose patterns for local development, container security, networking, volume strategies, and multi-service orchestration. Use when setting up containerized development environments or reviewing…
Add this badge to your README
[](https://modelsatlas.com/skills/aws/aws-auth/)
<a href="https://modelsatlas.com/skills/aws/aws-auth/"><img src="https://modelsatlas.com/skills/aws/aws-auth/badge.svg" alt="ModelsAtlas: BLOCK D"></a>
Questions about aws-auth
What does the aws-auth skill do?
Is aws-auth safe to install?
What can aws-auth access on my machine?
How current is this page?
Sources
- github.com/aws/agent-toolkit-for-aws/tree/main/skills/core-skill — the audited source at commit 25e39fea93f3 and every finding aboveObserved · 13 Nov 2026
Spotted something wrong? Report a correction · Methodology
Keep going in your AI
Opens with this page as the source. We add nothing else to the prompt.
- What does the aws-auth skill do?
- Is aws-auth safe to install?
- What can aws-auth access on my machine?