Atlas / Skills / antonbabenko / terraform-skill

terraform-skillSAFE

skills/antonbabenko/terraform-skill

Terraform & OpenTofu Skill for AI Agents - testing, modules, CI/CD, and production patterns

Verdict
SAFE
Grade
B
Trust score
89 /100
Version
1.17.1
Hosts
1 documented
License
NOASSERTION
Stars
2,409
01

Overview

Terraform & OpenTofu Skill for AI Agents - testing, modules, CI/CD, and production patterns

Read from source at commit 354db15c31b1OBSERVED · 2026-10-12
02

Host compatibility

What the documentation claims. We have not run a compatibility test.

HostStatusNotes
claude-codementioned
03

What it tells the agent

The instruction file, verbatim from the audited commit — this is the text the model reads, and the surface the audit's instruction layer examines. Quoted here so you can judge it without cloning anything.

---
name: terraform-skill
description: Use when writing, reviewing, or debugging Terraform/OpenTofu modules, tests, CI, scans, or state ops - diagnoses failure mode (identity churn, secrets, blast radius, CI drift, state corruption) with version-aware guards.
license: Apache-2.0
metadata:
  author: Anton Babenko
  version: 1.17.1
---

# Terraform Skill for Claude

Diagnose-first guidance for Terraform and OpenTofu. Core file is a workflow; depth lives in references loaded on demand.

## Response Contract

Every Terraform/OpenTofu response must include:

1. **Assumptions & version floor** — runtime (`terraform` or `tofu`), exact version, providers, state backend, execution path (local/CI/Cloud/Atlantis), environment criticality. State assumptions explicitly if the user did not provide them.
2. **Risk category addressed** — one or more of: identity churn, secret exposure, blast radius, CI drift, compliance gaps, state corruption, provider upgrade risk, testing blind spots.
3. **Chosen remediation & tradeoffs** — what was chosen, what was traded off, why.
4. **Validation plan** — exact commands (`fmt -check`, `validate`, `plan -out`, policy check) tailored to runtime and risk tier.
5. **Rollback notes** — for any destructive or state-mutating change: how to undo, what evidence to keep.

Never recommend direct production apply without a reviewed plan artifact and approval.

Never run `terraform destroy` (targeted or full) without first running `terraform plan -destroy` and showing the user every resource that will be deleted — including implicit dependents pulled in via locals or `for_each`. Get explicit confirmation before proceeding. Never use `-auto-approve` on destroy.

## Workflow

1. **Capture execution context** — runtime+version, provider(s), backend, execution path, environment criticality.
2. **Diagnose failure mode(s)** using the routing table below. If intent spans categories, load both references.
3. **Load only the matching reference file(s)** — do not preload depth the task does not need.
4. **Propose fix with risk controls** — why this addresses the mode, what could still go wrong, guardrails (tests/approvals/rollback).
5. **Generate artifacts** — HCL, migration blocks (`moved`, `import`), CI changes, policy rules.
6. **Validate before finalizing** — run validation commands tailored to risk tier.
7. **Emit the Response Contract** at the end.

## Diagnose Before You Generate

| Failure category | Symptoms | Primary references |
|------------------|----------|--------------------|
| **Identity churn** | Resource addresses shift after refactor, `count` index churn, missing `moved` blocks | [Code Patterns: count vs for_each](references/code-patterns.md#count-vs-for_each-deep-dive), [Code Patterns: moved blocks](references/code-patterns.md#moved-blocks-terraform-11), [Code Patterns: LLM mistakes](references/code-patterns.md#llm-mistake-checklist--code-patterns) |
| **Secret exposure** | Secrets in defaults, state, logs, CI artifacts | [Security & Compliance](references/security-compliance.md), [Code Patterns: write-only](references/code-patterns.md#write-only-arguments-terraform-111), [State Management](references/state-management.md) |
| **Blast radius** | Oversized stacks, shared prod/non-prod state, unsafe applies | [State Management](references/state-management.md), [Module Patterns](references/module-patterns.md) |
| **Destroy cascade** | Targeted destroy deletes more than expected; locals referencing a targeted resource make all `for_each` consumers implicit dependents | Response Contract: plan-destroy first; [State Management: Safe Destroy](references/state-management.md#safe-destroy-protocol) |
| **CI drift** | Local plan ≠ CI plan, apply without reviewed artifact, unpinned versions | [CI/CD Workflows](references/ci-cd-workflows.md), [Code Patterns: versions](references/code-patterns.md#version-management) |
| **Compliance gaps** | Missing policy stage, no approval model, no evidence retention | [Security & Compliance](references/security-compliance.md), [CI/CD Workflows](references/ci-cd-workflows.md) |
| **Testing blind spots** | Plan-only validation of computed values, set-type indexing, mock/real confusion | [Testing Frameworks](references/testing-frameworks.md) |
| **State corruption / recovery** | Stuck lock, backend migration, drift reconciliation | [State Management](references/state-management.md) |
| **Provider upgrade risk** | Breaking-change provider bump, unpinned modules | [Code Patterns: versions](references/code-patterns.md#version-management), [Module Patterns](references/module-patterns.md) |
| **Provider lifecycle** | Removing a provider with resources still in state, orphaned resources, `removed` block usage | [State Management: Provider Removal](references/state-management.md#provider-removal) |
| **Bootstrap / orchestration misuse** | `null_resource` + `local-exec` for bootstrap, `remote-exec` for setup scripts, provisioner stdout leaking secrets in CI logs | [Code Patterns: Provisioners as Last Resort](references/code-patterns.md#provisioners-as-last-resort) |
| **Navigation / safe-rename blind spots** | Cannot locate symbol defs/refs semantically, value-symbol rename done as blind text replace, grep-only refactor missing refs, hallucinated `rg` shim | [Code Intelligence](references/code-intelligence-lsp.md#terraform-ls-capability-matrix) |
| **Cross-cloud / provider mapping** | "What's the Azure/GCP equivalent of X", picking a backend/auth model per cloud | [State Management: Cross-cloud equivalents](references/state-management.md#cross-cloud-equivalents) |

## When to Use This Skill

**Activate when:** creating or reviewing Terraform/OpenTofu configurations or modules, setting up or debugging tests, structuring multi-environment deployments, implementing IaC CI/CD, choosing module patterns or state organization, configuring or migrating remote state backends.

**Don't use for:** basic HCL syntax questions Claude already knows, provider API referenc
04

Trust audit

SAFEgrade B · trust 89/100 Nothing in the source contradicts what it says it does. Grade A is reserved for packages that have also passed the behavioural sandbox.

LayerWhat it checksResult
L0Provenance & inventoryPASS
L1Static analysis of the codeNA
L2Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)PASS
L3Class-specific surfacePASS
L4Behavioural (sandbox)SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem
none-observed
Network
none-observed
Shell
none-observed
Dependencies
pinned
Secrets in source
none-found

Findings (2)

INFOPrompt injection · prompt.credential_read · CWE-94, CWE-1427
references/state-management.md:840
# Access password via Secrets Manager
Why it matters. asks the agent to read credentials
INFOSupply chain · prompt.pipe_to_shell · CWE-829, CWE-1357
references/security-compliance.md:43
curl -sfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/trivy/main/contrib/install.sh | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin

Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.

Audited 2026-10-12 · audit v0.4.1 · source sha 354db15c31b1full audit observations/trust-audit/skill/antonbabenko__terraform-skill.json · Report an issue / request a re-scan
05

Audit history

Every audit this skill has had.

DateSourceVerdictGradeScoreChange
2026-10-12354db15c31b1SAFEB89first audit
06

Questions

What does the terraform-skill skill do?

Terraform & OpenTofu Skill for AI Agents - testing, modules, CI/CD, and production patterns

Is terraform-skill safe to install?

The audit found nothing in the source that contradicts what it says it does, and graded it B (89/100). Grade A is held back for packages that have also passed a sandboxed behavioural run, which is why a clean skill reads B.

What can terraform-skill access on my machine?

The audit observed no filesystem, network or shell use at all in its source.

Which assistants does terraform-skill work with?

Its documentation mentions claude-code. That is what the text claims, not a compatibility test we ran.

How current is this page?

The grade is for one exact copy of the source (354db15c31b1), read on 2026-10-12. The repository is watched, and a new audit runs when it changes — this is the first audit.

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