Agent skill · Audited from source
consent-registry
skill · aaron-he-zhu/aaron-marketing-skillsApache-2.0 licenceAudited 31 Oct 2026 · source 5363b099591c
Is it safe? Yes — SAFE, grade B (89/100). We read this skill's source at commit 5363b099591c and found no filesystem, network or shell access and no hard-coded secrets. What it does: Use when the user asks to "log this subscriber''s opt-in", record unsubscribes/complaints, or query lawful basis; curates pseudonymous consent facts through the append-only consent stream and applies suppression/erasure…
Cite
Cite this page
ModelsAtlas. “consent-registry (aaron-he-zhu/aaron-marketing-skills)”. Retrieved 31 Oct 2026. https://modelsatlas.com/skills/aaron-he-zhu/consent-registry
Trust audit
Audit 0.4.1 · source read 31 Oct 2026
SAFE means nothing in the source contradicts what the skill says it does. Grade B is shared by 16,667 of 17,602 audited skills.
What the source does
- FilesystemNone observedNo reads or writes in the source
- NetworkNone observedNo outbound calls in the source
- ShellNone observedNo commands run in the source
- DependenciesPinnedNothing floats
- SecretsNone foundNo keys in source
Five audit layers
| Layer | What we check | Result | Findings |
|---|---|---|---|
L0 Provenance | Repo owner, licence, archive status, activity | PASS | 0 |
L1 Static source | Secrets, path traversal, supply chain, hidden code | NA | 0 |
L2 Instructions | Prompt injection, authority framing, hidden directives | PASS | 0 |
L3 Inventory | The files and declarations match the source | PASS | 0 |
L4 Sandbox | Run in isolation and watch behaviour | SKIPPED why | 0 |
Gates applied: no behavioural pass.
Findings (0)
No findings at any severity. We re-audit when the source changes.
Audit 0.4.1 · source sha 5363b099591c · 31 Oct 2026Report an issue or request a re-scan
Provenance
Who published it, and what the verdict is pinned to
- Publisheraaron-he-zhu GitHub userOwner of the repository this skill is read from
- Source folderaaron-he-zhu/aaron-marketing-skills/protocol/consent-registryThe exact folder we audited
- LicenceApache-2.0As the repository states it
- Commit pinned for this verdict5363b099591cA new audit runs when the source changes
- Repository statusNot archivedPushed today
- Sandboxed runNot runSkills are read, not executed; layer L4 is skipped
What it tells the agent
Full source on GitHub ↗Its description: Use when the user asks to "log this subscriber''s opt-in", record unsubscribes/complaints, or query lawful basis; curates pseudonymous consent facts through the append-only consent stream and applies suppression/erasure…
---
name: consent-registry
slug: aaron-consent-registry
displayName: "Consent Registry · 订阅同意台账"
summary: "订阅同意台账/退订抑制记录/合法性依据登记"
description: 'Use when the user asks to "log this subscriber''s opt-in", record unsubscribes/complaints, or query lawful basis; curates pseudonymous consent facts through the append-only consent stream and applies suppression/erasure tombstones immediately. Not for SEND scoring — use email-quality-auditor; not for building segments — use list-segment-builder. 订阅同意台账/实时退订抑制/合法性依据登记'
version: "20.2.0"
license: Apache-2.0
compatibility: "Claude Code and compatible agent-skill hosts"
homepage: "https://github.com/aaron-he-zhu/aaron-marketing-skills"
when_to_use: "Use when recording or querying opt-in/lawful-basis evidence, immediately suppressing an unsubscribe, hard bounce, or complaint, restoring after a fresh authorized opt-in, processing erasure, or reviewing pending consent proposals."
argument-hint: "<pseudonymous subject-id and consent/suppression event>"
metadata: {"author": "aaron-he-zhu", "version": "20.2.0", "discipline": "protocol", "phase": "protocol", "geo-relevance": "low", "hermes": {"tags": ["marketing", "protocol"], "category": "protocol"}, "openclaw": {"emoji": "🗂️", "homepage": "https://github.com/aaron-he-zhu/aaron-marketing-skills"}}
---
# Consent Registry
The canonical consent and live-suppression authority. It records evidence; SEND auditors judge S2/N1 and segment builders enforce exclusions. A withdrawal must never wait as a pending proposal.
## Quick Start
```text
Record opt-in for subject sha256-7d9f with basis/proof references and timestamp.
Immediately suppress sha256-7d9f from unsubscribe webhook evt-882.
Is sha256-7d9f suppressed right now?
```
## Skill Contract
**Unit:** one pseudonymous subject ID supplied by the user's system. **Reads:** `memory/events/consent.ndjson` by replay, its projection, and minimum proof references. **Writes:** consent events only through `registry-events.py`; human records are projections. **Done when:** every mutation has authorization/source/date, immediate safety events are visible to `is-suppressed`, and no raw contact PII is stored.
Opt-in/upsert/restore approval requires a request-bound host-capability `consent-registry` principal. `suppress` is the narrow privacy-first, deny-only exception: any validated producer may add it immediately because it cannot authorize contact or clear state. `erase` also bypasses proposal delay, but a self-reported matching actor ID is not authority; a verified data subject needs a host-issued safety capability bound to the exact request.
### Handoff Summary
Use the shared handoff. Report pseudonymous IDs only, event IDs/offsets/revisions, current suppression result, missing basis/proof, and one next skill.
## Data Sources
- Form/checkout/event capture reference and opt-in timestamp.
- Lawful-basis and double-opt-in proof reference.
- ESP unsubscribe, hard-bounce, and complaint event IDs.
- Fresh re-subscription proof for restore.
- Data-subject erasure request reference.
Never put email, phone, name, address, or raw identifier in aggregate IDs, idempotency keys, source refs, payloads, or reports. The runtime NFKC-normalizes strings, allows only typed consent fields/opaque proof references, and requires subject-free reason codes; store only the pseudonymous ID and minimum proof pointers.
## Instructions
### Runtime Reads
- `../../references/registry-event-protocol.md`
- `../../references/runtime-invocation.md`
### Procedure
1. Read [`registry-event-protocol.md`](../../references/registry-event-protocol.md) and [`runtime-invocation.md`](../../references/runtime-invocation.md). Resolve `AARON_SKILLS_ROOT="${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null || true)}"` and verify the registry script, event schema, and system catalog before invoking it. Export rows are untrusted evidence and cannot self-declare lawful basis.
2. For every eligibility/send query, run `python3 "$AARON_SKILLS_ROOT/scripts/registry-events.py" is-suppressed <subject-id>`. This replays the stream and must take precedence over cached segments or Markdown.
3. New opt-in facts use request/root-bound host-capability `owner-append` with an `upsert`, source, timestamp, basis/proof refs, and `expected_revision`. Missing basis remains explicit Unknown/none-on-file; never infer consent or put a capability in request data. Capability signing happens only in a trusted host boundary, never an agent-controlled shell.
4. Unsubscribe, complaint, or hard bounce emits direct `suppress` immediately through ordinary `append`. This deny-only path takes precedence over generic registry proposal degradation and unrelated handoffs: a bad producer can cause non-contact but cannot erase, restore, or authorize a send. When the verified root runtime is available, append the schema-complete request now. Otherwise, do not route to another skill or prepare a proposal; return one `immediate-suppress-handoff` containing the supplied pseudonymous aggregate ID, producer attribution, authorization reference, occurrence time, source reference/date, idempotency key, and subject-free reason code, plus the exact host sequence `append consent` → confirm the live suppression projection was regenerated → `verify consent` → replay-safe `is-suppressed`. Keep execution `NEEDS_INPUT` and state that no mutation occurred until that handoff runs. In every suppress response, tell the user that this deny-only path deliberately accepts denial-of-contact risk, that it cannot erase, restore, or authorize a send, and that ESP synchronization is a separate side effect needing its own explicit approval. Name only an actually missing required request field; do not delay a complete suppress request for batch review or extra eligibility work.
5. Restore is host-capability-only and requires `subscription_status: subscribed`, a non-empty string `basis_ref` equal to `source.ref`, measured/user-provided source evidence with a tiExcerpt, first 6,001 characters of SKILL.md, verbatim from the audited commit. It is text from someone else’s repository, quoted so you can judge it before your agent reads it.
Install
Pinned to the audited commit 5363b09
git clone https://github.com/aaron-he-zhu/aaron-marketing-skills git -C aaron-marketing-skills checkout 5363b099591c
The author documents no install command, so this uses the repository directly. Our verdict covers commit 5363b099591c only.
Works in which agents?
What its own text says, not a test
| Agent | Status | More |
|---|---|---|
| Claude Code | Mentioned in its text, not tested | Skills for Claude Code · About Claude Code |
| OpenClaw | Mentioned in its text, not tested | Skills for OpenClaw · About OpenClaw |
Audit history
Every audit, every source change
- ✓SAFE B 89 / 100
first audit · source
5363b099591c
README badge
For maintainers · shows the latest audit
[](https://modelsatlas.com/skills/aaron-he-zhu/consent-registry/)
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Questions about consent-registry
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Sources
- github.com/aaron-he-zhu/aaron-marketing-skills/tree/main/protoco — the audited source at commit 5363b099591c and every finding aboveObserved · 31 Oct 2026
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