Atlas / MCP servers / skwallace36 / Pepper

PepperBLOCK

mcp/skwallace36/pepper

iOS dynamic library MCP for agents

Verdict
BLOCK
Grade
F
Trust score
52 /100
Exposed tools
4 4r · 0w · 0d
Transport
stdio
License
MIT
Stars
105
01

Overview

From the repository's own README, as read at the audited commit. Badges and raw HTML are left out.

Pepper gives AI agents eyes and hands inside iOS Simulator apps.

It injects a shared library into any running simulator app — no source changes, no SDK, no build step. Your agent sees the screen as structured data, taps buttons, inspects live objects, intercepts network calls, reads the heap, and debugs layout issues. Dylib injection requires the simulator; device support uses a different mechanism.

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/42ab3f1b-21f8-48e6-820f-7ca4012fb03b

Claude navigating and inspecting [Ice Cubes](https://github.com/Dimillian/IceCubesApp) (Mastodon client) with zero source access.

Works with Claude Code · Cursor · Claude Desktop · any MCP client

Quickstart

Requires macOS 14+, Python 3.10+, and an iOS Simulator runtime.

pip install pepper-ios
pepper-ctl deploy            # inject into the frontmost simulator app
pepper-ctl look              # see what's on screen

Then ask your agent:

"Tap through the onboarding flow and make sure every screen looks right"

That's it. The agent uses Pepper's MCP tools to see, tap, and inspect — no extra config needed.

Other MCP clients (Cursor, Claude Desktop, etc.)

{
"mcpServers": {
"pepper": {
"command": "pepper-mcp"
}
}
}

Homebrew

brew install --HEAD skwallace36/pepper/pepper

Tap: `skwallace36/homebrew-pepper`

What It Does

$ pepper-ctl look
Screen: navigation_stack  (9 interactive, 4 text)

seg  "Trending"                       → tap text:"Trending"
btn  "Sheryl Weikal, Right wing tech bros: we love St..."
→ tap text:"Sheryl Weikal, Right wing tech bros: we ..."
seg  "Settings"                       → tap text:"Settings"

$ pepper-ctl tap --text "Settings"
Action: Tapped Settings
Scree
Read from source at commit 85ea78e915deOBSERVED · 2026-10-07
02

Connect

Built from this server's own package name, version and transport as found in its source — not copied from anyone's documentation, so it cannot drift against a page we do not control.

claude-code
claude mcp add pepper-ios -- uvx pepper-ios
claude-desktop
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "pepper-ios": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": [
        "pepper-ios"
      ]
    }
  }
}
03

Exposed tools (4)

4 read · 0 write · 0 destructive.

ToolRiskDescription
nav_backreadGo back one screen in a navigation stack. For modals/sheets use dismiss; for jumping to a screen use navigate.
nav_dismissreadClose a modal, sheet, popover, or overlay. For navigation stack screens use back; for system dialogs use dialog.
nav_keyboardreadDismiss the on-screen keyboard. Call after input_text when you need to tap elements the keyboard covers.
nav_screenreadIdentify which screen is currently displayed. Returns screen name and view controller class — no element data.
04

Trust audit

BLOCKgrade F · trust 52/100 Do not install this without reading the findings. The audit found something that could harm you or your machine.

LayerWhat it checksResult
L0Provenance & inventoryPASS
L1Static analysis of the codeFAIL
L2Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)PASS
L3Class-specific surfacePASS
L4Behavioural (sandbox)SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem
UNDECLARED (10 observation(s))
Network
declared (7 observation(s))
Shell
declared (1 observation(s))
Dependencies
not all pinned
Secrets in source
none-found

Findings (25)

HIGHCode injection · code.eval_exec · CWE-78, CWE-94, CWE-95
Makefile:103
@# Inject via SIMCTL_CHILD_ at exec() time instead (see simctl launch call below).
Why it matters. evaluates text as code
Fix. remove; use a parser or a dispatch table
MEDIUMFilesystem / path · fs.destructive · CWE-22, CWE-59
pepper_ios/mcp_build.py:101
os.remove(port_file)
MEDIUMFilesystem / path · fs.destructive · CWE-22, CWE-59
pepper_ios/mcp_build.py:249
shutil.rmtree(dst)
MEDIUMFilesystem / path · fs.destructive · CWE-22, CWE-59
pepper_ios/mcp_scripts.py:154
os.remove(path)
MEDIUMFilesystem / path · fs.destructive · CWE-22, CWE-59
pepper_ios/pepper_common.py:284
os.remove(path)
MEDIUMFilesystem / path · fs.destructive · CWE-22, CWE-59
pepper_ios/pepper_common.py:312
os.remove(port_path)
MEDIUMPrivilege escalation / persistence · fs.persistence · CWE-269, CWE-250
Makefile:102
@# DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES is a restricted var — launchctl setenv silently drops it.
MEDIUMPrivilege escalation / persistence · fs.persistence · CWE-269, CWE-250
Makefile:104
@# Non-DYLD_ vars work fine via launchctl setenv.
MEDIUMPrivilege escalation / persistence · fs.persistence · CWE-269, CWE-250
Makefile:105
@xcrun simctl spawn "$(SIMULATOR_ID)" launchctl setenv PEPPER_PORT "$(PORT)"
MEDIUMPrivilege escalation / persistence · fs.persistence · CWE-269, CWE-250
Makefile:106
@xcrun simctl spawn "$(SIMULATOR_ID)" launchctl setenv PEPPER_SIM_UDID "$(SIMULATOR_ID)"
MEDIUMPrivilege escalation / persistence · fs.persistence · CWE-269, CWE-250
Makefile:107
@xcrun simctl spawn "$(SIMULATOR_ID)" launchctl setenv PEPPER_ADAPTER "$(ADAPTER_TYPE)"
LOWInventory / provenance · inv.hidden_file · CWE-1104
.swift-format
.swift-format
Why it matters. hidden member outside the usual dotfiles
Fix. review its purpose
LOWInventory / provenance · inv.hidden_file · CWE-1104
.swiftlint.yml
.swiftlint.yml
Why it matters. hidden member outside the usual dotfiles
Fix. review its purpose
LOWInventory / provenance · inv.symlink · CWE-1104
tests/unit/Sources/PepperCore/PepperCommand.swift
tests/unit/Sources/PepperCore/PepperCommand.swift
Why it matters. link not followed
LOWInsecure crypto · crypto.weak_hash · CWE-327, CWE-338
Makefile:17
PORT          ?= $(shell echo "$(SIMULATOR_ID)" | python3 -c "import sys,hashlib; uid=sys.stdin.read().strip(); print(8770 + int(hashlib.md5(uid.encode()).hexdigest()[:4],16) % 100 if uid else 8765)"
LOWInsecure crypto · crypto.weak_hash · CWE-327, CWE-338
pepper_ios/mcp_eval_compiler.py:241
code_hash = hashlib.md5(source.encode()).hexdigest()[:8]
LOWInsecure crypto · crypto.weak_hash · CWE-327, CWE-338
pepper_ios/mcp_tools_nav.py:176
text_hash = hashlib.md5(text.encode()).hexdigest()
LOWInsecure crypto · crypto.weak_hash · CWE-327, CWE-338
pepper_ios/test_lifecycle.py:46
h = int(hashlib.md5(udid.encode()).hexdigest()[:4], 16)
LOWInsecure crypto · crypto.weak_hash · CWE-327, CWE-338
scripts/demo.sh:64
print(8770 + int(hashlib.md5(uid.encode()).hexdigest()[:4], 16) % 100 if uid else 8765)
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
Makefile:308
@ln -sf ../../scripts/hooks/post-merge-trigger.sh .git/hooks/post-merge
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
Makefile:309
@ln -sf ../../scripts/hooks/pre-push-rebase.sh .git/hooks/pre-push
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
Makefile:310
@ln -sf ../../scripts/hooks/post-checkout-guard.sh .git/hooks/post-checkout
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
scripts/setup.sh:147
SCRIPT_PATH="../../scripts/pre-commit"
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
scripts/setup.sh:159
PUSH_SCRIPT_PATH="../../scripts/hooks/pre-push-rebase.sh"
LOWObfuscation / stealth · obf.decode_call · CWE-506, CWE-94
pepper_ios/mcp_tools_nav.py:188
f.write(base64.b64decode(screenshot_b64))

Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.

Audited 2026-10-07 · audit v0.4.1 · source sha 85ea78e915defull audit observations/trust-audit/mcp-server/skwallace36__pepper.json · Report an issue / request a re-scan
05

Audit history

Every audit this server has had. A grade with a past is a grade somebody is still checking.

DateSourceVerdictGradeScoreChange
2026-10-0785ea78e915deBLOCKF52first audit
06

Questions

What is the Pepper MCP server?

iOS dynamic library MCP for agents

What tools does Pepper expose?

4 in total: 4 read-only, 0 that write, and 0 that can delete or overwrite. Every one is listed on this page with its risk.

Is Pepper safe to connect to an agent?

No — not without reading the findings first. The audit graded it F (52/100) and found 1 critical or high issue in the source. Each one is listed on this page with the file and line it is on.

What credentials does Pepper need?

No credential environment variables were found in its source, so it appears to need none.

How does Pepper run?

It speaks stdio, so it runs as a local process your client starts. It is published on PyPI as pepper-ios.

How current is this page?

The grade is for one exact copy of the source (85ea78e915de), read on 2026-10-07. The repository is watched and re-audited when it changes.

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