Atlas / MCP servers / respawn-app / Tool Filter

Tool FilterSAFE

mcp/respawn-app/tool-filter

MCP proxy server that filters tools from upstream MCP servers via regex-based deny list

Verdict
SAFE
Grade
B
Trust score
89 /100
Exposed tools
23 19r · 3w · 1d
Transport
sse · stdio · streamable-http
License
MIT
Stars
36
01

Overview

From the repository's own README, as read at the audited commit. Badges and raw HTML are left out.

[](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@respawn-app/tool-filter-mcp)

MCP proxy server that filters tools from upstream MCP servers via regex-based deny list.

Maintained: ✅ Yes (Spring/summer 26)

Why use this?

For effective context engineering, we want to minimize useless tokens. Most major agents right now (e.g. Claude Code) do NOT remove tool descriptions from the context. Even though the tool is completely denied and unused, the model will still get its entire description and still try to call the tool (and get error messages). For big MCPs, such as github, supabase, jetbrains IDE, atlassian, this is catastrophic to the context and leads to context pollution by 40-60k of useless tokens. You wanted your agent to be able to see jira ticket descriptions? Please also have these 44 useless tools to edit assignees on confluence pages.

This MCP completely solves the issue without introducing any overhead. Contributions welcome!

Installation

# For HTTP/SSE MCP servers
npx @respawn-app/tool-filter-mcp --upstream  --deny 

# For stdio MCP servers
npx @respawn-app/tool-filter-mcp --upstream-stdio --deny  --  [args...]

Usage

Basic Example (HTTP/SSE)

Filter tools matching .*_file$ pattern from an HTTP MCP server:

npx @respawn-app/tool-filter-mcp \
--upstream http://localhost:3000/sse \
--deny ".*_file$"

Basic Example (stdio)

Filter tools from a local stdio MCP server:

npx @respawn-app/tool-filter-mcp \
--upstream-stdio \
--deny "dangerous_.*" \
-- npx my-mcp-server

With Environment Variables (stdio)

Pass environment variables to the upstream stdio server:

npx @respawn-app/tool-filter-mcp \
--upstream-stdio \
--env "API_KEY=secret123" \
--env "DEBUG=true" \
--deny "admin_.*" \
-- npx m
Read from source at commit 6d6c4b552f5bOBSERVED · 2026-10-08
02

Connect

Built from this server's own package name, version and transport as found in its source — not copied from anyone's documentation, so it cannot drift against a page we do not control. Replace the environment placeholders with a token scoped to the least it needs.

claude-code (npm)
claude mcp add tool-filter-mcp -- npx -y @respawn-app/[email protected]
03

Exposed tools (23)

19 read · 3 write · 1 destructive. Blast radius: 1 tool can delete or overwrite — an agent that can be talked into calling a tool can be talked into calling this one.

ToolRiskDescription
another_long_namereadTest
delete_filedestructiveDelete file
get_envreadGet environment variable value
list_dirreadList contents of a directory
list_directoryreadList directory
long_descreadA
multilinereadFirst line\nSecond line\nThird line
query_databasewriteExecute a database query
read_filereadRead contents of a file
shortreadShort name
test_toolreadTest tool
toolreadThis is a very long description that goes on and on and on and contains a lot of text that might wrap in a terminal window
tool-with-dashesreadTest
tool.with.dotsreadTest
tool1read
tool_areadTool A
tool_breadTool B
tool_creadTool C
tool_with_underscoresreadTest
update_databasewriteUpdate database records
very_long_tool_namereadLong name
very_long_tool_name_herereadTest
write_filewriteWrite contents to a file
04

Trust audit

SAFEgrade B · trust 89/100 Nothing in the source contradicts what it says it does. Grade A is reserved for packages that have also passed the behavioural sandbox.

LayerWhat it checksResult
L0Provenance & inventoryPASS
L1Static analysis of the codePASS
L2Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)PASS
L3Class-specific surfaceWARN
L4Behavioural (sandbox)SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem
declared (2 observation(s))
Network
none-observed
Shell
none-observed
Dependencies
not all pinned
Secrets in source
none-found

Findings (7)

MEDIUMFilesystem / path · mcp.destructive_tools · CWE-22, CWE-59
delete_file
Why it matters. 1 tool(s) can delete or overwrite
Fix. prefer a read-only mode or scoped tokens; the page states the blast radius
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
.specify/scripts/bash/common.sh:11
(cd "$script_dir/../../.." && pwd)
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
tests/fixtures/mock-mcp-server.ts:1
import { FilteredTool } from '../../src/types.js';
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
tests/fixtures/sample-tools.ts:1
import { FilteredTool } from '../../src/types.js';
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
tests/integration/cli-tool-listing.test.ts:14
const { parseCLIArgs } = await import('../../src/cli-args.js');
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
tests/integration/cli-tool-listing.test.ts:28
const { parseCLIArgs } = await import('../../src/cli-args.js');
LOWSupply chain · supply.unpinned · CWE-829, CWE-1357
package.json
@modelcontextprotocol/sdk, safe-regex2, @types/express, @types/node, @typescript-eslint/eslint-plugin, @typescript-eslint/parser, eslint, prettier
Why it matters. 10 dependency range(s) float
Fix. pin exact versions or ship a lockfile

Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.

Audited 2026-10-08 · audit v0.4.1 · source sha 6d6c4b552f5bfull audit observations/trust-audit/mcp-server/respawn-app__tool-filter.json · Report an issue / request a re-scan
05

Audit history

Every audit this server has had. A grade with a past is a grade somebody is still checking.

DateSourceVerdictGradeScoreChange
2026-10-086d6c4b552f5bSAFEB89first audit
06

Questions

What is the Tool Filter MCP server?

MCP proxy server that filters tools from upstream MCP servers via regex-based deny list

What tools does Tool Filter expose?

23 in total: 19 read-only, 3 that write, and 1 that can delete or overwrite (delete_file). Every one is listed on this page with its risk.

Is Tool Filter safe to connect to an agent?

The audit found nothing in the source that contradicts what it says it does, and graded it B (89/100). Grade A is held back for packages that have also passed a sandboxed behavioural run, which is why a clean server reads B. Separately from the audit: 1 of its tools can destroy data, so scope the token you give it to what you actually need.

What credentials does Tool Filter need?

It reads API_TOKEN, TEST_TOKEN and TOKEN from the environment. Give it a token scoped to the least it needs — an agent that can be talked into calling a tool can be talked into calling it with your credentials.

How does Tool Filter run?

It speaks sse, stdio and streamable-http, so it runs as a local process your client starts. It is published on npm as @respawn-app/tool-filter-mcp at 0.4.3.

How current is this page?

The grade is for one exact copy of the source (6d6c4b552f5b), read on 2026-10-08. The repository is watched and re-audited when it changes.

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